Interview with Ambassador Maynard Wayne Glitman

Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR MAYNARD WAYNE GLITMAN

Interviewed by: James S. Pacy

Initial interview date: April 24, 2001

Q: This is James S. Pacy, known as Jim Pacy, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Vermont in Burlington, interviewing Ambassador Maynard Wayne Glitman. We are going to begin by asking Ambassador Glitman about his family, where and when he was born, his education, and so on.

GLITMAN: I was born in Chicago, Illinois on December 8, 1933. I have a mother and a father, and a brother and sister (twins). As for something about our home life and family interests, I guess they were normal American interests. My parents did have a strong interest in music and that brought me into contact with classical music fairly early in my life, and it still continues to be a great joy. I had the usual sports activities; I liked ball games, particularly football and baseball with my Dad. The Cubs didn't do any better then than they are doing now. But we still cheered them on. The Bears were pretty good though. I attended public schools in the city of Chicago, Budlong and Hibbard elementary schools and Von Steuben high school. I was on the soccer team, but we didn't have a football team; otherwise, I would have played football. I had a lot of good close friends, mostly involved in outdoor activities, such as hiking, into forest preserves. I developed a great interest for the outdoors early in life. We began skiing when I was quite young, and it was not yet the popular thing to do. My friends and I would often go out after there was

a little bit of snowfall; we'd go out, even at night, to the golf courses and do cross country skiing. Eventually we'd go up to Wisconsin and ski a little bit there, but this was in the very early days of skiing. Bindings that we started out with were rubber bands of some sorts around old Swedish skies, and galoshes were all the ski shoes we had, but with that outfit we still managed to go down hill and take little jumps, with no injuries ever. That also continues to be a great pleasure of mine, the skiing.

Q: Let's look at your collegiate education. Why the University of Illinois?

GLITMAN: It had a good reputation for one thing but, of some importance, it was affordable, and I was able to work while I was attending at least while I was in Chicago. I should point out that I began at the University of Illinois Chicago at Navy Pier and then transferred downstate to the Champaign-Urbana campus for junior and senior year. But as long as I was at Navy Pier, I stayed at home. I always had some sort of a job, working in a drugstore, supermarkets, that sort of thing. I also worked during the summers, and then I tried to find some job outdoors. Finally I ran into a person who suggested I try getting a job with the Forest Service. He gave me the name of someone who could help me with that, who knew about that, and I did try to get a job smoke jumping in Montana. They didn't have any openings for that, but they did offer me a job on a project in Colorado dealing with exterminating spruce beetles. I don't know what chemicals I took in at that point, but fortunately I didn't enjoy the spraying and was much happier just carrying the cans of the stuff up the mountainsides. Hopefully I didn't get too much of it in me. I very much enjoyed working with the Forest Service. I was there for two years, the first summer was devoted to this beetle eradication project working out of Eagle, Colorado, and second summer I worked with a trail crew out of Aspen, Colorado. Aspen was still a partial ghost town in those days. Very small population, the ski area had just opened and there was the summer music festival. But that was a very enjoyable job, both of them were. In any case, that's why the University of Illinois.

Q: You received your Bachelor's from Illinois in 1955, you graduated with highest honors and you made Phi Beta Kappa, and I can't help but ask were there any professors at Illinois who were influential regarding your Foreign Service career?

GLITMAN: Well, two were particularly helpful, just in general. One was Alden Cutshall at the University of Illinois in Chicago. He taught geography and geology. The other was Dr. Shirley Bill, also at University of Illinois in Chicago. She taught political science. Both of them really inspired me to work hard. I can't explain precisely how that happened, but I guess they both showed me a lot of encouragement, and I could see they had faith in me. They thought I could continue to do well and do even better, so they were inspiring in that regard. I appreciated both of them very much. They are both gone now, sorry to say.

Q: Now, the Masters degree you got in 1956 from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy? Again, are there any influential profs, secondly on classmates who served in U.S. Foreign Service with you, and you did mention some former classmates from Fletcher that you came across in your diplomatic career. Let us hear a little bit about your Fletcher experience?

GLITMAN: I had heard about the Foreign Service while I was at Illinois. There was a recruiter who came through, and I went with other people to meet with him. That really got me interested in the Foreign Service. So when the time came for graduate school, Fletcher obviously was my premier choice because it was dealing with the issues that I was interested in, foreign policy across the board. I had a very good year at Fletcher; you could get a Masters in one year at that time. I also took one class at Harvard, in geopolitics, with Professor Derwent Whittlesey, the American geopolitician. That also helped give me a view of international affairs, which I think helps, because you get a sense of where our country fits in the world, and of how the world looks to someone depending on where you happen to be. I actually began to use that sort of line of argument with my Soviet colleague when we were negotiating and trying to get them put the other guy's shoe on to see the world from something other than Moscow perspective. It didn't work

in many cases but I hope I got through to them a little bit with that approach. Anyway, that was the additional class that I had while I was at Fletcher. As for Fletcher colleagues who went on to Foreign Service, there were several from my class: Tom Boyatt and Herb Levin in particular. I continue to see them. And of course, among the Pakistanis who were at Fletcher, there was my roommate, Ataul Karim, who now is the Bangladeshi Ambassador in Washington, as well as Rafi Ahmad and Mansur Ahmed, both of whom stayed with the Pakistan Foreign Service. Rafi went to the UN and worked as one of the Under Secretaries there. I ran into these fellows throughout my career. We had postings together or would be at conferences together. I enjoyed very much the relationship that I had with them.

Q: You also did some additional postgraduate studies in Atlantic affairs at the University of California at Berkeley in 1965/66. You had entered the Foreign Service in 1956 and these additional postgraduate studies came up later in your career. Then you served in the Army and I thought you could put this together better in an explanatory style than I can. You were in the Army while in the Foreign Service, so to speak. Could you tell us about this Army duty of yours?

GLITMAN: Right. What happened as you can see took place not too long after I joined the Foreign Service and, I might add, not too long after we got married. We haven't mentioned my wife Christine Amundson (maiden name). We were married in December 1956, and by May 1957 I was in the Army. I did not volunteer for the Army per se, but I had the choice of being drafted or joining a reserve program. The reserve program involved a short time of active duty and a life-time of reserves. I was right off to Fort Knox for my basic training. I complained all the way; I wrote letters home to my bride, who at that point was pregnant, alone, and quite young. We both were, and separation at that point was tough for both of us. While I complained about the Army, mainly I was mostly unhappy about being separated, but in retrospect, separation aside, it was a fine experience. Physical basic training got rid of all the accumulated fat I built up after I left the University and had gone to work. And I never gained it back. Moreover, just the experience of having been

in a military organization also was helpful later in life as I spent a lot of my time working with the military. I am proud of the fact that after basic training was over I was given an award as outstanding trainee in the company; the award was a cigarette lighter—and I detest smoking. But I am proud of that accomplishment, for an older guy and someone with the background I had, to do well, it made me feel good. (In retrospect, apart from the separation, the Army experience was a good one).

Q: Okay. 1956-57 you were Economic Officer in the Department of State specializing in international economic affairs. Would you like to make a comment here as to what kind of duties this entailed?

GLITMAN: It was quite specialized. I worked in the branch that dealt with exchange rates. This was at time when most countries had fixed rates and the problem was that you often found countries that would be better off if they devalued. But some, out of a sense of pride, tried to keep their currency up and as a consequence their trade balance suffered. I worked on those kinds of issues. Fairly early on I got into the legal side of the questions, and found I really enjoyed that as well. Occasionally I would get papers prepared by the lawyers, and I took great pleasure in finding errors in their papers. Legal errors. Not from the personal standpoint so much as the feeling that I corrected something that might have been wrong. I liked economics, but it was work, whereas the political side, especially the political/military side was almost a hobby. Most of my early work was in the economic area.

One of the other things I did when I was at that job was during the Lebanese crises in 1958. The Lebanese came to us after it was over and presented us with a request for aid based on the cost of the war to them. My task was to look at their budget and try to figure out how much they had intended to spend before the war and how much they were now claiming that they were intending to spend. That took a fair amount of work, but I was able to point out that there were places where they were requesting things which they had not requested earlier. So we could save a few dollars because we could show these

were not expenses incurred as a result of the war, these were the things that they added afterwards. That was also an experience, getting to know how to take another country's budget and work through it. And use that in a way that would help us. Be compassionate but not overpay for something.

Q: Afterward, you worked in the International Financial Affairs Office in 1958; then in 1959, you went off as Vice-Consul at the Consulate General in Nassau, in the Bahamas. Could you talk to us about problems in protection US citizens and your major accomplishments personally and whatever else you may wish to comment on, such as supervisors?

GLITMAN: We had a relatively small posting in Nassau. We had three officers: consul general; consul; and vice-consul (myself) at this point. Ben Houck was the Consul and at first, Roger Tyler, then Gus Barnard served as Consul Generals. Ben had a very good “bedside manner” with visa applicants, and so I learned a lot from watching him deal with these cases.

Then there was a lot of protection and welfare. Cruise ships would come every weekend from Florida, and almost it seemed every weekend I would get a phone call on Sunday morning. I would pick up the phone and say, “Yes, Mr. Kemp, what do we have for today?” Mr. Kemp was the undertaker. I am probably exaggerating in my memory, but it seemed there were a number of times when he would call, almost all of these on Sundays. I would have assure that the next of kin were notified, sometimes inventory the effects that had been left, make arrangements for the body to be shipped back. And you had to be careful with the folks when you sort of acted as an intermediary. There were some sad, sad cases, but I won't go into them.

There were also other problems. Some of these involved American citizens who got into trouble. One example, a somewhat interesting case, was when the police called me and said they were holding some Americans. The problem was that one individual had been caught cashing bad checks. He had hired a ship, a captain, a crew, and a prostitute to

accompany him on his voyage to the Bahamas, and when they got to Grand Bahama, he went to the bank and put in a check. The bank looked at this name, checked with his home bank, yes the company had an account etc., gave him the money and he and his crew sailed off, this time heading for Nassau. When they landed at Nassau he tried to do the same thing. Went into the bank with the check, but this time the bank didn't just see whether the company had money, it made sure that he had the right to sign checks. It turned out that he did not. At this point, he was still drunk; I walked into the police station, he was happy as could be and not really aware of what had hit him. The police in effect said that he, as far as they could tell, the captain, the crew, and the prostitute, had made off with whatever money there was, but there was no way that they could prove that. This guy was in trouble. We did our best to see that he was treated fairly under British law, which was our job. They did treat him fairly, but I forget what sentence he got. That was a strange case.

Another one, which was unusual—and again it seems as if these always happened on weekends. This one was definitely on a weekend. The police called me and said, “You have to come down, we have a murder case.” I drove to the police station, which I should note was next to the Consulate General, and across from the post office and the store where I would get my Saturday and Sunday paper—so I had to drive that same road everyday. I sometimes felt I didn't need to drive, the car could find the way itself. In any case, I showed up outside the police station and I looked up, it had a balcony there and a railing. Hanging over the railing were bloody clothes. That was my introduction to this one.

I went upstairs, and the police described the circumstances. Two Americans, and again a prostitute they had picked up, had stolen a boat in Miami and had taken it on some voyage to find a tropical island where they could all cavort, or whatever. They ran out of gas and they saw a little island called Cat Cay, I think it was. There was no water on it, but they saw it and landed on it. Later, they noticed a boat on it. It was a fishing boat, American captain, taking some people out fishing in the Bahamas. These guys were on the island at that point. They had gotten to the island, gotten off their boat. Then the fishing boat came

into the area and sees them, and they motion to it. One of the guys on shore swims to the fishing boat; he has a pistol with him. The other one is on shore with the prostitute, and he has a rifle. After the guy swims to the boat and gets on board, he pulls his pistol out and the charter boat captain reaches for his shark rifle. Near very close to piracy, more or less, the pirate shot the captain and killed him. He then took the captain's body, the fishermen, and I don't remember if the prostitute stayed with them or not, but they were all deposited on the island, where again there was no water, no food. The two guys who had stolen the boat then took the captain's boat and sped off again.

What they didn't know was that the fishing boat captain had notified the Coast Guard as soon as he saw the stolen boat at Cat Cay. The Coast Guard was aware that people appeared stranded on Cat Cay. The U.S. Coast Guard handled the search and rescue for the Bahamas. So they did eventually catch these guys and brought them to the Bahamian authorities. That is when I showed up. They had them under lock and key in the jail in Nassau. My job was again to ensure that they got a fair trial under British law. I learned something about the Felony Murder Law. What that came down to was that not only was the guy who pulled the trigger guilty of murder, but his accomplice on shore holding a rifle aiming in the general direction of the boat was equally guilty. It was a felony, a murder was committed, and he was equally guilty. The charter boat's captain's wife came, and we made sure that she got what she wanted, which was a front row seat. She sat there throughout the trial. I went to the trial a few times and again guaranteed that they were treated fairly under British law. And they were. They both were hung. British justice was swift. The captain's widow wanted to be there at the hanging, but the British would not permit that. In any case, it was a sad situation. As Ben Houck, the Consul there, said to me, “This will kick the intellectualism out of you.” The work had impact, and you got to see how life is for a fair number of folks in the world.

Q: Very interesting commentary on life in the Consular Service.

GLITMAN: I have another case that was rather interesting. Again, there was a phone call, this time from the psychiatric institute. They had a woman, an American citizen, who was placed there because she was bothering one of the leading merchants. She was convinced that he loved her and that she had been incarcerated at his request. I guess it was that way if I remember correctly, so she said to me that she could “prove her love” for him. My task was to get in touch with her family to see if we could find some way that she could be induced to leave and go home. Eventually I was able to persuade her that the best way would be for her to leave, get a nurse to accompany her, and get back to the U.S. where her family could help her. It was a strange experience in one way, and that is that the doctor had put me in a room with her, and she immediately began asking for scissors. Because she wanted to do some knitting or sewing. A little pause for concern. So we got to experience that, too.

Q: I gather you had family there, your wife and one or two children?

GLITMAN: Our second son was born there, in the Bahamas.

Q: Would you like to make a comment on life in Nassau?

GLITMAN: I don't like hot weather for starters, nor does my wife, and that place I refer to as 80-80. Eighty degrees in temperature and 80 percent humidity. It was pretty steady like that. There was a time, and I don't want to knock it because many people go there for holidays, if you like that kind of climate, but there was a period there from about Christmas till about late February when it was just glorious, a beautiful spring, not too hot. We were there at the time when it was really relatively undeveloped. There is a place now known as Paradise Island, across the harbor from Nassau; then it was known as Hog Island. I've seen photographs of it today, filled with enormous resorts. At that time, however, two or three times during our three years, we rented a motorboat and went to the other side of the island—not the side facing Nassau but the side facing the ocean. I am not exaggerating;

there were beaches two-three miles long and nobody there but us. But not any longer from what I've seen in the pictures.

The island was 21 miles long and seven miles wide, and we spent two years without leaving it— and then we went to Miami for a long weekend. I think we were on every paved road and just about every dirt road on it. Lots of little places, a monastery hidden away up in the hills, with wonderful honey they produced, things like that that you find out about. There was a fair amount of socializing. As you can see, I spent a certain amount of time with the police, so occasionally we would be invited to their parties. They were British and wild. I remember on one occasion a rugby game broke out, in the middle of the party. They were good fun.

Q: Unless you had something else you wanted to add about Nassau, we can move on.

GLITMAN: I could make a couple more comments about consular work in general. I had issued a fair number of immigrant visas and most of the time I was pleased to do it. There were some interesting cases—this was at the time of the arrival of Castro and some of the people that came out of Cuba during this period had pretty bad reputations. Since they had been with the Cuban police, they had no police records, and there was no way you couldn't give them a visa. Because there was nothing to prove misdeeds other than their reputations. And the law says you can't just go on hearsay, you have to have a proof. On the other hand, there were many wonderful people to whom I gave visas. Intelligent people, people with professional skills, good business managers and so on. I felt we were really gaining a lot from the Cubans that came in at the time.

But in a more down to earth issue, there was one Haitian who came for an immigrant visa, and he made it; he had all qualifications, and I gave him the visa. He left for the U.S. It was soon after I got to Nassau and he came back after a year and half or two years to thank me and to show me that he had opened his business and was doing well. I was just delighted to know that.

I did a lot of work for the Commerce Department as well. Sometimes there were people who had swindled American firms, and I was a bill collector in a way; but that was a part of our job. I was glad to be able to do that—especially if we were successful in making their complaint, and getting back the money they were owed.

Q: This was your sole consular assignment?

GLITMAN: As you can see it was a rather full one. I also had to do the books, we had a local Foreign Service national who did the book keeping, but I had to oversee that, which wasn't fun because you were personally responsible for the errors. I had to do communications decoding in the old fashioned way. Then it was very pain-staking work —you had to get everything just right as there wasn't any fancy machinery. Changing the locks on the safe was another task that I had. In a small post, you do just about everything at least once.

Q: Then we move on to you becoming Economic Officer in Embassy Ottawa, specializing in international trade and financial and trade policy issues for years 1961-1965. While in Ottawa, Ambassador Glitman served under Ambassador Livingston T. Merchant and Ambassador William Walton.

GLITMAN: We were there relatively short time with Ambassador and Mrs. Merchant. But they made a very strong impression on us. Very professional people, both of them, very good and nice people. We were there for most of our tour with Ambassador Butterworth and Mrs. Butterworth. I enjoyed him very much. In some ways he was one of the last Victorians. He had great command of the language and a very forceful personality.

It was an interesting time to be in Canada, and both my and I wife enjoyed it very much. It was a nice place to raise the family. We liked the climate as, unlike the Bahamas, Canada has a really nice winter, and I was able to combine business and pleasure often. When

skiing with my Canadian contacts and friends, a fair amount of work got done going up in the chairlift as well.

There were a number of issues while we were in Ottawa. The U.S. and Canada were constantly having trade disputes, and that's simply a function of the fact that we are each other's largest trading partners. I don't know the exact numbers now but, I am sure they are in the hundreds of billions of dollars a year in annual trade. And if you have that much business you are bound to have problems. And we had many of them, but by and large we worked well together with the Canadians. I felt they were reasonable people and I enjoyed working with them.

It was a busy post, in part because of these activities but there were two or three specific issues that came up that I found interesting. Perhaps if I look back on what I felt I accomplished there, one would be the Automobile Agreement, in 1965. Canadians were trying to increase their production of automobiles and, as you probably know, at that point the companies were the same and the unions were the same, in the U.S. and Canada. You had the same automobile companies on both sides of the border and same unions on both sides on the border. So that circumstance made a difference in how we could approach this issue. What the Canadians tried to do was work out some sort of subsidization; it was, in effect, a program which would shift production as much as possible to Canada at our expense. There were different opinions about how we should deal with this proposal, but it seemed to me that we ought to take a very firm line. We had countervailing duty law which essentially works to counter the advantages that another country gives to its trade through some form of subsidies. Some of our colleagues in Washington were hesitant to push forward with this approach. I felt that we should use it, not because I wanted to countervail but because I thought we didn't have another solution and needed the leverage a threat to countervail would provide.

And in October of 1963, as I recall, I had an opportunity, at a cocktail party, to talk to Ed Ritchie, a Canadian Foreign Service Officer, and a very able man. During our discussion

of this issue and how to deal with it, I asked him whether it would be possible to work out some sort of a free trade agreement in order to deal with this. He and I discussed it at some length, and I came away persuaded that if we worked it right, were patient, kept the threat of countervailing duty there, as an element in it of course, but placed the emphasis on trying to work out an agreement whereby we would essentially get close to a free trade agreement on automobiles and automobile parts. That process took some years to complete but in 1965 indeed the U.S.-Canada Automobile Agreement was signed into law by President Johnson. It avoided a trade war. I believe that it helped consumers and producers on both sides of the border. And, quite frankly, I had a deeper motive—and that was my feeling and a view that eventually we ought to have a free trade area with Canada. That arrangement had been tried many times and failed, but I thought that the automobile agreement (if it were a success) would help set the stage for such a free trade area.

I was not in favor of any political union with Canada; I think we and the world are better off if there is an independent Canada. On the trade side and economic side, the amount of activity is so huge that it makes perfect sense to try to reduce the barriers as much as possible.

So that was one thing that I was able to accomplish while I was there. Another was dealing with a certain amount of economic nationalism on the Canadian side, which took the form of efforts to “buy back Canada,” which was the slogan at the time. It didn't really make much sense to spend money to buy back a plant that was already there and functioning. But it was symbolic or emblematic of certain mindset that had set in. I did try to work against that. I tried to ease it and demonstrate that American investment was helpful to Canada and to the U.S. We ran into difficulties with issues such as Time magazine putting ads in the Canadian edition. Again, the Canadian government was concerned that Canadian magazines were being forced out of business because of the strength of the American magazines, particularly Time magazine and the Readers Digest. That was another issue that I worked on. We made some temporary fixes to the problem, but I notice in the newspapers that it hasn't totally gone away. I can appreciate

the Canadians' concern; they want to maintain a magazine industry of their own and not to have everything coming from the U.S. By the same token, they have to try not to discriminate against the American journals.

And then another issue I got involved in was Quebec. This was at the time of the so-called “quiet revolution” in Quebec when the French Canadians began to sense that they had to move out of their old culture, not the basic culture, but adjust somewhat more to the modern world and get involved in finance and the rest of the modern economy. The Quebec government began by purchasing—nationalizing—Hydro-Quebec. The point that was interesting about that operation was that it was cited as a perfect example of how to do the nationalization of a firm. A bond issue was successfully floated, the bond market approved of this arrangement, and it was accomplished without any punitive actions against the companies. But I found that this was also tied in to some degree with Quebec interest in, if not separation, then more autonomy. And then, I would go to Montreal to talk to its business and financial community. During one of those visits, I was able to get a tip off that the Canadian dollar was likely going to devalue—and it did. Just in talking to the businessman, I could see that was where it was heading.

It was interesting going into the banks. I met several times with one of the money traders for the bank. The man must have had nerves of steel. He would sit there and talk to me about the future of the market and then he would get interrupted by a phone call and you could hear him, I couldn't hear the other side of the conversation, but he would listen and say how about this how about that and then he would listen to the response, and then would say, “Sell a million at 340.” Just like that. I asked him, “Do you go home at night and think about what you've done?” And he said, “No. Once it's done it's done.” I had to admire that.

In this connection with Montreal, Fred Rope, a Foreign Service officer who was number two in Consulate General in Montreal, introduced me to Jacques Parizeau, who at that time was a professor at University of Montreal but who had been involved in the takeover

of Hydro-Quebec, a friendly takeover. I had two meetings with him and learned an awful lot about where Quebec was heading at least in as so far as people like Parizeau were concerned and where they wanted it to go. It really came down to a sense that if they wanted to protect their culture, they had to make it possible for people to work in important business, in international businesses, and so on. They needed to be able to work in banking and finance, in production, and in companies where they didn't have to give up their French when they got to the office. In other words, the phrase was that you had to "take off" your French language and culture, as if it were an overcoat when you went to work and become Anglicized. Parizeau made the point that you could never really get ahead in some of these companies. Many of the Canadian companies, Sun Life and some of the others, banks, were headquartered in Montreal at that time and have since left. But if you wanted to get ahead in these large companies, you could; however, you had to move into English speaking parts of Canada, and there was no school for their children in French so the children would lose the culture. They just didn't want to see that happen. So they began to figure out ways to try to increase the number of companies in Quebec that would be Francophone owned and operated.

It was a complicated scheme; it involved using pension funds and so on to buy up facilities like Hydro-Quebec. If not run by the government at least there would be some government tie-in. This was a beginning of what eventually turned into an independence movement. We know that goes on today, it hasn't succeeded yet in wining any of the votes that they have taken on it in referendums. But they don't give up. I'm sympathetic to their concerns about retaining their culture, I think, again, that the world is a richer place for it. I only hope they can do it in a way that doesn't tear Canada apart. It ought to be possible. In any case, it was in the early '60s that the entire movement began, and I was able to report on it to Washington and give a heads-up that "it's coming." It was interesting work. Those were things that went on, that I did while I was at the embassy. They were full years, and a lot of good work with the Canadians there.

Q: The Cuban missile crisis, how did that affect your work there?

GLITMAN: It taught me something—a little lesson I guess. We had plans to disperse our aircraft in case of an emergency, and some of them would be dispersed to Canada—to Canadian fields. If you look at the map, at the globe, you could see that a lot of activity was likely going to occur over Canada anyway, if the Soviets decided to head our way. So they were involved with this. But what happened was that when the crisis broke out, the Canadian Foreign Minister, Howard Green, I think he was from British Columbia, became quite agitated and concerned that if American planes were dispersed to Canada, this would somehow be seen as a provocation and create a war and Canada would end up in it itself. The lesson I took away was you really have to be concerned about people reacting that way and set up arrangements in such a manner that it becomes automatic and it isn't seen as a provocation. For example, you need to exercise those operations frequently. If you know you are going to disperse there, exercise that operation. Don't do it just when there is a crisis, do it so that it is routine. Because if you don't have it set up that way then someone is going to say, “You are creating a provocation. You are going to trigger something we want to avoid.” I don't know, but I think, in the end, something was worked out. Still that was the lesson I took from that experience. I was able to apply it a couple of times later in my work.

Q: Did you have a presidential visit while you were in Ottawa?

GLITMAN: No. President Kennedy was assassinated while I was in Ottawa and like most Americans, I can remember exactly where I was and who I was with at that very moment.

Q: How about Congressional Delegations?

GLITMAN: I didn't have much to see or do with that. If they were there, I don't recall any visits. Later in life I got to see a lot of them, but not at this point.

Q: How about activity amidst the diplomatic corps?

GLITMAN: There was a fair amount of it. We were young, in our early '30s at that point. Chris and I did get around a lot. We lived in a small house, but she was able to make it work, and we would often have people over. Sometimes after cocktail parties, we would just gather up a group of people and pick up some spaghetti or something and come over to the house and she'd get things set up in no time. So we'd entertain that way. There were a lot of parties and usual diplomatic back and forth. I have to make it clear, they are not all fun; most of it is work. I gave a couple of examples already about cocktail parties and agreements coming out of them.

Q: Generally your wife and all, were your children of school age then?

GLITMAN: My two boys went to school there and our eldest daughter was born there, on this tour. We remembered how much snow accumulated in Ottawa and began to think, as we reminisced about this, that we were probably exaggerating. We went back to Ottawa, took our daughter who was born there and her daughters. We went back so she could see the house where we were living when she was born. It was in the winter, and we were not exaggerating. There were huge piles of snow outside everyone's driveway. It was a long way to school and again we thought we exaggerated how far our kindergartner and first-grader had to walk from the house to the school. But it was a long walk. And they made it longer by climbing up every snow pile on the way home. It was a nice place to live. I had good Canadian friends there. We would go fishing together, sometimes we'd do a bit of business, but that would take place when driving to and from the stream. Some of them were kind enough to show me good fishing holes in the area. There would be skiing, the same thing. I would occasionally work it out so instead of just going to lunch with somebody, I'd pick them up, we'd both go across the river to Gatineau and ski for the afternoon. Of course, there is a plenty of time for talk on the chair lift. We had, as I said, a lot of good opportunities and fun together with the Canadians.

Q: What about travel beyond Ontario and Quebec?

GLITMAN: No, we didn't really. We did circumnavigate Lake Superior on one of our summer vacations, and that was good fun. And then going into Quebec was easy because it was just across the river. As I mentioned we skied there. We learned fairly interesting things about different cultures. There were two ski resorts, Camp Fortune, which one Japanese colleague referred to as Camp Misfortune. I forget the name of the other resort, but it had an English name. The funny thing was that Camp Fortune had fairly large French Canadian clientele and the other resort was almost all Anglophone. So when you got to Camp Fortune, I noticed—and it took me a while to figure out what was going on—a curious process. At the other resort, there were lines. Everybody got in line and queued up. But at Camp Fortune there was the phenomena we later saw in the Alps; there were what I refer to now as “French lines.” These are triangles, the apex of which is at the entry point. So I learned a lot from the French Canadian kids on how to beat the system. Because if you look at the shape of this triangle, you do not want to enter the line at the back. You want to go off to the side and that's what those kids were doing. So I watched them a bit and I said, “Wow, okay.” I got in there, and it worked out fine. But when I went to the Anglophone resort, I joined the queue, which I preferred. But we found that same phenomena in Europe. These are good natured lines, these “French lines.” You can find some cultures where this becomes a very serious issue. But with them it's just a joke, if you get ahead, you get ahead. If not, well, you take your time. Just a small little thing that popped up there.

Q: Any comment on Ambassador Butterworth?

GLITMAN: Yes. As I said, he was probably one of the last Victorians. He had wonderful command of the language. One thing that sticks with me is his reaction to a message that we got from the Department of State. This was before one of the Canadian elections, and we had been putting together a series of messages, for example, what were the issues and how the elections were likely to affect the U.S., how was it likely to turn out and how

that circumstance would affect us, and what might the U.S. be doing in preparation for this. I had written a certain number of these analyses with my colleagues in the political section. A telegram came from Washington and it effectively said, “There is going to be an election up there, how about you guys sending us some information about it. We'd like to know what's going on.” Butterworth was furious when he saw this and he called me and said “I want you to compile for me a list of all the telegrams that we have sent in...” (Including our airgrams which we had in those days as well as telegrams) “...on this election, a little bit of what the subject is, and get back to me as quickly as you can.” I went back and went through all the reporting/analysis we had done, brought it in to him, and he said, “Umm, okay, thank you.” Next thing I saw was a telegram from him back to Washington. Essentially it said something like this, we have been sending back messages on this election and so on and so forth, and then he said, “The Department, like Aunt Sally, having gotten a glimpse of the obvious, now proposes to have us tell it about this election. Well, we already have, and here are the cables. Why doesn't Washington read these?” “Department, like Aunt Sally, having gotten the glimpse of the obvious.” Wonderful. That was kind of funny approach he had. I enjoyed him very much.

Q: Then, in 1965 you move on to the academic area, University of California, Berkeley. Would you tell us about that experience?

GLITMAN: Yes. I had hoped to actually go to work in Europe, but instead I had to go out to California. I was assigned to Berkeley to learn about it. It was fine, it was a good experience. This was right after the free speech movement and just before Vietnam heated up. I really had an opportunity to spend a year at a University with the generation of the '60s. And that was an eye opener. Three are some scenes in my minds eye: student pulls up in a Triumph convertible outside of the bank across the street from the main entry to the campus, dressed in rags, but in this brand new sports car, goes into the bank—I think probably to cash papa's check—and then he goes out and complains about the horrors of society afterwards. But I got to know a lot about these guys. And they were basically decent human beings, but it was a different generation. I took a course in Judo,

with the freshmen, and one of them said to me one day, his name was Meek, and he was my Judo partner, bigger and stronger then me, beat up on me regularly, but I liked him, as it was part of the sport. He said to me, “You dress kind of peculiar.” And I said, “What do you mean?” He said—and it was true—”You wear blue jeans, but then you got a jacket and a shirt and a tie on.” I said, “That's my town and country outfit. But I am flattered that you think that I dress peculiarly.” His usual outfit was t-shirt, shorts, and flip-flops. It was kind of fun, being with that generation.

We had some good teachers. Ernst Hass did international relations, and I spent time with him. He was my advisor and had lectures on history from a Marxist perspective. That also was useful later in life when I had to deal directly with Marxists. It was a good year off. There were several Foreign Service Officers out there, a group of us, including Ernest Johnston and Ed Dillery.

Ed and I used to play squash and handball together. I think it was handball at that point. There was also Tom Hall from USAID and another guy named Felix Bloch.

Q: Oh, yes, we've heard of Felix Bloch.

GLITMAN: He was there. Very unusual person.

Q: Did you know him fairly well?

GLITMAN: He was kind of stand-offish. I'll do this account of him for the record. Often we'd have get togethers, play football, but he wouldn't do that very often. We'd do it with our families, grown ups and kids, just throwing the ball around. We made it a point to go out together, every so often, to different restaurants. Ernest Johnston took us to a Japanese country restaurant in San Francisco, and we learned about that. Anyway, as we were getting ready to leave at the end of the academic year, we decided that we would get together and go to the Top of the Mark and watch the sun set, which was a traditional thing to do. Everyone agreed but Felix. He just didn't want to go with us. So the rest of us went

over, and we went to the Top of the Mark, and we were having our drinks, looking around. And who's over there with his wife? Felix. He knew that we were going to be there! I don't know. I wasn't totally surprised. He was an unusual guy.

Q: In 1966 you're Senior Economic Officer in the Office of Canadian Affairs in the Department of State, as International Relations Officer. Now, talk to us about that.

GLITMAN: I am not sure what “International Relations Officer” was supposed to mean in that respect. But the other parts were correct. This is another personal story. I had hoped that we would get an overseas assignment after Berkeley. If you had been keeping score, you will see that in 13 years we have circumnavigated Northern America, but we have never been overseas. Canada and the Bahamas don't quite make it. We had both hoped to go abroad, and I was told that I was in line for an assignment at Embassy Paris in the political section working on political-military affairs. Boy, I was really interested in that; it would have been wonderful. At the last minute, I was faced with a choice. I could go to Paris, but I would have to do international finance, working with the Treasury Attach#. Or I could go back to Washington and work on the NATO desk. And being a puritan, I chose to go back to Washington and work on the NATO desk, rather than to go to Paris because I really was interested in that subject.

So we were driving across country, and when I got to Washington I went into the Department and I went to the NATO desk. They said, “go see the European Bureau personnel officer.” I knew something had gone wrong. I went over there, and simple enough, the assignment had been broken.

Rufus Smith, who had been the head of the Political Section in Ottawa and later became the DCM, had become the Country Director for Canadian Affairs, a new position, and he heard that I wasn't going to Paris. He then insisted that I be assigned to work on economic affairs on Canada, under him. So my assignment to Paris didn't happen and I didn't get to

work on NATO affairs, but I ended up back doing economic on Canadian issues. Which, again, still interests me.

A word about Rufus Smith. He was one of the best officers I ever met. And he ought to, ought to, in any rational system, he would have been Ambassador to Canada. But it didn't happen. His contacts were so good and the Canadians had so much confidence in him, that on one occasion, he was asked to come back to Ottawa and participate in a cabinet meeting, because they couldn't remember what had been said and done at that time. And yet, he ended up as a Country Director for Canada. I told you I was going to tell you a country director story.

Q: Yes, so is this the time?

GLITMAN: Yes. Rufus Smith, this is in his honor. We used to have a Canadian desk and various desk for different countries. But about this time, the management at the State Department decided that they really should have the person who works on the country be seen as the principle point of contact, almost to being like an ambassador to that country, but located in Washington. And they came up with the title Country Director. Rufus, I think was DCM in Panama at that point, but he was sent back to Washington to do that job. So let's see if I can remember that song.

[singing]"I wanna be a country director, My ambitions really reached the skies. I wanna be a country director, and take charge of all the other guys. I wanna be a country director, my ambition is plain enough to see. I wanna be a country director, and make some high foreign policy."

"Make me a county director, let me really strut my stuff. Make me a county director, you'll see I'm just a diamond in the rough. Ask me all kinds of questions, on matters esoteric and arcane. And you'll see from my obtuse answers, that I'm a pro at this Foreign Service game."

“Well, they made me a country director, far above all the bureaucratic flak. Well I know I'll be getting a phone call, from Nicholas de Katzenbach. But there is one thing that's got me worried, that makes me wonder if the things aren't so great. The guy that had this desk before me, was a brand new FSO-8.”

Q: Anything else on duties of Senior Economic Officer in the office of Canadian Affairs at State?

GLITMAN: It was the same, working on the banks, the Canadians trying to make it difficult for American branches, that kind of stuff.

Q: Did you every have to dash up to Canada for any reason in this task?

GLITMAN: I don't recall that. I got up there later when I was in trade work and later again when I was in the Pentagon. Once it did happen, and that's this UN thing, the next assignment. Rufus felt badly that he had promised me that I would be able to do some political work. The fact was, and those of us who worked for him agreed, that he did it better than any of us could anyway, so he didn't give me any of those things to work on. He called me in late summer of 1967 and asked me if I would be interested in going to the UN as an advisor to the U.S. delegation to the General Assembly, advisor on European affairs. That was interesting as the only time I'd been in Europe was five days for an OECD conference when I was in Ottawa. What he didn't know was that Chris' family comes from Greenwich, Connecticut, Old Greenwich, and that they had a nice size house, and all five of their children had left home, and we could go move in with them, and I could be a commuter. So I talked to Chris and she said, “Sure, we'll take the kids up there, we'll put them in the school I went to, and find a nursery school for our young daughter, and it will be fine.” I called him the next day and I said, “Yes.” “What??” He didn't think I'd say yes. It worked out fine for us. That's how I got there, and that leads us to the next assignment.

Q: Your 1967 posting to the UN General Assembly, as Advisor on European Political Affairs, where you had an opportunity to work with the Permanent Representative to the UN, Arthur J. Goldberg.

GLITMAN: This was a very enjoyable experience. One shouldn't talk about joy; it's work. But if you like your work and you find it interesting—then you can say it's enjoyable. One thing I have to say about most of my time in the Foreign Service: I liked what I was doing. There were some exceptions, and I didn't like some of the administrative practices; but the fascination and the interest and the sense that you could do some useful work for your country, when you're working on substantive matter, overcomes any of the drawbacks.

The prime issue for that General Assembly was of course the end of the '67 Arab-Israeli war and trying to find a solution to that. Everything we did revolved around that issue. I got to deal with other subjects and my contacts were with the European delegations. I had some interesting experiences doing that. Watching the UN, being a part of its activity, it's sort of like a legislature in a way. I was a party whip without a party.

Let me give you some examples of the things I would run into. On one occasion, this was during the debate on China...

Q: The admission of China?

GLITMAN: Right. It was a procedural vote, but we were desperately trying to keep the mainland Chinese out of the UN and keep Taiwan in. This was an annual battle which, at this point, we were still winning. Each of us would be given assignments in the morning; we would go to our delegation and there would be an instructions guide—essentially, what you were supposed to do for the day. My task was to talk to all of the European delegations and ensure that they were going to vote the right way, that is, as we would like them to vote. I was going on my rounds, and I would stop and talk to different ones. I met with the Norwegian and some others, and then, after while, the Norwegian came up

to me and said, “I think you should know that one of the Swedish delegates is following you around and everyone you talk to, he's now talking to, to try to change their mind.” This Norwegian was from the same village as my wife's mother.

Q: Really? Isn't that interesting?

GLITMAN: Yes.

Q: Do you recall the Swedish diplomat's name?

GLITMAN: I've forgotten it. I can see his face though. He was doing his job. I was angry about the way he did it, but he was doing his job. I eventually caught up with him and told him, “Now I am going to follow you around.” The vote came out the right way, on that one.

Then there are some other things that happened. I mentioned my Pakistani friends. One of them was at the UN for this General Assembly. Of course we had a lot of activities, concerning how to handle the political end to the '67 war. Rafi Ahmed was there at that time. He sort of let me in, he sort of said, “You know, all the Arabs, if you are going to talk to them, if you are going to talk to any of these guys, it is Ramadan, it's sundown I'll be down at the lounge getting coffee and some cakes and so on and why don't you come on down and I'll introduce you.” So I did. I did get to meet them, and interesting things would come out of that. On one occasion, they were all going out to lunch. He was a part of this group. There were several countries that had broken relations with us—Algerians and Syrians, for example. And Rafi just swept me up and said, “Come on, come with us.” Off we went for lunch, and I was able to learn a few things from them and give them a few comments on our position.

Q: They spoke with you?

GLITMAN: Sure. That was kind of interesting. It's a cauldron of diplomacy there, at the UN.

Q: Good terminology, “cauldron of diplomacy.”

GLITMAN: All things were bubbling. I'll tell you a couple other interesting stories there that I thought were kind of curious. One time, on one occasion, a Romanian diplomat at the UN came up to me and he said, “I want to have lunch with you.” I thought, okay, fine. I couldn't imagine what we would discuss, but there could always be something in this “cauldron of diplomacy.” We went out, had lunch, and he started talking about Vietnam. He was mentioning different arrangements that were going on and I was taking all this in —and I didn't have a clue what he was talking about, or who he thought I was, or who he thought I worked for. I won't go into any more detail, except afterwards, I went back and reported to our senior officials, not to Ambassador Goldberg, but to some other guys about this conversation. One of them turned on me in a fury, “How did you find out about that?” And I said, “Look, let me try again. I didn't ask this guy for lunch, I didn't raise this issue, he obviously had me confused with somebody else.” And he said, “Write it up and forget you ever saw it or thought about it.”

Q: Did you meet this Romanian again?

GLITMAN: No, I am sure that he figured out that I wasn't the person that he really ought to have talked to. But it was kind of amusing.

Q: Some closing comments on your work with the UN General Assembly. Perhaps you would like to say a word or two on the diplomatic scene in the UN?

GLITMAN: I would. There is one other topic I wanted to discuss as well, which is my work on the Non-proliferation Treaty. That issue was also being discussed at the UN at that time, and it was my introduction to arms control. Here again, I had my contacts with a number of the other delegations, including my Pakistani friends, and one of the issues involved in the NPT was whether there would be review conferences. The other countries, non-nuclear countries, were anxious not only to have a treaty, but to have an opportunity

to review it every so often. I began working on that issue along with Rafi Ahmed. We both were able to come up together with some suggestions on how review conferences might be held, what the terms of reference would be, and the frequency of the review; it ended up being once every five years. That eventually was in the treaty. I don't want to claim that I put it in there, but at least I had a chance to see how arms control negotiations work and got a feel for it.

The social life was quite active, but as you know, the social life is really work in another form. So there were lots of receptions every night, usually more junior people like myself would be assigned to go along with a senator or a congressman that we had with us at that time. At every UN General Assembly session, there are either two senators or two congressmen. They switch off, the two branches, every year. They become part of the delegation. And it was very helpful. Anyway, we would often be assigned to go with them to a reception and help them along, take notes on their conversations so they could report back.

Here is what a typical day is, or what it was for me anyway. I'd get up early enough to catch the eight o'clock New Haven commuter train from Old Greenwich station to Grand Central. Then I could walk to the U.S. Mission to the UN. That was a nice way to start the morning. I'd pick up the New York Times and by the time I got to New York I had read the paper. We would start every day with a staff meeting. Everybody would show up and Ambassador Goldberg and the other senior staff would lay out what the activities were for that day and what we should be concentrating on. We'd get our assignments.

Then we'd go to the UN building and, if there were committees meeting, we'd go to those; or if there was General Assembly activity, we'd go to that. We'd keep quite busy during the day. Almost always there was a working lunch of some sort. If you went over there, you would find another delegate with whom to have lunch, and could continue the business that way. After lunch, we'd come back to the U.S. mission and, at that point, we would have to write up all of the events of the morning and the lunch, get them ready to send

to Washington. In the afternoon, once again back across the street to the UN building, participate in either G8 or Assembly activity, or various committee activities. But you weren't done yet.

After that part of the day was over there were always receptions or dinners. Those would go on till 7:30 p.m. or 8 o'clock. At that point we still weren't done. We had to come back to the mission from wherever the reception or the cocktail party was and write up the events, what had happened at these so-called “social events,” and get those reports off to Washington if they were of importance. The net result was that I averaged getting home by 9:30 p.m. The children were already asleep by that point and, when I left in the morning to catch the train, they hadn't awakened. So I could go several days without seeing them. That wasn't so good.

But the work was interesting. At first, taking that train back at night, I would take serious things, Economist or some serious magazine like that to read, but as time went by, I found that I was just too tired to do that; so the quality of the materials that I read slipped and slipped until I eventually stopped trying to read anything and tried to catch a little sleep and relaxation till I got back to Greenwich.

Q: Before we leave the UN, anything else?

GLITMAN: A couple of things—one in particular. I had a very strange experience. I was invited to lunch by one of the Czech delegates and went with him to some restaurant not far from the UN building. It wasn't so much what we talked about, but it was what was happening around us. And that was that an attractive waitress shows up, and he seemed to know her a little bit. She was paying, shall we say, special attention to me. Frankly, I got kind of suspicious as to what was going on here. We had our lunch, and I went back and reported this. It turned out that he was indeed one of the intelligence officers on the Czech delegation. I'll never know what the truth of that one is.

I guess I should tell a little story about myself because I have sort of a mischievous bent on occasion. I was asked to meet and greet some visitors, I think they were Danes, who were coming to see Ambassador Goldberg. I picked them up at the lobby and went up in the elevator with them. They began talking in Danish about the meeting that was going to take place. We finally got to the floor where Ambassador Goldberg's office was, the gates opened, and I said to them in my best Norwegian, “Turn left here.” You should have seen the look on their faces. I didn't really know in any depth what they were talking about, but it was kind of fun for the moment. I told them I didn't speak that well. But for a second, they were sort of shocked that someone else might have heard them.

It was an interesting assignment. I might also say that while most of the time I had to go to these events in the evening alone, there were a couple of occasions when spouses were invited so Chris came down, and we went to dinner together. On one occasion, our Ambassador wasn't able to use some tickets to an opera, and he gave them to me. Chris and I went and invited some Canadians along with us; that was also a very special event. I liked working at the UN. It would have been a good assignment for a longer term, but it didn't work that way.

Q: Then, 1968, you were with the National Security Council where you covered international economic issues and Western European affairs. Let's talk about the National Security Council.

GLITMAN: That assignment came out of the blue. The UN General Assembly ended us usual in December, for Christmas. Chris and I and our children went to our home in Vermont, which we had put up in 1967, and spent Christmas there. At that point we didn't have a telephone. One of our neighbors came up and said, “You got a call from the White House.” I said, “Really?” “Yes,” he said, “and they left this number with me.” I said, “Thank you very much.” I took the number and eventually got down to their place and called. It turned out that it was a man named Edward Fried, who had been in the State Department and with whom I had worked when I was on the Canadian desk. He

asked me if I would like to come to work for him on the National Security Council, handling international economic issues and Western European affairs. Of course I was delighted to do that. He would have to straighten things out with Rufus, because now you see what happened. Rufus let me go to New York but now I was about not to come back to the Canadian desk but head over to the NSC. I did make one stipulation, and that was that if I had an opportunity to get a good overseas assignment, I would really want to go to do that in the summer. Ed Fried said that was fine with him. On that basis I went to the NSC.

What's it like working there? Well, it depends on the president. There is one generalization that I think would apply in any case. Let me explain in this way, to give you a sense of what I'm getting at. Soon after I arrived there, I was instructed to prepare a letter for signature by President Johnson, on some sort of gift that he had received from some country's president (I forget which). Simple thing, it was a thank you letter and so on. I prepared the letter, Ed Fried read it and sent it forward; it then went through Ross Dell and the next stop was the President. So there were really two stops between me and the President. In due course, I got a phone call from the President's Secretary, to let me know that the President had signed the letter. I felt very good about that. I went to see Ed Fried and said, “I just wanted to let you know that I got this phone call and the President signed the letter.” Ed Fried is a New Yorker and had a very blunt and brisk way of speaking, he was very smart. He looked at me and said, “You darn well better have your letter signed by the President. He's not your editor. Those letters go in perfect!” And I thought, Oh great! But what it made clear to me was there was no room for error when you work there. Because it was just a couple of stops between me and the President's signature. So don't feel happy when the president signs your letter. That's the routine.

Q: Let me ask one question, about the location of the National Security Council. Is it in the old Army Navy State building?

GLITMAN: Old EOB, Executive Office Building. Yes. I think at that time there were less than 20 of us, working on the NSC staff. The National Security Advisor had an office in

the White House itself, in the west wing and in the basement area. The National Security Advisor was Eugene Rostow at the time, but I am not sure I can remember who the deputy national security advisor was at that point.

The NSC was divided up not too differently from the State Department in that it was addressing international issues. Ed Fried and I were working on global economic issues, except for foreign aid, and all Western European issues. Someone else was working on the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries, someone else would handle Africa and the Middle East, and so on and so forth. It was pretty much broken down geographically. At that time, as I said, the staff was rather small.

Our task was largely to keep an eye out for new developments, and my job in particular was to get an inch thick pile of telegrams that came in every morning and go through them to see what issues might eventually come to the president. To sort of keep an eye out for the issues that could find their way to the president, follow those, get in touch with the people on the desks to find out more detail about it if we needed that information. And you acted in a way as a broker, between different agencies and different parts within the Departments, but mainly between different agencies. If there was an issue that came up, we would get memos for the president from the Secretary of Defense, for example, and also from the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Treasury. The object was to see which memo would get to the president and in what form.

Our job was to take these positions and try to broker a compromise amongst them if a compromise were possible. The object was not to find the compromise; the object was to come up with the best position for the president, as we saw it. But it put us in a very powerful position. We might get a fairly long memo, but what we would have to do was boil that down into a single page. Essentially, “Here are the highlights.” The power of the job was clear. This is particularly true for the National Security Advisor as he can write a little chit on top of what we had done, which in turn was on top of what was coming from these cabinet secretaries. What the president would see first was this note on the top. But it was

all done in a very shorthand manner. A lot of thought went into these papers, and we did try very hard to boil these issues down to their essence and not to fuzz them over, but try to make sure that the president clearly understood the issues.

That changed. Here is another anecdote. After I left that job, and I did have an opportunity as you will see to go to Paris in the summer of 1968, more or less the job that I thought I was going to a couple of years earlier.

Q: Let me interrupt to inquire, to make sure I understand, the NSC job was strictly in early '68?

GLITMAN: Yes, it ended in the summer of '68.

Q: And in the summer you took off for Paris?

GLITMAN: Yes.

Q: Alright. Just checking.

GLITMAN: But let me just, before I go on, make the contrast with after Kissinger got there. This was at time of great stress in the U.S., 1968. There was the assassination of Robert Kennedy, assassination of Martin Luther King. It was a period which I will always remember. Looking out of my window at the EOB, across to the White House lawn, and seeing machine guns being set up. The city was being closed down for fear of riots. And then seeing smoke coming from the distance in the city of Washington as the riots were underway. It was a very worrisome period for the country, but we worked our way through it. The president continued with much of his regular schedule, and there would be, e.g. state visits, such as the visit of the president of Austria came, among others. Of course, as he was a European official, a European chief of state, we got involved; I was involved in helping prepare for these meetings. But there was always a certain air hanging over this as a result of what happened in '68. And of course President Johnson

had early in '68 announced that he would not run again. But still we functioned, and it was an interesting experience. I wasn't sure I would actually be able to leave because when the president said that he was not gong to run again, a paper came down that essentially said, “Nobody's leaving till it's over.” But as I mentioned earlier, I really wanted to get overseas if I could. So I was allowed to leave for Paris. But before then, it was busy. There were a lot of international economic issues. Ed Fried was working on those particularly, and he did a superb job on the two-tiered gold system that he helped work out to deal with some of our balance of payment problems.

After I had left the NSC and went to Embassy Paris, I came back to Washington, for some reason that I now forget, and stopped to see Ernest Johnston who was at Berkeley with us and had taken my job effectively, the economic part of it, at the NSC staff. I went in to see him, and he was sitting in the office I used to have. I stopped and talked to the secretary, Marie. I asked her how things were going and she said, “Oh, Mr. Glitman, this is terrible. They are so busy.” I said, “Well, we were pretty busy before, what do you mean?” She said, “I am typing all the time.” I said, “Typing?” She said, “Yes. You used to do those little chits, but now with Dr. Kissinger, we are writing major papers here. I am just being worn out typing.” I went in to see Ernest and, indeed, things had shifted. What we were doing during the Johnson administration was different, now the NSC was in a way duplicating what the State Department does, getting the whole picture out there. I often felt that Dr. Kissinger, Secretary Kissinger eventually, was showing the career people how an academic can really take over. He had the regular service, full timers, doing all these large tomes. Whereas he did the action things, the bureaucracy was tied up pretty often with writing these papers on this or that part of the world and how it would affect the U.S. But these were almost academic in nature. There is a story, more apocryphal than true that said that he once called in someone and said, “Have you prepared the paper I had asked for?” The person showed it to him, he looked at it very quickly and he said, “No, that's not very good; work it over, do it again.” After a few more days, the person comes back and said, “Here it is again.” He looked at it, “That's not good enough yet, I want it better.” And

the third time the fellow comes back and says, “Here is my paper now.” Kissinger looks at it and says, “Is that the best you can do?” And the guys said, “Yes, it is.” And Kissinger then responded, “Well, in that case, I'll read it now.” There was that major difference in the way they operated. I am not sure which approach worked better, but, anyway, it did lead NSC into a much forceful role than beforehand, and that's largely the result of Kissinger's personality and the president's willingness to work with him. He played an important role in that.

Q: Then we move on to years 1968-1973. Political Officer, Embassy Paris, and you were involved in political/military matters, arms control and West European issues.

GLITMAN: This was a wonderful assignment. As you can see, it lasted for a long time. We really got to understand France, both my wife and I, as a result of living there and working there on those issues. When I came to the Embassy in Paris, we were still dealing with the aftermath of the French withdrawal from the integrated military command structure and NATO's departure from Paris for Brussels. A lot of issues I worked on came as a result of that action. My first thought was to look at these questions and see if there was some way that I could try to help mitigate the negative results of France's pulling out of NATO. I thought that if I had a goal to accomplish something while I was there, it would be to achieve that result—if I could. I began by looking at everything that General de Gaulle had done or said during the period when they were leaving. I found a possibility in his comment that France would be able to participate in some contingency planning with NATO countries, but this would be of a general nature and that they were not going to come back into the integrated command structure. But that phrase, “contingency planning,” struck me as perhaps being a way that we could, if not get back to where we were with France at its full participation, at least have some element of working cooperation. I began to look at ways to see how we could foster that activity.

Another issue that I got involved in was dealing with the financial consequences, for all of us in NATO, of France's decision to leave the integrated command structure and

effectively to tell the U.S. to leave its bases in France. These bases, which were referred to as the “line of communication” stretching from the Channel ports into Germany, were really crucial for us. If you look at the map, you'll see why very quickly. Assuming that an attack comes from the east, we needed to be able to move forces quickly from the ports into Germany. After France withdrew, we still had some possibilities through the Netherlands and Belgium. But most of the material would have to come through Bremerhaven in Germany. Again, if you look at the map, that requirement means that our supplies and reinforcements were going to be heading south, as the potential attack was coming from the east directly across our line of communications. Whereas if our material could come from France, as it was set up to do, potential attackers, the Soviets, would have to go through our forces to get to our line of communication. We had pipelines, which had been put in during the Second World War, some coming from the Brittany and Normandy coast, and some coming from the Mediterranean coast of France. We did work out with the French arrangements for those pipelines, gas and oil, to continue to operate.

There were problems, but nonetheless that operation continued to function. What we needed to do was pin down in greater detail, how these lines of communication would be kept open. In addition, we also had to continue working with the French, so that if there were an attack, and I had no doubt that France would be on our side, that we could work smoothly together. Again, the contingency planning offered a possibility, but we needed to continue talking with them and making one another aware of how these contingencies would work. The French were not too interested in getting involved in exercises with us. That would have been one way really to prove that we could work together. But in time they became more interested in working with the Germans. Germany was a full-fledged member of NATO, so through that relationship, indirectly, we were able to get some activity together. And I worked very hard and continually tried to foster that arrangement, and in time we were able to work some things out. They are probably still classified, so I am not going to go into them. They are one of the few classified topics that I worked on

that that were kept a secret for a good long while. Some of it has come out, but I am not going to be the person who puts any more of it out.

Another issue was dealing with the financial consequences for us. We had all these bases, they were in France, and some of them were quite useful for other purposes. Some were hospitals, for example, and the French government was essentially saying, “We want these.” The question was do we sell them to France and how do we get paid for them? I got involved in trying to figure out a way to getting the French to agree to pay for the property we were leaving behind. This was one way where I could combine work with pleasure. I wanted to see these bases and see what was being done with them. So we would drive around on the weekends, taking the family. We had a micro-bus at that point; all five children. Our youngest daughter was born in Paris. We'd all hop in this micro-bus, and I would look for baseball back stops. This is how we knew we were getting near a base—you'd see a baseball back stop. At that point, there were no signs that this was formerly an American base. I discovered that some of these hospitals were being used by local French communities. The airfields were also good. Other things came up.

One story that I heard was that the Air Force had a golf course at one of the bases in Normandy. We vacated the base, the Air Force said these greens were worth something, and that the French, should reimburse us for these. And the French said, “No, no, we are not going to do that.” This may be another one of those apocryphal stories, but in any case it's worth recounting. Apparently, the U.S. Air Force said, “Well, in that case we are rolling up the greens and taking them to another place.” They began to do it and the French said, “Wait, stay right there. The French Air Force will buy this golf course.” If it's not true, it ought to be.

Interesting things came up. When we were trying to figure out the value of some of these properties, we would look at the lighting, for example. Well it turns out we use a lot more lighting than the French do. So their argument was, “You may have three lights in this room, or 3,000 lights in this facility, we only need 1,500, we are not going to pay you

the extra amount." While all this was going on, these details, I got into the international law cases. I looked up one called the Chestushowa Factory Case, and I went into all these arguments about legal aspects of this and so on. We had discussions about these properties and how we evaluated them and so on. It seemed to me that in the end, there was going to be a political deal. We had to come up with a number that would be good for us, good for them, and settle this subject. Eventually, it worked out that the French defense minister was going to visit Washington. So I sent cable and I said this would probably be a good time to make an offer. What we asked for was I think about $100 million. Our initial claim was about $300 million. Well, I am told that for surplus property normally it's nickel for a dollar, and we were going to get about 25-30 cents on the dollar, so we weren't doing too badly. And it opened up a way to a better relationship in general. So we settled that. The foreign minister told our ambassador—and this went into my efficiency report—that my work with this problem had been very important towards a settlement. We got over a hurdle with no bad feelings about what happened to the property.

And, as I said, there were other things we did that I worked on. Some ideas that I came up with led to very much closer cooperation in terms of planning and working together. It unfortunately still hasn't returned to what it used to be, when they were a full NATO member, but little by little, we learned to work with them. I spent a lot of time when I was at NATO working with the French. I guess I'd have to say I'd always found them very worthy adversaries. You got to watch yourself, they are smart. But you can deal with them; you can work things out with them.

Let's see, what else about Paris? We had a good embassy, a good group of people there. Many of whom became close friends. Bob Frowick, who I first met when I was in Ottawa; he was in Montreal. He worked next to me in the political section. Allen Holmes was also in the political section. Bob Anderson was the Political Counselor. John Condon was the Labor Attach#. I hadn't mentioned Joe Presel, who later became Ambassador to Uzbekistan. John Condon and Joe Presel were two of the best contact people I ever

met. They were just wonderful in getting out and meeting folks, getting useful information, coming back, and reporting. Both became good friends of ours. There was a lot of social activity in Paris. You can imagine, lot of cocktail parties, receptions, dinners, lunches, on and on. We did a lot of entertaining at home.

We found a wonderful apartment, it was on the Rue de Rivoli and Rue Cambon, which puts it across the street from the Tuileries and was two blocks from the Embassy. The kids had to commute to school, and I walked to work. In those days, before the troubles in Vietnam and so on, we had a side gate into the Embassy, so when it was raining I learned that I could walk under the arcades on the Rue de Rivoli, stay down till the metro but not use the metro, walk underneath the Place de la Concorde and Rue Royale, come up outside the station to Hotel de Crillon, and then walk into the Embassy through the side gate so you would get a little moisture on you but not much.

That all ended while we were there and when the dangers from Vietnam grew. In fact, I was assigned the task of examining the Embassy to see what we could do to strengthen security. That was an interesting job, because I got into the basement and to the back side of the building, trying to figure out where we would have to put up gates and so on. There was a security officer but, for whatever reason, the ambassador asked me to do this. It began to change. That side door was closed. If you go there—the last time I was there at least—it was a small fortress.

We had quite a good spirit in the staff there. In fact, everyone was happy to be living in Paris. Almost everyone. I can't imagine why anyone wouldn't be. It was one of the most wonderful times of our life. And the dollar was strong, at least until 1973, when we left. In '71 I think the gold standard ended. It was good strong dollar, the prices were not bad, and we were able to see a lot of the country. We traveled extensively through France. We both got to know it really well. Soon after we got there, without too much effort, we felt at home. You could spend the entire day in French and not feel out of place. It was automatic. It was a good place to be.

We had two ambassadors while I was there. The first was Sargent Shriver, who I enjoyed very much. He was interested in things. If you sent him a memo, he didn't just read it. He'd write marginal notes and he'd call you in and ask you to explain things, and he was active, encouraging. Some of the issues that I mentioned and that I didn't want to discuss in any detail went through him. I had some difficulties with some of the other folks to get some of the key messages. I got in trouble with one of those guys afterwards, but I had to do it. He was blocking what I knew we needed. Just a presentation of this. And Shriver called me in and he looked at this paper that he had in front of him, which I had written but it wasn't really what I wanted, and he said, “This is too vague,” etc. I said, “Yes sir, it is. How would you like to see a legal version of this, sort of a legal approach?” Shriver was a lawyer and he said, “Yes.” I said, “Just a moment.” I got in trouble for this. I went and I said, “here.” And he said, “yes! That's what I've been waiting for.” That paper had been sitting on somebody else's desk for a month and a half, and he wouldn't let it go. He was really ticked at me afterwards. Not Shriver, but one of my supervisors. Really angry. But, if I had not done that, we would not have gotten this message out and the program that we finally worked out with them, with the French, would not have happened.

He was always late to events, Shriver. But he couldn't help it. I accompanied him to receptions, and people would surround him. He was a gregarious man, he enjoyed talking with people. He would head for the door, because he had another reception—or two or three a night—and people would grab him. And he couldn't be rude. He was late, but I didn't hold it against him.

Ambassador Watson was probably one of the most difficult people I've ever met. He was a very hard guy to work with. There are tons of stories I could tell about him, but I am not sure I should, he is gone. Just leave it at that, he was not easy to work with. And mercurial in some ways. I'll mention the one occasion I used the word to describe a situation. Remember I told you about learning from Howard Green about the problems of being seen as provocative and how you should, if you see a situation as one that could become

a problem, try to do things on a routine basis so that if you do it in emergency it'll seem normal. And we had a problem. One of the jobs I had was every year and I guess once a month in addition, we put in for over-flight rights. That is for American planes to over-fly France. When they left NATO, we had to go through this drill with them. It was their sovereignty, and they wanted to demonstrate that they would work with us; but we would have to make a presentation and say, these planes will be doing this on that mission.

I had attended a conference of political/military officers in Stuttgart with U.S. military as well as folks from embassies. They were concerned with over-flight rights in case of trouble in the Middle East. It occurred to me that when I put in these requests, they were usually for various types of flights. But if we thought we were going to have to over-fly with troop transports or something like that, again remembering that lesson about not appearing to provoke, it would be easier for the French to give clearance for a fairly large number if we had established a pattern in advance. We would show that when we did these over-flights and missions, and were going from here to there, we were practicing and exercising. So I suggested that we move in the direction of asking for more over-flights in certain areas. I will say this, and it will give you a feel for why Watson was hard to deal with. I explained this, that this concept came out of this conference, and that I thought we had a way to deal with this issue by every year, every time we put in these requests, putting in a request for this particular type of over-flight. You see what I am getting at? And I said, “If we skew the request in this direction, if there is a problem, it will be much easier for the French to accept, because it had already been accepting that kind of thing in great numbers.” He blew up. He said, “I don't like that word “skewed.” It's not in the dictionary, and I banned it from IBM.” Bob Anderson grabbed me, “I know it's in the dictionary, don't get on with him.” And Watson said some other things which I won't be repeating. That was the end of that. But in fact we did eventually begin to make that move. I could only assume that at some point in the past, someone had used that word at some meeting and he got angry or whatever was the case. I don't know what it was but he just took off. There were other funny stories, but as I said, I won't go into them.

Q: How about Mr. John Irvine?

GLITMAN: He was, if I recollect correctly, Watson's brother-in law.

Q: Oh, that's interesting. Arthur K. Watson's brother-in-law?

GLITMAN: Yes. John Irvine was a fine man. Calm, thoughtful. He knew his stuff but he did leave the impression sometime that he wasn't sure. But he had it right. You could talk to him, he'd understand it quickly but often I'd get the sense when he asked questions afterwards that he wasn't sure that he had it right, but he did. He was a good man.

Q: What was Watson's career? What was his background?

GLITMAN: He was a son of the founder of IBM.

Q: I'm sorry. I meant Irvine's?

GLITMAN: He was married to Watson's sister. I believe that's the tie-in. He was a lawyer, and had eventually become Deputy Secretary of State, either before or after this. But I liked him. As I said, he was an easy man to work with.

Q: How about some comment on Corps Diplomatique and life in Paris, just in general? We've learned about this fabulous home of yours...

GLITMAN: The diplomatic corps was large, as you can imagine. There were many events, receptions, and so on. You'd get quite busy with it. They were a good group of people. I can't think of any specific examples and events that stand out particularly. It was just a very busy place with lots of activity. Most of the people assigned there were very good, from all the different countries. Life in Paris? Well, what can I say? It was a wonderful place to live at a wonderful time.

Q: Did you have school-aged children? Did they go to school in Paris?

GLITMAN: Yes. The two older boys went to the American School. They were too far along and we felt, maybe wrongly, that they would be better off doing their studies in English rather than going to a French school. But for the three younger ones, we put them in the Ecole Active Bilingue, bilingual school; it was in the Parc Monceau, and you may have seen pictures of wonderful gilded gates. It was a wonderful school. What they did there was to spend the first semester doing history in English and algebra in French or math in French and so on. You would take different subjects in a different language, and then, in the fall, you would switch around. Children very quickly became bilingual. My wife would pick them up at the school, and she would listen to them play with the French children, and back and forth, between English and French, whichever language seemed to best fit the need of the moment to describe something or make a point, they'd switch to that. They were very fluent, all three of them that went there. And they never lost their good French accents.

Our son, who was our youngest boy, he was able to read Le Monde, at least to pronounce the words, and then the Herald Tribune, but here is an interesting point. When we left Paris, we got on TWA and flew out. My wife and I tried to encourage them to continue to speak French, but he just would not—not even on the airplane. In his mind, he was going back to the U.S. and he was not going to be speaking French. Well, he still speaks it quite well, but he did consciously try to stop. Another thing that happened, in his case, was that he learned to write (the French don't go through printing, they start with script). He had beautiful penmanship and, when we got back to Washington, to Bethesda, they forced him to print. We had his old French books, written out with this wonderful hand. His handwriting is awful now, and the school system would just not make an adjustment for this student. Which is too bad. My handwriting is pretty awful, and his is still far better than mine, but it was, if you could see it, the child of five or six writing so beautifully, and then at eight or nine it looks not quite so good.

I had mentioned that I was able to walk to work while the kids were going to have to commute. That was true for two older boys, but Chris had to drive the three younger ones to school. Both of us, I am afraid, picked up some bad driving habits, driving around in Paris in particular. We had to make corrections when we came back to the States.

As you know, when we make a left hand turn, people line up in the left hand turn lane. But in Paris, they don't do that. They line up shoulder to shoulder and the whole side swoops across. It's great fun. That reminds me of a remarkable scene I happened to witness where the Champs Elys#es comes out into the Place de la Concorde. I was able to walk to the Quai d'Orsay, across the bridge from the Embassy. On this occasion I had some business there, but I was walking. You have to try to picture this scene. This is what I saw. Coming down the Champs Elys#es, which is a very wide street, were a number of cars, blocked by some other vehicles that were cutting across the Champs Elys#es, just before they enter the Place de la Concorde. There is a little street there. What happened was that there were buses in effect blocking the view of the people coming down the Champs Elys#es, and blocking the view of what was below that. And those who were coming out of the Place de la Concorde, seeking to go in to the Champs Elys#es, their view was also blocked. What I noted was that there was this line of buses across there that blocked their view. On either side of this line of buses, blocking the view of those coming out of the Champs Elys#es, the drivers had begun to spread out. In other words, instead of staying in the right lane or the left lane on both sides of this traffic, which they could not see, they had spread out to cover the entire Champs Elys#es. So when the buses disappeared, you found lines of cars facing one another. And they had trouble sorting that one out. It was very amusing to see that.

We talked a little bit about the apartment. I should point out that it was a wonderful place. It took a month of negotiating to get the price to where we could barely afford it. I made sure the contract was settled in dollars, so when French franc devalued we were able to handle that. That worked out fine. There were also some presidential visits, one very important

presidential visit. That was the visit of President Nixon, soon after he was inaugurated. Each of us was assigned to a different event, to cover and act as liaison with French officials. And to preview the event and make sure that everything was set up right. I was given the Petite Trianon, a palace where Nixon and President de Gaulle were going to meet. I was able to go there and, in effect, walk through the building and see exactly where they were going to stand and sit. We had to report all that information back to Washington in exquisite detail: President will arrive; he will walk up three flights of steps; turn to the right; go x number of feet; General de Gaulle will be there to greet him; they will then proceed to this room and that room; and so on and so forth. But we got to see the entire inside of the building.

A couple of interesting things happened during that visit. One was that Dr. Kissinger missed his motorcade, so he arrived late, and was quite unhappy, but we did manage to get him in. We knew the building and we knew exactly where he should be. The other two points were that, while President Nixon and President de Gaulle were meeting alone, the foreign ministers were also supposed to be meeting. But all the key interpreters had gone with the President and that left the need for someone to interpret between the American Secretary of State Rogers and the French Foreign Minister. That task fell to me. I was pretty nervous. The subject was Vietnam. It doesn't matter which way it was, French into English would have been somewhat easier, and I think that's the way it went. But I was not a trained interpreter. Taking notes and so forth. But there I was on the spot. Well, the discussion went on, and there were some very easy short phrases; but then, at one point, one of the participants dove into the matter and began going on at great length. I was falling further and further behind and, as I was about to get almost submerged, to drown in this, somebody came in and said, “The two presidents are ready to receive you now.” So I didn't have to do the translation. That was kind of an amusing escape.

Another thing I learned when I was in France, and that I later put to use, was the material with which we were working on the political/military side. I dealt with the Quai d'Orsay principally, but after a while I began to go to the Defense Ministry as well and meet with

Michel Debr#. He was Defense Minister and he had a foreign service officer, Serge Boisdevaix, from the Quai, working as his diplomatic assistant. So I spent a lot of time with Boisdevaix and was fully in with Minister Debr# as well. What I discovered during this period was that when you are trying to deal with some military problems, there are advantages to trying to keep diplomats out and let the military work with the military. It's a much better way to get things done. Because they get down to the brass tacks. They know exactly what it is that they need, they know how far they can go, and that was something that I found useful later. If you are having trouble dealing with your diplomatic colleagues, see if you can make progress by letting the military do it directly. It did help move these issues along in France, and also later in NATO.

Q: In 1973 you returned to Department of State, serving as Director of the Office of International Trade Policy and subsequently as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Trade Policy. In this later capacity you chaired several U.S. delegations to GATT and OECD. Let's talk about these matters now.

GLITMAN: This was a particularly difficult time in a sense that there had been an Arab-Israeli problem again in '73 and the price of oil begun to rise as result of the war. This was one of the consequences of the OPEC raising prices on oil. So a lot of the economic activity was focusing on the energy problems. The trade side had a role to play and it was essentially, as I refer to it, as a “blocking back.” That's how I saw my role at this point. To keep the road open so that we could make progress on the crucial energy problem. The key issue that we were confronting on the trade side was protectionism in the U.S. and elsewhere. There was new trade legislation that was going into affect about the time I came to that job, and I got to see it through to its approval. We were working on another trade round, trying to get that set up. But essentially, this was all an effort to keep the international economic system functioning as smoothly as possible and to avoid a possibility that we would be a part of an effort to raise barriers to trade at a time when we

really needed to keep things as open as possible. Much of the work became quite detailed on the specific questions.

To give you some quick examples: mushrooms. One becomes an expert on mushrooms in this kind of work. And whatever else you deal with. I won't say that you become an expert, but you at least become somewhat knowledgeable about it. And the problem here was imports coming from, I believe, Taiwan and Korea in particular. These were tinned mushrooms, which were cutting into the American mushroom producers' market. One of the problems was that they were being undersold by these imports. But as somebody pointed out to me, if we enjoyed fresh mushrooms in this country, it was because the fresh mushroom industry was functioning; however, if it went under because of the importation of canned mushrooms, we'd have nothing but canned mushrooms. That was somewhat of an incentive to work hard for the mushroom industry. It did involve a lot of discussion with the diplomats, trade people from Taiwan and, I believe, from Korea as well. There were rules and regulations that we had to follow, but, on the other hand, the problems of dumping, that is to say selling exports at a lower price than you would normally buy in an internal market, topics like that, we certainly had grounds for taking them to the GATT. We would do this to ensure that they would follow the GATT rules.

Other issues, topics that came up, were cheese and dairy products. These were also a problem because of a surplus of such products in many countries. Many countries subsidize their dairy industry very heavily. And again, one learns things about how different industries function. The issue with the dairy industry was butterfat. The object for countries was to get their butterfat out, if not in the form of milk and cheese, then in the form of butter cookies. But the net result of that approach was, if we started getting heavy imports of cookies and other items made from butterfat, it ate into our own domestic dairy industry. Again, we had rules and regulations in GATT which described what was legal and what wasn't. If we thought the other countries were not following the GATT rules, we would, in effect, take them to court.

Sometimes I found that on our side things maybe had gone a little too far. One example had to do with cheese in which some of our people were very zealously arguing that other countries were exporting their cheese to the U.S. and selling it as very cheap cheese. Then the imported cheese would be melted down in the U.S. into something like Velveeta. They began arguing that some of the cheeses that were brought in this way were Emmentaler and Gruy#re, two very expensive Swiss cheeses. It didn't seem to me to make any sense, to export expensive cheeses so that they could be melted down for cheaper cheeses. In any case, one of the items we got into was whether anyone could tell the difference between Emmentaler and Gruy#re. I said that if I could prove to them that I could tell the difference blindfolded would they agree with me that Gruy#re at least did not belong on this list of cheap cheeses that were being dumped in America. So we did do a blind taste test and I did get them right. That's sort of a strange way to make policy, but it did prove the point.

Another case we got involved with was steel imports from Japan. Again, there was concern that these items were being dumped in the U.S. Once again, our effort was to try to make sure that our industry was properly protected without going beyond the rules and the regulations that we had agreed. I found myself in this job traveling an enormous amount of time. I figured out afterwards that I was gone just about one week of every month. For example, in the case of Japan, I made a very brief trip there during one of the steel issues. I found out about it, determined that I was going to have to go to Tokyo for one day, and 24 hours later I was on a plane and we flew to Japan. We went to meet with the Japanese Foreign Ministry, gave them some bad news, then they took us to lunch, to some restaurant in Tokyo, my first time there, so of course I was interested in everything I was seeing. Then we visited with the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and we gave them some bad news. Then we ran for the plane, in order to be back in Washington before the announcement could be made so that we wouldn't be asked any further questions about it. Washington would handle all this out of Washington. But we wanted to give the Japanese a heads-up by flying there. Travel led to Geneva quite frequently as well. And it was at a

time when I really felt that I had seen enough of airplanes. In any case, I believe we did succeed in dealing with the protectionist problem at that time. It was possible then to make some progress on the energy side.

One thing I introduced during this period was what I refer to as the “graduation concept.” That was result of having seen ads in American newspaper for Brazilian armored infantry vehicles, and I began to think that if Brazil was capable of competing with us in something like building armored cars, military vehicles, not Cadillacs with extra armor but military vehicles, that perhaps time had come, at least in that kind of industry, when Brazil really didn't need the type of assistance that a less developed country might need. That concept of graduation eventually found a way into the U.S. approach to the trade policy; I think it's still there now. It was a fairly full period in my life.

Q: How long were you in this position? You started in 1973. Was it '76 that you...?

GLITMAN: Yes, in 1976, it's a fairly long story but, quite briefly, I was told that I would have to move out of the Deputy Assistant Secretary's job because the Department was going to put political appointees into deputy slots in almost all of the Bureaus. Since both Jules Katz who was the principle Deputy Assistant Secretary and Joe Greenwald who was the Assistant Secretary, were both very competent, able guys and trade policy was their forte, they would be able to keep an eye on whoever came into the trade portfolio and handle it, that is, the deputy assistant secretary position in trade. So my job was the one that was going to go. That meant I had to find something else to do. At that juncture I had an opportunity to see George Vest; I explained my situation to him and asked him if he knew of anything that was coming open. And in fact he had, he did, and he said, “You need to get hold of Gene McCauliffe, another Foreign Service Officer who has just become Assistant Secretary at the Pentagon for International Security Affairs, under Rumsfeld. He's looking for somebody.” I said, “Boy, I would really like to do that.” George agreed to give Gene a call and suggested that I call Gene as well; so I did. Both McCauliffe and Rumsfeld had tried to get me to work for them when they were at NATO together. So they

knew about me. As soon as I called Gene, he was ready to have me come over. Next thing I knew, I was being called by his military assistants and preparations were underway to transfer me from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. That leads into my next period.

Q: So, now in 1976 you become Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

GLITMAN: This was a very interesting job. I liked it very much. It was very active. But I want to begin by drawing some contrast between working in the State Department and working at the Pentagon. One of the trips I took just before I left the Department of State, on the trade side, was to Ottawa. It took me a day of travel to get there, a day to do my business, and another day to get back from Ottawa. Three days were spent on one-day visit. Soon after I went to the Pentagon, I was told that I needed to go up to Ottawa to meet with the Canadians on various issues that we had with them. And it was a one-day trip. An Air Force plane flew me to Ottawa. The airplane stayed there, I did my business and I came back that night. That was quite an eye opener.

In addition to that, I felt that the atmosphere at the Pentagon was a good deal friendlier. Working in the State Department you have your friends and your colleagues, but there was something about just walking down the corridors in the State Department, which didn't become clear to me until I got to Pentagon, and until years later when I read a letter in the State Department magazine. People said “Hello” in the Pentagon, even if you didn't know them, as if you were in some small town together. There was cheerfulness in the atmosphere. In terms of making your work easy, I just gave one example of how that was done, with the airplane. The State Department doesn't have its own air force, but still the military has that capacity and they used it. There was also this sense of willingness to find solutions, to cooperate, and to resolve problems. I just have trouble regarding to what to attribute this difference. But there was definitely that sense of being in a sort of more friendly community.

I mentioned, years later there was a letter to the editor of the State magazine. The headline, the title on the letter was “That look away look.” It was a letter from a military officer who had been sent over to the State Department to work. He described walking down the halls at the State Department and he'd see people he knew there, but rather then make eye contact with him, they'd look away. He found that most peculiar. I thought about it and I said, “My Gosh, he's right. It does happen.” I wouldn't say all the time but it did happen there. And that was another contrast. I found out also working there later in life, that the military really does have a greater sense of their esprit de corps than the Foreign Service does. Maybe that's in part because they literally depend on one another for their very lives. And maybe that creates a sense of working together, helping one another. I found in retirement that the military officers genuinely helped one another in terms of finding jobs or contacts, what have you. This is the case far more than I find with the State Department and the Foreign Service.

In any case, even though the Pentagon was a large building, with lots of people in it, one did find that more friendly atmosphere—even though it was a huge bureaucracy. In my job as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, there was one stop between me and the Secretary, and that was my boss, Assistant Secretary, in this case Gene McCauliffe, also an FSO. That ability to get in touch directly with the head of the organization was far greater in Pentagon for me than it was at an equivalent job at the State Department.

As for the substance, this began with the Ford administration. We were working on ways to try to help the Defense Department get back on its feet—and our forces in Europe in particular—after expenses and the cost of the Vietnam War. We began that program. I also participated in a briefing of NATO Permanent Representatives, which Secretary Rumsfeld instituted (he having earlier been Ambassador to NATO) about the Soviet military buildup. It was on that occasion that I had my first introduction to what later became a major part of my life's work, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces issue. We, for the first time, showed the allies the situation that we were together beginning to

face as a result of the Soviets coming up with some very powerful new missiles. After the change of the administration, I stayed on in that position, working on the same questions with David McGiffert as the Assistant Secretary of Defense and Harold Brown as the Secretary of Defense. I worked very closely also with Bob Komer and our efforts there were to revitalize NATO, to ensure that the alliance would be able to meet its defense commitments with sufficient revenues, new equipment, etc. It was very serious, very important effort to try to get NATO back on its feet after the Vietnam War. I stayed at that job until the summer of 1977. At that point I had an opportunity to go overseas again and to serve as Deputy Chief of Mission at NATO, with William Tapley “Tap” Bennett, Jr. as our Ambassador. That brings us to the next phase. To round off this aspect, it was a job that I very much enjoyed. I think I made some useful contributions to national security on the job. In a way I was sorry to leave, but on the other hand having an opportunity to deal with these problems in the field and meet directly with our allies at NATO headquarters was also an important challenge, so I looked forward to moving to Brussels.

The DCM at NATO, in Brussels, had a house assigned to him. We had no need to find a place to live. It was very pleasant with a nice large yard and a lawn. It was obviously designed for entertaining downstairs. We did a lot of work to make some improvements to the reception room. It also was not far from where we lived to the For#t de Soignes, which was a large remnant of the European forest that once had covered the continent. As I mentioned earlier I very much enjoy the outdoors and one of the pleasures of living in that particular home was that I was able to go out the door, and Chris with me, and the dog, or children, and within a short couple of blocks we were in the forest. You could walk miles and miles in this forest, once you got to know the paths. There were highways that bisected it in some areas, but you could find out where the tunnels were to walk under them, so it was nice to have something so close to your home for the weekends at least when we weren't working, it was, as I said, very pleasurable. We had to drive to work, but at this point I did have a driver. Certainly after I got there, thanks to the security situation,

we began to drive with armored cars. In the beginning these were make-shift, large lumps of plastic over the windows, I suppose some sort of steel in the doors, etc.

Q: Had there been some problem that brought this about?

GLITMAN: No problems specific to Belgium, but a worldwide problem at this point. It did make a difference in our lives. From there on we would be living in that kind of situation. On the weekends, we had our own vehicle and would just go. We had purchased a Jeep Wagoneer, which wasn't the smartest thing to have at that point, but we bought it before we knew we were going overseas, and it was with the idea that we would use it to drive home to Vermont. It would have been a good choice in that instance. But it was not to be, so we shipped the car to Belgium. One of the procedures that we went through with that particular car was that to meet Belgian rules and regulation, we had to change some of the wiring. Belgians with their fog insisted on a separate fog lamp in the back, and they didn't like yellow lights that we had in the front, parking lights, whatever you call them. They had to be white. They made some other changes in the wiring. I'll finish the story about this vehicle. We then, you'll find later, moved from Brussels to Geneva and we took the Jeep with us, but the Swiss had different wiring regulations, and so all the wiring was done over for Swiss specs. Then we went briefly to Vienna, took the Jeep there— and Austrians had their wiring arrangements. And then just to make everything nice and cozy the vehicle went back to Brussels when we returned there later. We did finally ship the Jeep home to the U.S. We paid for that ourselves on this occasion. It finally died in Vermont, and you can guess how—the wiring harness burned out. It was too bad, that was the end of the poor car. So many times, with these different rules and regulations. That was another side of life in the service.

While we are still on the more social side, and then I'll get to the substance, we had a very heavy social schedule. Again, social life is work in another form. But in Brussels, at NATO I should say, there really was a lot of activity. One nice thing about NATO events and particularly the dinners was that they started at eight and they ended at 11 p.m.;

everybody arrived on time and everybody departed on time. So you could pretty well count on it. Again, as was the case in other diplomatic assignments, the dinner parties and the receptions were opportunities to continue the work that had been going on during the day at the office, but at least in a more informal setting. These events, and particularly the dinners could be difficult for Chris or any of the other spouses. I could see that often she'd be seated between two diplomats, or a diplomat and a military officer, or two military officers, people who were working together all day and had more business to transact during the evening. She would just find herself sitting there while they talked past her. There was nothing I could do about it and even today, even thinking about that circumstance, I feel badly about it. I probably was guilty of doing it myself on the occasion. But it was just the intensity of the work that I think led into that situation.

The work itself covered just about every problem in the world. It's not the UN, it's NATO, but when you begin to look at the issues that the NATO countries are interested in and the way the organization is set up, sooner or later almost any problem would find its way there, if only for experts' discussion. So NATO doesn't deal say with Latin America or the Far East, but it was not unusual for NATO Latin American experts or NATO Middle Eastern experts to come to a meeting at NATO headquarters to discuss the subject. And you could see why, given the nature of the alliance and its security role, this would be a perfectly sensible approach so that the countries could cooperate on issues. It's well beyond the boundaries of the NATO countries or the continents that they were located on. It doesn't mean that we'd actually have a defense arrangement involved; we didn't. But there was at least a discussion of these issues.

There were fixed meetings of defense ministers and foreign ministers; they would meet twice a year. In addition, the defense ministers would meet as an organization called the “Nuclear Planning Group.” It was smaller, not all the defense ministers participated in that forum, but most did eventually on a rotational basis. That was another set of meetings,

which defense ministers did. Incidentally while I was at the Pentagon working on NATO issues, I would go to those meetings as well, so I had continuity which carried over.

We worked on a number of key issues during this time. One was continuation of building our forces back up after the Vietnam War—in keeping with what was clearly a buildup of Soviet forces. We were actively engaged in that. A project that we put together (in which Bob Komer played a key role) was the long-term defense program, which he helped shepherd through NATO. It entailed setting specific goals: targets, both for results and for spending; 3% of GNP to go for defense for all of the NATO countries; this was the expenditure goal. Then there were specific goals each country agreed to meet to improve their forces. Committees and groups were set up to monitor the progress in doing that. It was a pretty thorough operation. I think it proved to be successful in helping NATO not to get back on its feet but to compensate for its forces being drawn down during Vietnam, and now to help deal with matching the Soviets and countering the increasing Soviet expenditure. The other project we got involved in, and I got deeply involved in was on the nuclear side. That culminated in a key decision NATO reached on December 12, 1979.

Perhaps I could say something about daily routine at NATO to give you an idea of the amount of activity that we had there. We had a staff meeting every morning when we came in to work. We went over the activities that were expected that day. Practically everyone had one or two committees that they were charged with following and attending in which they were representing the U.S. Some of these committees would meet on a weekly basis, some a little less frequently, but it gave everyone an opportunity to participate directly in the affairs of the alliance because of the fact that there were enough committees for everyone to have a role to play.

The permanent representatives, “perm reps,” had two scheduled events every week. One was a perm reps lunch, which took place on Tuesdays. The purpose of the lunch was to allow informal discussion of subjects which were likely to come up during the week in a more formal setting and for countries to try to get a sense of how well their position would

be received or what kinds of changes they may have to make in it and/or what sort of changes they may want others to make in their positions. The U.S.; ambassador or myself, one of us, would always be at these perm rep lunches.

Wednesdays were formal North Atlantic Council meetings. We'd always call that, of course, “the NAC.” The perm reps would be present for that meeting. This was formal occasion, as I said, and countries could put their position forward as a formal country position. The agenda was usually set during the preceding week or during the first part of the week, but normally you'd have a heads-up that such and such items were on the agenda. The international staff (NATO has international staff as well as country representatives) would sometimes be tasked to devise the agendas. They would discuss these issues with the countries delegations (national delegations) to get an idea of what different countries might be proposing. Those were Wednesdays.

On other days of the week, the special political committee, consisting of the delegations' political officers, would meet. There was a once-a-week economic committee. There were a lot of public affairs activities. We would have frequent visitors from Washington. We welcomed them, particularly from the Congress. I felt that when they came to NATO, they came for serious work. We tried very hard to give them a clear picture of what was happening at the Alliance, how it would affect the U.S., and how they could help the U.S. in its efforts at NATO. By and large, I found most congressmen and senators helpful and anxious to be of assistance to the Alliance.

Twice a year there were ministerial level meetings for both political issues, State Department and foreign ministers, and for defense ministers. For each of those meetings, there was always a formal communiqu#. Larry Legere, the officer who headed the defense side of our mission to NATO and who was formally the Secretary of Defense's representative in Europe, and people working directly for him in our mission would be responsible for putting together the communiqu# for the defense ministers activities. I would clear all of those, as would Ambassador Bennett at this time. We would clear

those communiqu#s and would assure that they were in keeping with broad U.S. policy. We never had any serious problems with this effort. And those communiqu#s would be hammered out by the staffs from the various NATO countries, usually at night. The next morning the ministers would pass on them.

For the foreign ministers' communiqu#s, the head of the political section would work on the communiqu# during the lead up to the final night, and then I as DCM would represent the U.S. at the final session. These sessions usually didn't start till about eight or nine o'clock at night and they habitually went into the small hours. I only know of one occasion, a meeting in Ankara, when we were not able to finish. We heard the call to prayer at night as the sun went down and we heard to call to prayer in the morning as the sun came up. We didn't make it that night, as I recall. As I remember, the key issue had to do with a CSCE, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, question. I don't remember the details, but I do remember that my British and French colleagues had very differing views on how to deal with this problem. And exceptionally, they exchanged a few sharp words during the course of the discussion. As always, these things tended to work out. Normally, we'd be done at three, four o'clock in the morning.

My task was to get the communiqu#s to the Secretary of State as soon as he awoke, so that he could read the communiqu# at breakfast and then, after he had read it, I would usually be called in and asked questions about it, why this was that way and how we came to that position and so on. I enjoyed those all-night sessions. I did have an advantage; I am more of a night person then an early to rise person, so as the night wore on, others wore out but I was still going.

There were times when there were disagreements between us and the French. Fortunately, I had a very good relationship with Jacques Jessel, who was the French number two for most of time that I was at NATO. There were occasions, one in particular, where he and I had reached an agreement between us on how to deal with a problem and it felt we had resolved it. But, the person chairing the group, who was normally one

of the senior NATO staff members, at the last minute, as Jacques and I were coming to agreement, you could see where the compromise would arise, jumped in with his own solution; which got both of us angry at him; because we could see that we were about to settle it. The Chair was trying to be helpful, but it would have been good time for the person chairing the meeting to sit back and let the two who were causing the problem, so to speak, settle their differences. We did. Working with Jessel was very helpful later, particularly as we got into some of the nuclear issues. And let me turn now to those questions.

The Long Term Defense Program that I had mentioned, where Komer had done a good job in getting it going, dealt largely with conventional systems. This caused some of our allies to wonder whether the U.S. was going to start downplaying its nuclear commitment to NATO. And I made a point when the issue began to crop up to make sure that Washington was aware of this sensitivity. As a result, we decided to add another element to the Long Term Defense Program, which was to examine NATO's nuclear requirements. The effort to get that element properly included into the Long Term Defense Program absorbed a huge amount of time and became extremely sensitive. The Allies, particularly some of the German leaders, had evidenced concern that we were possibly going to give up the prospect of having cruise missiles in the context of our bilateral SALT negotiations with the Soviets.

We conceded to the Allies that there was a great concern there. Specifically we might be backing away from our nuclear commitment and that our negotiating on strategic weapons could have the effect of not making it possible for the Allies or us to field new systems in Europe with which we could directly protect the Allies and directly counter new Soviet missiles, particularly the SS-20. This was a three-war head missile, about 4,000 kilometers range, which was being deployed in the Soviet Union in rather considerable numbers. We had nothing really to counter it as such. Cruise missiles were a possibility, and just to repeat myself to make sure it is clear, the Allies were saying, “Yes, but it looks as if you may giving up on them in order to get your strategic treaty with the Soviets, and that's

going to leave us in a bad situation." We tried very hard to persuade the allies that there was no reason for concern. That is, we could take care of their needs on the nuclear side with what we had. We were not going to give up everything in order to satisfy the Soviets on the strategic side; we had their concerns in mind; the targets were covered and so on. We made a major effort to do that, but it didn't work. The concern was there.

But then, in one of those ironies of history, about the time that we began to say, alright, maybe the Europeans have a point; maybe, if they are concerned, we ought to try to have some nuclear systems to back them up against the Soviet threat. At this point, the Europeans began to have somewhat different views. And part of this change on their side links back to the so-called "neutron bomb affair." About the time that I left the Pentagon, an article appeared in The Washington Post, concerning a new warhead for U.S. weapons in Europe. The very name itself was questionable. It was dubbed, by The Post, "the neutron bomb." That was a pejorative name for any kind of nuclear bomb, or any weapon, period. If you start talking about neutrons, very unpleasant images will be flashing in your mind, including the prospect that other parts of you could be "neutronized," so to speak, could be radiated. The purpose that the military had in mind with this particular weapon—and it was not a toy—was to reduce the blast effect of the weapon. When you reduce the amount of blast, you reduce the damage to surrounding properties and people. The neutron effect was not the goal; the goal was to reduce the blast. Another effect of reducing the blast was to concentrate neutron waves. Those are dangerous developments, but again, it doesn't cover a large area. What that means is that you could use, or threaten to use, these weapons in somewhat more crowded areas—because you wouldn't be blowing up houses and people. If you were looking for Soviet tanks, you could get the tanks and limit the damage around them, "collateral damage" as the military calls it. I have to back off for a moment and say there is obviously an element of unreality, lack of reality in all of this. One wonders about the value of these systems. But that's the theory that we were looking at and working from at the time.

The Soviet propaganda machine seized on these articles; the articles ran five days in a row in Washington Post, and it was the headline story. I must admit my favorite was a headline that read “Killer Bomb.” I had to say, what did you expect this thing to do? Tickle them to death? But you can get from that headline, the mood that they were in when they used that phrase, “killer bomb.” Again, the image was there. This topic got picked up in Europe, and the flames were fanned by the Soviet propaganda machine. We had some evidence of that having been in effect. Much of this activity was centered in the beginning in the Netherlands. Chris and I went up one weekend, just to look around and see, and we both noticed large full color posters in windows, “Stop the neutron bomb.” And there was this awful American weapon, the neutron bomb, that had to be stopped. We also picked up on a corner, a pathetic mimeographed 8”x10” sheet that read "Stop the SS-20 Rockets,” but you could see that the heavy funding was going to the opponents of U.S./ NATO deployment and not to opponents of Soviet missile deployment. As I said, history articles have been published that corroborated the fact that the funding was coming from the Soviet Union.

There was an effort, still, underway at NATO, to go ahead with this weapon; and the U.S. put a lot of effort, as our embassies did, as the Secretary of State did, as the Secretary of Defense did, with their colleagues in NATO-Europe to support this particular program. Ambassador Bennett and I were scheduled to have a meeting on this topic with perm reps, I think it was going to be on a Monday, which was unusual timing, to discuss this issue and to reach a final conclusion. We sent a telegram in, saying that it was going to be a tough fight, and there were some concerns with various other countries whether they would go through with it in the end. But we believed that we did have the votes, and there would be support for this if we wanted to go ahead with it.

I received a phone call the night before Bennett and I were scheduled to see the NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns, lay out our posture for the meeting, and get his support for what we were going to do during this meeting with the perm reps at which the decision

was to be made. That night, Friday or Saturday night, before the meeting was to take place, I got a phone call from Washington, late at night, I was still up but Chris had fallen asleep, it was after midnight. Person on the other end, I remember who it was but I won't go into it, said to me, “Are you sitting down?” I said, “No.” He said, “Well, you'd better because when I tell you this you are going to want to be sitting.” And he just said in effect, this was in “double talk” but I knew what he was talking about, and he just said, “It is all off. The position has been changed; you'll have a message in the morning. We know you are going to see Luns, you'd better read this message before you talk to him.” And of course the message told us that President Carter had effectively said that this was going to be delayed. We eventually had the meeting with the Allies.

I reported back that there was a lot of rancor and anger by the Europeans at the fact that we had gone this far with them, they were ready to move, and here we were, backing away, delaying the process which in effect meant killing it. That day the Soviets, I think, drew the conclusion that if they could get the European “peace movement” on their side, through a major propaganda effort, they could turn NATO around on issues of this sort. And that conclusion had a major impact on our program to improve NATO's defense posture and to include a nuclear element to that posture. So it was in my view a very costly move by President Carter. From what I can tell, his cabinet secretaries were not aware that he was going to do this either. I have read the president's memoirs, and he suggests that they were all on board and that the Europeans were on board with his move. But from my research, I don't see that conclusion and, from talking to people who were working for other involved cabinet officers at this time, they also told me that cabinet officers were caught totally off base by this decision. The so called “neutron bomb affair” was very costly for us. I tried to get the name changed, and tried very hard to get at least ourselves, the U.S. officials talking to one another, to stop calling it the neutron bomb, we could call it the reduced blast bomb, because that was what the scientists were aiming for. But, despite using it myself, I could never get anything back from Washington, rarely got anything back from Washington, trying to change the name. It was probably too late to do that anyway.

With that issue in the background, we were still continuing to try to work with the Europeans to determine what we were going to do about the Soviet nuclear build up and how we were going to handle it. Our initial effort was to try to persuade them that there wasn't a problem. We then came around and realized that if they thought there was a problem, then there was. We were dealing here with perceptions as much as reality, and if that was their perception—that we were going to abandon them—then we had a problem that we had to work on together. Because, as I said, as we began to move in that direction, the Europeans, particularly the Germans, began to wonder just how much they could do. The way that we dealt with this perception, and I think this was really a very crucial decision, was not to say, “Well, this is our negotiation, and we are going to do it all ourselves, with the Soviets.” It was essential to say to the Europeans, “We were in this together; we are going to have full, complete consultations; and we will set up a separate, new body in NATO. It will be chaired by an American, but it will be wide open for every country to be represented and all of their views will be taken into account.”

This began with an organization called the “High Level Group,” which was going to look at the deployments (possible deployments) and the “Special Consultative Group” which would look at the diplomatic arms control side. So we began; I attended most of these meetings in my capacity as the DCM. One of the procedures I quickly adopted was to suggest that there be dinners, which I would host at our house, before the actual meetings, so that we could sit down and have an informal discussion amongst ourselves—all the allies together. And if there were any specific concerns or suggestions that countries wanted to try out in an informal session, we could do that. The other idea I had in mind was to create a club—to make this effort like a club. We had a very small dining room, but we made changes to this so we could accommodate more people, so that we had enough room at the table for everybody. There were a couple of countries that would have particular issues for us, and we would have them come over little bit before for drinks or something, before the dinner. That would provide an opportunity for that sort of smaller group to discuss things. The whole point was to make this effort into true consultations.

The SCG met usually at NATO. Richard Pearle headed up the HLG. Richard had a reputation; I think “Prince of Darkness” was his nickname. That may be how he appeared to some people, but I can only say that in his capacity as the chairman of this international group, he was not anything like the caricature that had been created of him. He was a superb chairman. I must say there were times when I would have been harder nosed than he was in dealing with some of the suggestions. But he bent over backwards to bring people along with him. There was never any sense of threat, that we were going to walk out, or arrogance on his part. And he was good company. Because the U.S. military had bases here and there, instead of coming to Brussels all the time, he would arrange for these meetings of the High Level Group (the defense side of the discussions) in places like Naples or Garmisch, and so on. And again, he was building a club. People felt that they were a part of this group, and that they were building this process: they wanted to work together. So it was very effective. On the foreign ministry side, the State Department side, they didn't travel outside Brussels, but we continued the events at our house. We always had dinners that were a social get-together before they actually went to the conference table.

Now, on the substance. We had a lot of alternatives and objectives. And they had to work together. What sort of missiles would we agree to deploy? How many? And where? And on the arms control side, what sort of arms control regime did we want to field with the deployment program? This process took until, as I mentioned earlier, December 12, 1979, when it came together. We came up with, effectively this proposal: Here is what we are going to deploy; we are prepared to take everything out if we get everything out from the Soviets' side. It was from the beginning an effort to try to get to zero. Or at least the lowest possible number. But we didn't want to put out a huge number. We tried to keep it low. Our own forces to start with. All that had begun, I can't emphasize enough how important it was, that it all be done in consultation. The numbers were agreed by all of us, the U.S. didn't impose anything on the others. On the contrary, some of the smaller countries had extremely good representatives. Johan Jorgen Holst of Norway, who

was later instrumental in the Oslo Peace Accords for the Middle East, was his country's representative on the HLG I believe, as well as on the SCG. And even though Norway doesn't have nuclear weapons and doesn't host any nuclear weapons, he had some good ideas. So those ideas found their way to a position. Fred Ruth was the German representative on the SCG, obviously Germany was an important country with great interest in this negotiation. But again, Ruth's personality, his knowledge, and abilities, were put to full value in this kind of circumstance; you can see his ideas are in there. I could go on and mention many others, but I don't think anybody would say, “This is mine.” The “club” put it together. The group put it together. And that was the position that we carried with us into the INF negotiations. Again, we had the strength of being able to say to the Soviets, “You can't split this alliance; all of us agree on this.” It wasn't just the U.S., it was all of us. And, as we will see as I discuss this process further, the Soviets tried their best to split the Alliance, but for an American negotiator I had the 1979 decision, in writing, published and those were the principles that we were going to follow. It was an important moment. I think we set the standard for what consultations were supposed to be in that process.

I don't want to leave the DCM at NATO without saying a few words about Tap Bennett, who was the Ambassador during my entire time there. He was a remarkable man. He was always very calm and went about his work in cheerful way. Calm and cheerful. He knew what he wanted, and he had a remarkable way of using his low key approach to get it. His wife Margaret was also an exceptional person. Very cultured. She wrote beautifully. We know that because her Christmas cards were, and are, a delight to receive. In part because of the quality of the writing that she does, in something as simple as a Christmas card. Tap was very good at dealing with senior people—particularly with the Secretary of State and especially with the congressmen and the senators. He just had a marvelous way of making them feel comfortable and himself being comfortable around them. I wish I had that quality myself. I used to look at that and say, “Well, that's really a wonderful trait.”

Q: Where there quite a few congressional visits to NATO while you were there?

GLITMAN: Yes. And I think I may have mentioned earlier that when they came to Paris while we were there, we had a fair number of visits. Part of it was work, but part of it was not. I'd say it was part work and part “other stuff.” But when they came to NATO, they came to work. They came to learn about the organization and how issues were proceeding at that time; they had specific questions to ask. Obviously it was of importance to us that they came away from NATO with a correct view of the organization—to know its flaws as well as its strong qualities. We wanted them to know how they might be able to keep it working properly and in America's interest. There were lots of visits and, I think by and large, as I have said, these were serious visits.

There are a couple of other aspects of this process that I would like to mention at this juncture. First, I think it is useful to know who was in charge of the HLG and the SCG during the period leading up to this important decision in December 1979. Dave McGiffert, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, headed the U.S. team going to the HLG. And Reginald Bartholomew, I don't know precisely what position Reggie was holding at that time, but he headed the SCG team. Both of them did a superb job. Indeed, we were very fortunate throughout the period of negotiations, beginning with this period, this lead up to the '79 decision and continuing until the ratification. The people who represented and chaired the meeting for the U.S. side of the HLG and the SCG were all superb. Each one of them had their special qualities, and it just seemed that the right person, with the right qualities, was in the right job at the right time. I wanted to give those two people credit for having brought that decision to fruition.

The decision itself merits a little more discussion. I pointed out that it became the basis for the U.S. negotiating position. It had several principles which we carried with us into the negotiations and which we would not and did not abandon. Among these points, perhaps the key objective was that we made clear that any future limitations on U.S. systems, principally designed for theater missions, should be accompanied by appropriate

limitations on Soviet theater systems. In other words, there would be no unilateral disarmament. We said limitations on U.S. and Soviet long range theater nuclear system should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT-3 framework in a step-by-step approach. There was no SALT-3, but the key point was that it would be a bilateral negotiation between us and the Soviets. That also remained part of the process, and it was very important issue. The immediate objective of negotiations should be the establishment of agreed limitations on U.S. and Soviet land based, long range theater nuclear missile systems, and what we were doing in these discussions was defining what systems we believe we should be subjects of the negotiations. You will note that aircraft are excluded and anything that has to do with ship-based systems would also be excluded from the negotiation. We stuck with that principle throughout the negotiation. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. Therefore, the limitations should take the form of de jure equality both in ceilings and in rights; that was the key crucial principle. The Soviets had many more systems at the beginning of the negotiations than we did. And one of their constant themes was “We have to reduce more to get down to a low number.” And our counter to that was, “It doesn't matter who has to reduce how much of what. There should be no bonus for having produced more and going first. What really matters is that we end up at an equal number for the U.S. and the Soviet Union.” In addition, we talked about adequate verifiability and we made verification a very important principle for us throughout the negotiation. Those were really the basic guidelines, if you will, that the American negotiators took into the negotiations. I think we can say without any doubt that at the end of the negotiations all of those principles were found in the treaty; all of those principles were maintained. And the fact that they came out of this process of consultation strengthened our hand enormously, in insisting that these principles form the backbone of the treaty itself.

While we had these principles and a strong agreement within the alliance, we could not move to negotiate, unless we had a negotiating partner. Unfortunately, in December 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. That put a whole new light on the prospects of

negotiating with them. I should have added that we also made a move on the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiation, in December 1979 to try to give some impetus to that negotiation, which dealt with conventional weapons in Europe. That negotiation and the prospect of an INF negotiation both looked good as we came away from the December 12 decision, but the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan put them both in sort of a cold storage for a while. We continued to try to persuade the Soviets to respond to our initiative, to see if they would come to the table, throughout 1980, even with the Afghan invasion in the background. But it really wasn't until Helmut Schmidt, the German Chancellor, visited Moscow in the fall of 1980 that the Soviets began to show interest and began to hint that there could be some negotiation. I think it is important to note that it was the German Chancellor's visit that acted as a catalyst for the Soviet response. Germany was crucial in the entire INF picture. The Soviets spent a lot of time and effort trying to persuade elements of the German public to take a friendlier view towards them and more negative views toward NATO. It was a form of battleground for people's support. We'll see in the end that the ballot box was more important than the people demonstrating in the streets. But the Soviets at this point were not yet persuaded of that reality. We'll see that eventually they did become persuaded.

In any case, following Schmidt's discussion with Brezhnev, it took a while but eventually the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to preliminary talks, talks about talks, which would involve Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF systems), and they agreed to begin in Geneva in October 1980. These talks only lasted for a month. We had an election, as you may recall, at this point. But they did cover a good deal of ground. I went back and read all the memorandums on their conversations and verbatim text from both sides that were exchanged, in preparation for going to Geneva. Anything that we had to cover for the rest of the negotiation came up at these preliminary talks, so they were useful in helping define where the sides positions were to start with. Of course, after only a month, we couldn't get too much further along.

As I said, there was an election and Ronald Reagan became the president of the United States. The change of administration, of course, meant a new look at all policies, which is a normal event in the U.S., and among the issues that came up for a new look was the INF issues and whether there should or should not be negotiations. There was indeed some question regarding whether there would be negotiations. There were some officials in the administration who were opposed to the negotiations. But in the end, the decision was made to move forward and to conduct negotiations with the Soviet Union. It took another year after the election before those negotiations did begin. But they would be a major element of the rest of my career.

Q: Okay, we'll now move into late 1981-1984. You'd been appointed Deputy Negotiator with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations with the rank of Ambassador in Geneva. How did this job come about?

GLITMAN: As you've seen, I was very deeply involved with the whole INF issue and had been for some time. It was almost natural that I would continue to see this issue through, hopefully to its successful conclusion. Not being a military man, I could not be a part of the deployment aspect of the development, which was the agreement reached in '79 to deploy weapons. But I did feel that I could make a contribution to the arms control negotiation side. And I made my interest known. I was, at one point, the State Department's candidate for the position of Chief Negotiator, but the decision was made to appoint someone who had far greater experience and certainly was better known, to the job of the Chief Negotiator (that person was Paul Nitze), and I would be the Deputy Negotiator with the rank of ambassador.

Nitze was the first Washington official I had ever laid eyes on. It was at a conference on national security issues, with senior students selected by their university, in my case the University of Illinois. I don't recall what he said, but I remember the positive reaction I had to it and to him. When I returned to Washington, after the arrangements had been

made that he would be the chief negotiator and I would be his deputy, I joined in the U.S. delegation's preparation for the opening round of the INF negotiations.

I soon found that Nitze and I approached problems in a similar manner. In our delegation meetings, all ideas, regardless of who proposed them were considered and subject to a rigorous logic check. It they passed the check, they were adopted. If one part of an argument was questionable, it had to be dropped. If the proposition could not stand without that argument, the proposition would be discarded. When Nitze's contributions were subjected to the process, he was, to his credit, quite prepared to rethink his position if he or the group concluded that someone else had a better idea or formulation. This rigorous examination really was the key to the delegations ability to put forward logical, well constructed papers.

Nitze was and still is a remarkable human being in every sense. Not only is he remarkable intellectually, but also physically. He was in his '70s and we used to ski with him, and he continued to be active. He is just a remarkable human being. I very much enjoyed working with him. I learned a lot from him.

I should also note that the one other thing we shared, Nitze and I, and that was appreciating the value of “constructive ambiguity” and “bifurcated clarity” in situations where it might be necessary temporarily to put aside a difference during the negotiating process. But we also both saw no room for this device in the formulation of the treaty which would legally bind the U.S. Again, there was that rigor which he had and I felt very much akin to and tried to continue when I took over as the chief negotiator. It was a very positive element in our ability to work closely together.

In preparing to go to Geneva, Nitze asked our legal advisor, Tom Graham, who was from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), to begin the process of drafting the treaty; the final version of which would mark the culmination of the negotiating efforts. Getting an early start on this task helped us ensure that we would be able to prepare

a draft of the treaty early on and thus improve the prospects that negotiations would in effect be, but without anyone making a point of it, worked from our draft. Again, this was a process in which we continued to try to stay ahead. The legal writing was ahead, our views would be available in legal form early on, so that when the discussion began to turn on a specific issue, whatever section of the treaty you are looking at, we had a text down and the other side did not. Our text essentially became a working document. The Soviets could say, “Take this paragraph out, put this paragraph in,” but they would work from our document. And again, Nitze showed great foresight and acumen in getting that process started early. I can assure you that I followed that same pattern as well.

In addition to the legal aspects of the treaty and the tactical aspects of the negotiation, there was one point that I worked very hard to get across within our delegation. Noting the political nature of the INF issue, I urged that the substance of our position, as reflected in the draft treaty, be rooted in the '79 decision. This was not SALT; this was not a bilateral strategic negotiation involving only U.S. and Soviet interests. In the INF issue, we were acting as agents for NATO allies as well as for the U.S. We would have failed, if we had ended with an agreement which was technically sound from the U.S. standpoint but which left the allies with an impression that their interests had not been adequately taken into account. To ensure that this did not happen, the negotiator would need to remain in close contact with the SCG process, at the North Atlantic Council, at NATO headquarters, and directly with NATO capitals. One of the reasons I was given the rank of ambassador was to permit me to carry out those duties, in an effective way, with the Europeans.

Q: After all these preparations, we get to Geneva?

GLITMAN: Yes. Before Geneva, Nitze and I went to call on Helmut Schmidt and the German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher. Days before the actual beginning of the negotiations we were in Bonn and in Hamburg to meet with Schmidt. We were underscoring the effort we made to keep the allies fully informed of what we were doing. Obviously the Germans were key because the Pershing missiles were going to be

deployed only in Germany and the cruise missiles would be deployed in Germany plus four other basing countries, the U.K., Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands. Indeed it was symbolic of the underlying nature of this negotiation that our first task on the opening day of the negotiations was to meet with the group of European parliamentarians. We reviewed and compared the negotiating positions of both sides, noted the importance of allied solidarity (including continuing with the deployments) to achieve an agreement. Even as we prepared to meet with Soviets, you could see how important keeping the allies on board was—not just on board, but working closely with them. I particularly took seriously this concept of being an agent for them as well as for ourselves.

The building we moved into is called the “Botanic”; it's in Geneva of course, and it's across from the botanical gardens. It is not too far from other UN offices, and on a nice day, you could walk to it. The American mission in Geneva was in a separate building, up the hill from us and the UN offices, so it was a little climb to get there. But we were not housed at the U.S. mission; we were housed in this Botanic building. It had been originally constructed by a financier, Bernard Cornfeld, I believe the name was. I think he went bankrupt. I hoped that wasn't going to happen to us. I had been in that building earlier because the U.S. delegation to the GATT was also housed in that building, so I was familiar with it. It had a certain number of drawbacks from the security standpoint. The building was also home to the Hungarian delegation to the UN. Obviously, that wasn't too comfortable. The West Germans were also located in the building and, in fact, shared a wall with us. That wall was in our main room where we met with the Soviets for plenary sessions.

Let me say a little bit now about how we actually worked. Twice a week, we would have plenary meetings. These would be formal sessions, full delegations would be present, and we would have prepared a paper, without any idea what Soviets were going to prepare. And they would have prepared a paper without any idea of what we were going to prepare. These were formal documents that we exchanged. And on both sides they were stamped “Secret.” So we were giving over secret papers to the Soviets, and receiving secret papers

from the Soviets. In fact, at one point, we had a security investigation and somebody asked one of our people, “Did you have secret papers,” “Oh, yes.” “And what about the Soviets?” “Well, we gave some secret papers to them.” And the security man was quite upset. I had to explain to him that this was a normal exchange. But, the fact that we did exchange these papers meant that we had to be extremely careful in how we wrote them. Anything we put in those papers could be used against us. We took great care—I think I mentioned that point earlier—we took great care in preparing these papers, almost as if they were the treaty itself. Because we realized that you are giving over a hostage to fortune when you turned over one of those papers to the Soviets.

After the formal meetings, we would divide into subgroups. The ambassador and the committees would meet. I would be there with Ambassador Nitze. On the Soviet side it was Ambassador Kvitsinsky and General [Nikolay] Detinov. It would be the four of us who would meet. Then the senior people from the foreign ministries on the delegations would meet in a somewhat larger group, maybe instead of just four maybe six, maybe eight people, three or four on each side. The military people had a table of their own. There would be coffee, soft drinks, and snacks on these tables. The intelligence people would have their own table, even though they were all supposed to be unknown to anyone else, they quite quickly figured out who was who and that's where they would sit together.

A few more points that I wanted to add. One was that in addition to all the other tenants that I mentioned, there were several commercial firms in this building, in the Botanic, including a lighting company which never seemed to have any customers and which closed its doors when the U.S. arms control delegations moved out of the building in the late 1990s. That was the Zonea Electric Company, and we always kind of wondered about it but never could say anything definitive. It was clearly not ideal from the security stand-point, and it would become less so when terrorism also became a major concern.

We also uncovered another fault, or rather my wife did. When I described the office situation to Chris, I also noted that there were problems with the stairwells should we

need rapidly to evacuate the building. However, I said, there were fire escape stairs. “How do you know they are open at the street level,” she asked. “I don't,” I said. “Maybe you should walk down those stairs,” she replied. I did. They were locked tight. Neither the crash button, which should have opened the doors with a push, nor the regular door lock would budge.

Corrections were made. On the positive side, the Botanic offices were bright and cheerful. And the main conference room, which doubled as a reception room, offered a fine view of the Alps. A fair amount of our time at the office was spent in a secure conference room which was lacking most of these characteristics and amenities.

Let me describe a typical day for us; a plenary day in particular. Members and advisors would read the overnight cable traffic and the newspapers. They would individually consider what developments and reactions might flow from the “take” and perhaps discuss this with one or two others. The delegation would meet around 10:00 a.m.; our first task was to go over the formal U.S. plenary statement, due to be presented on that day, and ensure that it was factually correct and accurately got across our points. An advisor would have been assigned to draft a statement, which would have been developed in outline form in an earlier delegation meeting, and already subject to at least one or two reviews. The entire delegation would once again go over the draft, fine-tuning it if necessary. It would then be put into final form and translated into Russian. The English version was considered authoritative, and the Russian version was a courtesy to allow non-English speakers on the Soviet side to refer to the U.S. statement during the discussions. Both would be handed, as I said, to the Russians.

Having approved the statement (we are still in our delegation meeting—our internal meeting), we would then rehearse the arguments in its favor. Finally, we would discuss what we thought the Soviets might introduce at the meeting, how they might react to our statement, and how we should react to their remarks. This is something that I introduced, that is, “what are they likely to come up with?” We would use the precision of a rifle in

laying out our position, and the wide coverage of the shotgun when considering what the Soviets might have in store for us. I had, as I said, introduced this approach to help reduce the chances of being caught unaware and thus to improve the chances of acting appropriately and confidently and not having to improvise on the spot. By and large, the system worked.

The Plenary session would normally begin around 11:00 a.m. with the exchange of the formal statements. And then, as I pointed out, we would break into smaller groups. Normally, this would go on until past the normal noon hour. But, in any case, once the meeting did formally conclude, if it were held in our place, I would normally escort Ambassador Kvitsinsky and General Detinov out of the building, which afforded another opportunity to gauge the Soviet reactions to the meeting or reinforce one of our points as we went down the elevator and out the door.

As I said, the meetings would break up about one or two in the afternoon. We'd go back to our secure conference room and exchange views and reports on the formal and informal meeting. “What did you think this meant?” “How did you feel about that comment?” We would analyze the Soviet remarks for any hints of movement or signs of retrenchment, and offer our estimates of Soviet reaction to our presentation. Then we would consider what suggestions we might make to Washington for tactical or strategic moves. Summary reports, including analysis and action recommendations, would be prepared on each of the meetings and sent out at the end of the day; which often meant well after normal closing time. Interpreters prepared verbatim reports of the meetings, and all of this material was put together in a package. Norm Clyne, who was a very able delegation executive, was responsible for doing that. After he finished, Nitze and I would review and approve each of the reports before they were sent. It all made for a very long day. After leaving the office, many of the U.S. team, including the support staff, would go out together for dinner and then to their respective hotel rooms for calls back home and bed.

The negotiations were broken down into rounds which would last approximately two months. Rounds would then be followed by two months in capitals. The chief, the deputy chief, and immediate staff and the members were expected to stay the course of the negotiation, the advisors and most of the support staff might skip every other round. Most of the members were accompanied by their spouses, but the advisors usually came alone.

Recognizing the importance of continued close consultation with the European allies, I opted to be based in Geneva after the first round, and to use the inter-round period to attend SCG or HLG meetings; visit NATO capitals and meet with government and opposition leaders; attend conferences where INF was the main topic of discussion; and generally get our points across to opinion leaders, to the media, and to the public. I would usually return with the delegation to Washington for the debriefings and the determination of work assignments in the inter-round period. Then I would return to Washington again in time to participate in the final preparation of our instructions for the next round and return to Geneva with the delegation. I should add that there was some opposition to my staying in Geneva as opposed to being home-based in Washington. But given the task that I had before me, it seemed to me that I ought to live and work on the same continent. And in the end, Washington approved, and it meant that I was able to make the rounds (as I pointed out) to the European capitals to reinforce the sense and reality of consultation with the allies.

Regardless of where one was home-based, whether or not spouses were along, the continuing back and forth movement, plus being away from home for extended periods, was not conducive to a normal family life. Nitze's Secretary, Nancy Jenkins, had at one point been the social director at an officer's club. She (and the military assigned to the negotiations) understood the importance of maintaining morale in such circumstances. She organized weekly events, movies on some occasions, square dances and others events. An end-of-round party provided an opportunity to let off steam by skits and application of topical lyrics to well known tunes. Despite efforts such as these, by the time

the negotiation had ended, there were some divorces, balanced by some weddings. Most, however, adapted to the unusual rhythm of life as best as one could.

Let's get to the very first meeting. It was held at the Soviet delegation. They lived in a compound with a large wall around it. There was one old mansion which was used for some events, and I believe we held our first meeting in what must have been a dining room in that building. Then they had some newer buildings. Many of the Soviet delegates lived in those buildings. I gather they had a communal kitchen and a restaurant. Some of them lived in hotels as most of our people did, but the majority of them lived within the compound. The first meeting began there. Of course the press was busy; we sort of waved to the media and walked in.

As we expected, both sides at the first meeting laid out in broad terms their basic positions and the reasoning behind them. We underlined the concerns of the U.S. and its allies, as laid out in the December 1979 NATO decision, and the principles that were embodied in that decision. We highlighted the principle of an equal outcome, explaining why it was essential to a balanced agreement. We reviewed the arguments for concentrating on long range INF missiles and placing global limits on them. And we noted the importance of incorporating an effective verification regime within the treaty.

The Soviets had been proposing a moratorium on any new line of missiles in Europe, via the media, before the negotiations began. Not surprisingly, at the first plenary meeting, they put forward a proposal for a moratorium on the deployment or preparation for deployment, of new or additional INF systems in Europe. As you can easily see, this was a patently one-sided position which would have left the Soviet Union with over 1,000 war heads on its INF missiles while the U.S. would be frozen at zero. While it was patently one-sided, as we will see, it was not unusual. Very often they seemed to like moratoriums when we didn't have anything and they had something. They became less fond of them when we began to deploy ourselves.

While the Soviet plenary statement contained no surprises, the informal session was surprisingly revealing of the Soviet position, and Kvitsinsky's view of the relations between states. Kvitsinsky, General Detinov, Ambassador Nitze, and I, as well as two interpreters—one Soviet and one American—were at the first post plenary meeting. Kvitsinsky began by saying he wanted to tell us a joke about a rabbit and a bear. The two were traveling in the same train compartment. Some time after the train had left the station, the rabbit began feverishly searching his pockets and then let out a gasp. “Ah!” “What's wrong,” asked the bear. “I seem to have lost my ticket,” replied the rabbit. “So what,” said the bear. “So what,” exclaimed the rabbit. “When the conductor comes around he will find that I have no ticket and have me locked up!” “Don't worry,” said the bear, “I can take care of it.” Kvitsinsky had a great bass voice. “How,” asked the rabbit. “Well,” the bear said, “when the conductor knocks on the door, I'll pick you up by the ears and hold you out the window. I will give him my ticket and he won't know you are here.” Assured that the powerful bear would protect him, the rabbit calmly awaited the conductor's arrival. Then, as promised, when the conductor knocked on the door, the bear picked up the rabbit by his ears, and held him out the window of the speeding train. “Where is your ticket,” the conductor asked. “Right here,” the bear said, showing his ticket with his right hand. “And what to you have in your other hand,” the conductor asked. “Nothing,” the bear replied, pulling his now empty left hand out of the window.

I should add that our plenary statement had made several references to the importance we placed on serving the interests of our NATO allies. Nitze and I concluded that Kvitsinsky's joke was meant as an object lesson for how a great power should deal with their allies. We were astonished by Kvitsinsky's near recklessness in a situation where anything you say can and will be used against you, in suggesting so openly to us that this is how the Soviets would act if they were in our place. And it was his failure to understand that we neither would nor could play the role of the bear. I did not fail to repeat the joke in future meetings with NATO allies.

The bear story clearly reveals one of the more serious issues we had with the Soviets, basically how you deal with allies. But there were also many other fundamental differences. And the first among these was a basic disagreement over whether the U.S. and its NATO allies had the legitimate right to deploy U.S. nuclear missiles in Europe capable of reaching targets in the Soviet Union. The U.S. and its European allies based their position on the inherent right to individual and collective self-defense accorded by Article 51 of the UN charter. This inherent right underlies the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. The Soviet position in denying that the U.S. and its allies had the right to deploy U.S. missiles in Europe in defense of NATO presented, in effect, a challenge to the legitimacy of NATO itself. In devising proposals, which in all of their variations had a common theme, that is no deployment of U.S. INF in Europe while the Soviets maintained all of their new SS-20s and modern medium range aircraft as well, the Soviets were seeking to give practical and juridical legitimacy to their claim that the U.S. had no role to play in Europe, that the issue of INF missiles was one for Europeans to handle alone.

Kvitsinsky understood this. At one of our early meetings when I noted the Soviet unwillingness to move in our direction, he replied that their very participation in these negotiations with the U.S. was in itself a major concession. And given the Soviet point of departure he was right. But in making his comment, he also acknowledged that the Soviet Union knowingly accepted the premise of our position by agreeing to the talks. It remained to be seen whether the practical outcome of the negotiations would further support the underlying U.S. and NATO position.

Another underlying philosophical and political force was a question of principle. Should the outcome be based on equal reductions, as the Soviets argued, or on an equal outcome as the U.S. proposed. And connected to this issue was the Soviet insistence that U.K. and French nuclear forces be taken into account in determining the existing and future balance of INF missiles and aircraft among the U.S., NATO, and the Soviet Union. No

other issue in the negotiating process took up more time than this fundamental nexus of linked questions of legitimacy, the nature of equality, and the bilateral nature of the negotiations.

One of the other issues we dealt with was whether to include aircraft. Our basic point was that aircraft were not as threatening. I am not saying that they were unthreatening, but not as threatening as the missiles, and that we really needed to concentrate on the missiles. In addition to this point, the Soviets continued to argue that we had more aircraft than they did. We'd been rather defensive about the aircraft position, and, as the debate wore on, I suggested that we might go over to the offensive. By our account, the Soviets had far more INF range aircraft than the U.S. and NATO. We might suggest to the Soviets, that while we continue to consider missiles more worthy of priority attention, we were quite prepared to consider reductions in aircraft and then confront them with the quantitative asymmetry. The U.S. Air Force had some qualms about this approach, but when they ran the numbers and saw how we could argue in good conscience that the Soviet INF range aircraft outnumber ours, they took up the challenge.

Among the aircraft that the Soviets sought to exclude was their new Fencer. They argued this aircraft could not fly a 1,000 kilometer round trip mission. At the same time they insisted that older U.S. aircraft could undertake such a mission. When we probed the Soviets how they could have come to such conclusion, the discussion turned into a question of flight profiles. Aircraft use less fuel when flying at high altitudes but at lower altitudes, where the air is denser and offers more resistance, they use more fuel. It was generally understood that most aircraft would take off low, fly high towards the target, drop down under the radar to deliver their weapons, exit the target area, and then fly back to base at higher altitudes. The Soviets claimed that their flight profile called for flying low to and from the target. As a result their range was limited. When we asked them why their aircraft had to fly such a flight profile while our aircraft could fly a more efficient and effective flight pattern, they replied that our airplanes had technical advantages over theirs.

For the Soviets to make such an argument was most unusual. The fact that they used it is an indication of the importance they placed on being able to protect their claim that NATO had an advantage in aircraft, even if it meant acknowledging the superiority of U.S. equipment. We continued to hammer away at this chink in their armor. In any event, the seeds were planted which would eventually lead both sides to agree to drop aircraft from the INF treaty regime.

Despite or maybe because of the inability of both sides so early in the negotiations to move off their opening position, the verbal jousting during the post-plenary sessions continued at a brisk pace. In preparing for my job, as deputy chief U.S. negotiator, I read a number of articles about Soviet and Russian negotiating tactics. Some of these were provided by my European NATO colleagues, thus giving me more than one slant on this topic. In addition, my previous work in the international trade arena had exposed me to a wide variety of national and individual negotiating approaches. Among the frequently mentioned ploys, the desire to get the last word, and the device of putting your words into an interlocutor's mouth, and vice versa, seemed to have been particularly well learned by our Soviet counterparts.

After our first two post-plenary meetings, I pointed out to Nitze that Kvitsinsky seemed especially to favor these two old standards. As our next meeting drew to a close, he was at it again. Nitze, however, got the best of him by saying, “Well, Mike, he really has to have the last word so let's give it to him and get out of here.” Which we proceeded to do. At the next post-plenary meeting, Kvitsinsky, indirectly referring to the tale of the rabbit and the bear, suggested that in approaching the negotiation we should go beyond good and evil. I said, “That judgment comes from Nietzsche and you know what had that lead to.” “Yes, I do,” said Kvitsinsky. “Nietzsche lead to Wagner. Wagner, I said, “gave us the Gotterdammerung.” Soon thereafter, as the meeting seemed about to enter into the last word jockeying phase, Kvitsinsky turned to General Detinov and said, “Well, Nikolai, Glitman always has to have the last word, so let's give it to him and leave.” Later in the

negotiations, the Soviet ploys took on a counterproductive and perhaps sinister aspect adversely impacting efforts to find a common ground.

In addition to the major issues involving the longer range INF systems, there were several other issues which were of special importance. We were beginning to see them and recognize that we would have to resolve them. One was the treatment of shorter range systems. These would be systems with ranges below 1,000 kilometers. NATO had originally proposed that these systems be dealt with under some form of “collateral constraints,” but it wasn't spelled out. But somehow or other, they would not be allowed to run totally free when we would put a ban on the production and holdings of the longer range INF missiles which went from 1,000 to 5,500 kilometers in range. We proposed to limit certain of these shorter range systems. The Soviets argued that short of eliminating all non-strategic nuclear forces from Europe, systems with ranges below 1,000 kilometer should not be constrained. Needless to say, they had quite a large numerical advantage in those as well. That was one question, we referred to it as SRINF, short range INF, and it was one issue we knew we would have to address as the negotiations proceeded.

Another one involved the method of reduction. We favored destruction; the Soviets had a combination of destruction and some withdrawal. And then there was the question of the duration of an agreement. It was clear we were going to have some differences of view on this issue. We saw the treaty lasting with unlimited duration, and the initial Soviet approach had the treaty lasting till 1990. Which was obviously a very short term agreement.

While we had not gotten very far into verification, it also became obvious pretty early that we were going to have difficulties in reaching agreement on verification. The Soviets were leery of too much on-site close inspection, and we were moving in the direction of wanting to have as rigorous and stringent an inspection process as possible, compatible with our own need for a certain amount of secrecy. That too was clearly on the agenda as we moved into later stages of the negotiation.

We should also bear in mind that during this period, at the beginning of the negotiations, the public interest had grown considerably, and this interest began to take form in larger and larger demonstrations against nuclear weapon policies. Something like a 100,000 in Hamburg, Schmidt's hometown, rallied against nuclear weapon policies, on June 20, 1981. The coming months would see more such demonstrations. There were four days of peace rallies in East Germany, attended by 480,000 in April 1982. In June, there were crowds of approximately 15,000 in Paris, 300,000 in Rome, and 115,000 in London. This was all in 1982. There were over 300,000 demonstrating in Bonn in April 1982. Even in New York, something like 800,000 demonstrated in support of the nuclear freeze movement. And I might note that while primarily aimed at the U.S. strategic nuclear force, the nuclear freeze movement approach to the new deployments fit perfectly with the one-sided Soviet INF moratorium proposal and would have undercut NATO's dual track decision. And there was a freeze movement in the U.S. as well as abroad. On August 5th, the U.S. House of Representatives failed by two votes to pass a resolution in support of an immediate freeze on production, deployment, and testing of nuclear weapons. In October, over 20,000 demonstrated in Ottawa against Canadian agreement to approve testing of U.S. cruise missiles in Alberta. Again, a lot of this activity was supported and aided by the Soviets. It was a clear-cut effort to influence publics, and through them, governments to, in effect, accept the Soviet position in the INF negotiations to essentially not deploy anything on the NATO side and to leave the Soviet Union with an enormous superiority in these type of systems. We had our work cut out for us. We know now that Soviets were actively working with these groups. Essentially, as we'll see later, the Soviets put too much faith in those groups' ability to swing governments and publics. It was becoming obvious that the outcome of the negotiations would depend on the ability of the European NATO governments and the U.S. government to maintain public support for the dual track decision.

The negotiations themselves were about to settle down into a campaign of maneuver with each party introducing variations on their basic theme and working to show that they were

being flexible. But there would be no give on the fundamental differences. The Soviet proposals, no matter how they were dressed up, all led to the same conclusion, i.e., that there would be no deployments of U.S. INF in Europe while the Soviets would retain a substantial portion of their new SS-20 force. During the second round, which went from May to July 1982, the Soviets tabled a draft treaty based on their proposal that both NATO and the USSR would reduce their medium range systems to 300. NATO's 300 would consist of U.K. and French forces, with only a small number of U.S. aircraft in the mix and no new type on INF missiles would be allowed. Restrictions would not apply to the Soviet forces in the Far East, although SS-20s east of the Urals were quite capable of reaching targets in NATO Europe. Ground and sea launched cruise missiles would be banned regardless of location. Of course we were producing new systems of that sort as well and Soviets were behind in that field. The Soviets did agree that the treaty could be of unlimited duration, specified a zone of withdrawal, and agreed that Soviet INF systems west of 80 degrees of longitude would be subject to limitations. They also suggested that systems with ranges below 1,000 kilometers could be covered in side protocols. There they begin to make some move towards capturing SRINF.

While these proposals made minor adjustments in the Soviet positions, they didn't change the fundamentals. It would lead to an unequal outcome, exclude any U.S. INF missile deployments, and allow the Soviets to deploy an INF force which would equal the number of all U.K. and French INF systems, but would not limit Soviet strategic forces which could also target the U.K. and France. For its part, the U.S. worked on the basis of making progress where it could be made, while continuing to explain its position and to explain the weaknesses of the Soviet proposals. The U.S. tried to get the Soviets to agree to set up some working groups on technical issues. One of them was a data experts group, which would consider date and try to reduce the differences of the data of the sides on such issues as the number of existing systems and their capabilities. Another was a treaty text working group, which would begin to blend together language of the two draft treaties in

those non-controversial areas, based on “boiler-plate” language, where they were already quite close.

It was against a background of not much progress at all in the negotiations; indeed, where the progress that was made was a secondary issue; that the political situation in West Germany began to grow increasingly tense with the demonstrations both reflecting and helping create a climate of angst. Nitze and I had visited FM Minister Genscher and his arms control and security staff in Bonn, and Chancellor Schmidt in Hamburg in mid-April, between the first and second rounds. It was a few days after a major peace rally which attracted 480,000. We came away from our meetings feeling that the German leadership would stand by the 1979 decision and carry out the deployments. Both of us were concerned, however, that the end result might well resemble a pyrrhic victory, with considerable damage inflicted upon the Alliance as a result of disaffection of a large portion of the public of several alliance member states. As the end of the second negotiating round came into view, Nitze became increasingly concerned over the situation in Germany. With these concerns in mind, and with word from Kvitsinsky that Moscow would be holding a major review of the negotiations during the summer break, he discussed with me and others his belief that the U.S. would need to cut through the morass of issues and try to find the basis for a deal. He concluded that the U.S. was unlikely to achieve an agreement involving substantial movement on the Soviet side unless we were prepared for a substantial movement on our side. These observations are taken, in part from my memories of the time, and from Nitze's book From Hiroshima to Glasnost.

I shared his concern and his belief that the U.S. would need to make some changes to its position. The zero-zero proposal remained an excellent bedrock upon which to base our position, but the Soviets, by putting forth variant after variant of their basic unequal outcome proposal, had created the appearance but not the reality of flexibility. In my view, what the U.S. needed was to offer an equal outcome at some number other than zero. While retaining zero as our preferred outcome. In other words, we needed an interim

proposal which would show movement on our part without abandoning our principled approach.

More fundamentally, although I was very much in favor of trying out variations of our own in order to demonstrate flexibility, I was persuaded that the Soviets would not agree to any outcome other than their unequal no-U.S. deployment proposals before the U.S. had deployed its new INF missiles in Europe. To do otherwise would be to give up on their possibilities of overturning the 1979 NATO decision and splitting the Alliance wide open. There would be no serious movement on the core question of an equal outcome from the Soviet side until NATO had demonstrated the will and the ability to deploy. In the meantime, the Soviets would rely on their negotiating and public relations skills and on the political impact of the anti-nuclear demonstrations on NATO governments to help fashion a favorable outcome. We now know that the Soviet negotiators' instructions were indeed “mainly to prevent American INF deployments.” And this quote is taken from the book called The Big Five: Arms Control Decision Making in the Soviet Union, and the authors were Aleksand'r G. Savel'yev and General Nikolay N. Detinov, my counterpart during these negotiations. In any case, we would need to use our skills to prevent either an outcome which would prevent our deployment or one which would yield a pyrrhic victory. Without revealing that he was considering going soon to Kvitsinsky with his concept, Nitze outlined parts of what would become his “Walk-in-the-Woods” formula to me. Its main feature was an equal outcome at a number above zero with the U.S. deploying only cruise missiles. While we would drop the Pershing-2, obtaining Soviet agreement to the deployment of the cruise missiles to NATO Europe, would meet our political and military requirements. Moreover, I believed that even if Soviets would not accept any U.S. deployment, the U.S. proposal was imaginative. Its eventual move into the public arena would help us and allied governments in what would become a very important struggle for public support in NATO Europe.

Two days before Nitze and Kvitsinsky took their walk in the woods, Chris and I attended a dinner hosted by Norm Clyne and his wife Alice. Nitze, Kvitsinsky, and their wives were

among the other invitees. After dinner, Kvitsinsky and I had a serious—and for his part gloomy—conversation. After going over our respective views of the state of the talks, Kvitsinsky said that he thought the negotiations were heading towards an impasse and that he could see no way out. When I commented that we needed to recognize that the talks were likely to go on for some time, and that what seemed impossible today might be possible tomorrow, Kvitsinsky said he thought hopeful circumstance was unlikely. “In the end, you will deploy and we will walk out in indignation.” Thirty-six hours later, he would walk with Nitze down a path in the Jura.

The round ended soon after the walk in the woods. Nitze had arranged that he and Kvitsinsky would keep in touch while both were in their respective capitals via a special point of contact in the Soviet Embassy at Washington. As the summer went by without a word from Kvitsinsky, opposition to the concept begin to grow within the U.S. administration. The stated concern was that the Soviets would reject the overall approach but then pocket those aspects of it which they liked as concessions that the USG, the United States Government, had made to the USSR. The opponents to Nitze's approach considered that allowing the Soviets to retain ballistic missiles, while limiting the U.S. to less capable cruise missiles, was in effect an unequal qualitative outcome, regardless of the numerical equality. However, it was agreed that if the subject came up when Nitze met with Kvitsinsky in Geneva, or Secretary of State Shultz met with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, Nitze and Shultz would say that the U.S. had examined the package and considered it to be unequal, because the U.S. was not permitted to have in Europe any missile comparable to the SS-20, it was allowed only slow flying cruise missiles. Nitze and Shultz would note that the U.S. also took exception to that part of the walk-in-the-woods formula which allowed the Soviets to retain 90 SS-20s in the eastern USSR, which could reach, or be moved into range of targets in NATO Europe. The U.S. was however, prepared to continue to exchanges in the Nitze-Kvitsinsky channel.

Nitze carried out his instructions during his meeting with Kvitsinsky on September 29, 1982—the eve of the formal opening of Round Three. Kvitsinsky in turn gave Nitze a short

paper which reiterated the main lines of the Soviet position. Full compensation for U.K. and French nuclear forces, no U.S. deployments, no constraints on Soviet INF systems east of the Urals, major reductions in dual capable aircraft, including those on U.S. aircraft carriers, and full adherence to the concept of equality and equal security; this latter point was a Soviet formulation which sought to provide a philosophical foundation for inequality. Finally, Kvitsinsky told Nitze he would not continue discussions with Nitze in his channel. Moscow had turned down both the substance of what Kvitsinsky and Nitze had agreed to present to their capitals, as well as the informal channel that gave birth to the proposal. Unfortunately, when inevitably the episode leaked, the media portrayed the issue largely in personal terms, placing emphasis on internecine bureaucratic warfare in Washington. The result was to the give the public the impression that it was Washington's reaction, not Moscow's, that was mainly responsible for the failure of the walk in the woods. We asked our selves why did Kvitsinsky continue the discussion during the walk with Nitze, even after Nitze said there would be no point in continuing the conversation if Kvitsinsky had no flexibility on third country systems. Nitze did make that point. Why did he take the first step down that path, despite his having forecast, correctly as it turned out, that this phase of the negotiations would end with the U.S. deploying and the Soviets walking out? Neither Nitze nor I asked him. The whole episode left a bad taste in everyone's mouth, and there was little interest in pursuing motivations in a failed attempt.

The round would continue and we would try to make progress towards convergence in some of the secondary areas where both sides had similar positions. But the Soviets held back, arguing essentially that no progress could be made unless the U.S. accepted their basic approach to an agreement. And they began to introduce obstacles to progress, refusing to enter technical discussions to support their assertions on missile and aircraft ranges. They put in some basic new proposals, which were in effect additional variants of their unequal outcome approach. They would have allowed no U.S. deployments to match Soviet missiles, once again ignoring Soviet strategic missiles and virtually eliminating U.S. nuclear capable aircraft. The Soviets also stepped up their threats of countermeasure

should NATO proceed with the deployment of U.S. INF missiles. And again, they hinted at new deployments of their own and of walking out of the negotiations.

It's obvious that Soviets were both seeking to give the impression of a stalemate and creating the reality of one. It's also obvious, as I had believed from the outset, that their real target audience was not their negotiating partners, but rather the European and to some extend the U.S. public. The number and size of anti-deployment demonstrations was attracting wide media attention. The impression was being given of an unstoppable movement. The Future of the North Atlantic Alliance and the course of the Cold War would be determined by how well NATO would respond to this challenge.

While I had had some indirect contact with the peace movement in Europe, my first real contact with the U.S. peace movement occurred in Vermont. We were on home leave from assignment at NATO, it was 1981, when Chris pointed out an article in the Burlington Free Press, that a group of local peace activists were going to hold an anti-nuclear rally which featured a walk from Washington to Moscow, both in this instance being small towns in Vermont. They invited speakers from both the U.S. Department of State and from the Soviet Embassy in Washington. The Embassy agreed to send someone, but the State Department, short of funds as ever, had declined. Chris said the U.S. government ought not to appear afraid to take on a challenge. I agreed and after checking with the department called the organizers and offered to speak. I had, of course, been working on both the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe and the proposal to negotiate limitations on those weapons. I believed that the U.S. and its allies had a logical and sound position. I had put this position to Europeans and was prepared to propound it before an American audience. Chris and some of our children accompanied me to the outdoor rally in Washington, Vermont. There was a fairly large crowd by Vermont standards. It appeared from the banners and placards and comments of the speakers that all were of one mind—opposing the very idea of nuclear deterrence, supporting a nuclear freeze, and willing to see the U.S. and the Soviet Union as equivalent states.

My talk was designed to lay out an alternative proposition, based on the premise that the Reagan administration was serious about providing a strong defense and achieving negotiated reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons. It was among the first of many such efforts to persuade the peace movement that the U.S. was determined to enhance its security and NATO's security by deploying new weapons, negotiating sound and durable arms control agreement, or creating a combination of the two. I argued that the “Better red than dead” slogan was based on a faulty juxtaposition of alternatives. The talk emphasized that with the proper blend of defense and arms control policies, we could continue to enjoy both our freedoms and avoid nuclear war. To underscore that there was no equivalency between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, I pointed out that one need not be believer in international conspiracy theory to recognize that the Soviet Union is a totalitarian state. Just look at its historical record—or at least a map—to see a pattern for concern. Recall Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, Hungary. Be aware of its use of military power to intimidate and question the policies of a regime which forces distinguished intellectual and artistic leaders into exile or worse—refuse to let others leave.

Then to underscore our willingness to negotiate, my talk continued by stressing that this litany does not lead to the conclusion that we should have no contact with the Soviets. Instead I concluded, we must and should seek agreements with them. The only way to achieve successful arms control and reduction agreements was through a long slog of complex, extensive, and intensive negotiations backed by the will to be armed. In order to demonstrate that the U.S. administration was far from being isolated in this approach, I cited statements by left-of-center European leaders and others recognizing that a freeze would leave the U.S. at a dangerous disadvantage, especially given the continuing Soviet buildup and understanding that the Soviets would never negotiate with us unless we had missiles of our own. “When the seriousness of our intent becomes clear to the Soviets,” I said, “they will tire of proposals such as those which seek to freeze NATO's modernization program, before it has begun, while reserving for themselves the advantages of hundreds of deployed SS-20s. They will recognize that what is required in our mutual interest is a

serious negotiation, not efforts to achieve one-sided advantage.” I was to return to many of these themes throughout the next several years.

However, while I was still only partly trough my speech, some in the audience began shaking their placards and shouting “We've heard enough, let's start marching!” I particularly noted the proverbial energized gray-haired woman in sneakers. One of the event organizers whispered to me, “Wrap it up.” I quickly reminded them that they had asked me to speak for 20 minutes and I had prepared my remarks accordingly. At that point a voice called out to “Let the man finish.” And the crowd quieted down until I had finished. The voice it turned out was that of my son Erik —and without prompting from his mother. Afterwards, a few of the audience paid me a backhanded compliment, congratulating me on doing an excellent job defending a bad policy. I would see the placard shaking woman again, several years later, under very different circumstances.

The Burlington Free Press, in reporting on the event, stressed that both the Soviet speaker, who gave his talk in Moscow, Vermont, and I were cut from the same mold, wearing similar clothing and arguing our cases in a similar manner. It was a phenomenon I would encounter again. Unfortunately, an effort to bend over backwards to appear even-handed, sometimes ended with the appearance of establishing moral equivalency between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. There was no chance that the Soviet media or peace organizations would reciprocate. The event was my first encounter with the American peace movement. The fervor and the evident unwillingness of some of the group to hear or even allow some others to hear differing opinion made a deep impression. It appeared the struggle for public opinion would take place on three fronts: countering the Soviet propaganda directly; seeking the support of the European publics—NATO publics; and maintaining the support of the American public. I passed my observations to colleagues in Washington, many of whom had not been aware of the extent to which the home-grown version of the European peace movement had developed.

Q: We are going to continue with Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Negotiations in Geneva, during the time frame 1981-1984. We will take up after the failed walk in the woods.

GLITMAN: The nature of the failure of the walk in the woods, particularly the clear sign that the Soviets would not agree to any approach which would have permitted U.S. deployments, or one which would result in an equal outcome between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., really reinforced my view that no agreement could be reached until we had U.S. INF missiles on the ground in Europe. At the same time, we were determined to negotiate seriously and to be seen doing so. When the third round began, on September 30, 1982, the U.S. delegation continued with the effort to persuade the Soviets to at least acknowledge that NATO had legitimate security concerns as a result of the Soviet INF deployments and to recognize that the U.S. was prepared to work out an agreement that met both sides' concerns. We also continued to seek to make progress in those areas where the positions of the sides that had begun to converge, where common language had been agreed in earlier negotiations, or where the sides could move ahead even if they remained deadlocked on key issues. The Soviets, unfortunately, were not really ready for this type of negotiation or to move in that direction.

During this period, the Soviets came up with quite a few seemingly new approaches, new proposals, but it was blatantly apparent to those of us engaged in the negotiations that these were not new, but all variations on a theme. And that theme was essentially that the U.K. and French forces balanced the Soviet forces, and, therefore, there was no room for the U.S. to have any forces in Europe. It was again the proposal for an unequal outcome between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. And it was doubly unequal because the Soviet Union not only had SS-20s to counter British and French forces, it had its entire strategic force in addition to SS-20s, which could play that role. But, the Soviets were quite clever in the way they managed to portray these proposals as new positions. We were, in a way, frustrated. I remember going to several of the SCG meetings during this period and on

one occasion I pointed out that it seemed that all of the Soviet proposals could fit on a t-shirt. They were easily turned into a slogan: “Freeze now.” Our reactions, our proposals, and our criticisms of their proposals were correct; but they were also much longer. They were much more thorough perhaps, but the net result was that the Soviets had a clear propaganda advantage over us.

This led me to begin considering also whether we needed to move towards a more flexible position, putting out some new concepts. The problem here was somewhat political. President Reagan had formally proposed a zero result, that is, no INF missiles for either the U.S. or the Soviet Union. And that was our established position. But it seemed to me that we ought to be able to say, “We will take a lower number, although zero remains our preference.” In other words, if we don't get zero, it would be because the Soviets were not prepared to go that far, but that was our preferred outcome. We were prepared to consider an equal number, somewhere below the total of 572 missiles which we planed to deploy. It took a little while to persuade everyone in Washington we needed to do that. But eventually, it did become our position and, at that point, we were also able, therefore, to show some flexibility. Not a rigid demand for zero, rather a preference for zero but willingness to consider other equal numbers, as long as they were below the 572 number which was the number of our planned deployments. Again, the stress was on equality between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

While we were not able to make as much progress as we wanted to during this period, there were some other areas where we seemed to get a little closer to the Soviets. One of these was on short range INF missiles. Again, during this period in late 1982, in the fall of 1982, they proposed constraints that would be quantitative in nature and apply only to the missiles between ranges between 500 and 1,000 kilometers. That was within our concept as well. We did want collateral constraints. The Soviets also began to move in a familiar direction; when we got into their proposals, they frequently ended with a freeze proposal. Of course, a freeze in the SRINF would leave us with zero and the Soviets with

hundreds. So we made the point that this result would be a totally unequal outcome and not acceptable.

As a result of our responding to their really unequal outcomes, we began imperceptibly to move away from a general concept of some kind of collateral constraints to a conclusion that we had to have an equal outcome in SRINF as we had insisted on in INF. That happened virtually imperceptibly to us. Only when I went back and looked at it years later did I see what had happened. I might say, to the best of my recollection, the Soviets never called us on that, that we had sort of shifted our position from collateral constraints not otherwise defined to equality not only in long range INF but also in SRINF. At the same time, they included in their 500-1,000 kilometer range, the SS-12-22 missiles that they had and the Pershing Is which we had and some of which were in the hands of the Germans. We will come to that issue later; it would become a major issue. But they continued to deny the very existence of the SS-23, and that missile we will hear about as well in the future as we go through this account.

There were also other proposals that the Soviets came up with during this period. One was a sub-ceiling for missiles; we had a ceiling for aircraft and a ceiling for missiles. While it appeared that the sub-ceiling would be set at the level of the U.K. and French forces, it did represent an acknowledgment that the aircraft and missiles should not be treated as equally potent weapons, but the overall result of this proposal was to leave intact the basic Soviet unequal outcome approach. In addition to these sorts of carrots and efforts to appear flexible, the Soviets often had other proposals, and some of them looked rather enticing on the surface. Brezhnev announced a unilateral freeze on SS-20 deployments, but that announcement proved short-lived and they moved off of it. When we examined these proposals, they all remained rooted in the fundamental Soviet unequal outcome. No U.S. deployments and the equation of Soviet INF with U.K. and French forces; that was the basic aspect of their position, and it didn't change. As I said, I referred to these as variations on a theme. For some reason, Kvitsinsky didn't like that phrase. I guess the word in Russian is “variant” and it seems to have a pejorative sense, which it doesn't carry

in English. But nonetheless, those were variations on a theme and not anything really new. As I said, these continued adjustments gave the impression of Soviet movement and flexibility. But I did begin an effort to try to move us to a different position; as I pointed out earlier, zero was our preferred outcome but we would be willing to consider other alternatives.

Finally, while the Soviets had been offering all these alternatives, they also began brandishing some sticks, as well as carrots. And there was a notable increase in the threat of countermeasures which would follow any U.S. deployment. These statements were clearly designed to frighten European publics. The SCG prepared a document called the “SCG Progress Report” which came out about the time of the deployments. And it summed up, I felt very clearly, our own, the U.S. INF delegation view on the status of the negotiations at the end of this post walk-in-the-woods round in September 1982. It increasingly became apparent that the Soviet effort in Geneva was aimed to a significant extent, if not primarily, at public opinion. The Soviets tabled several variations of the same proposal, all of which would have had the same essential outcomes, apparently to position themselves to claim that they had shown flexibility and had offered a range of solutions to the INF problem. At the same time, they increasingly stymied progress on the smallest of issues, in an effort to create the appearance of a negotiating dead lock, the blame for which they attempted to place on the U.S. Their calculation undoubtedly was that such a stalemated negotiation would generate pressure for U.S. concessions and against proceeding with deployments as scheduled. This was published, as I said, by NATO and this judgment represented the view not just of the U.S. but of all the allies on the status of the negotiations at this point.

This might be a good time to try to restate somewhat more clearly the basic point that I made earlier about my sense that we needed to move off of the zero approach and to consider some alternatives, which would maintain our fundamental principles but give us the ability to show some flexibility. I wasn't alone; most of us on the delegation were somewhat frustrated by the situation because we could see that the Soviets were scoring

propaganda points by the variations on their themes. The reaction in Europe was that the Soviets were being flexible. We would shoot them down one by one, but that response still didn't detract from the view that we were somewhat on the defensive.

There are times in negotiation when one must stand firmly on a position. And there are elements of a position which one cannot abandon or compromise without undermining the fundamental premise of one's approach to negotiation. There are times in negotiation when one can and must demonstrate flexibility by offering alternatives which would not breech the fundamental premises of ones approach to negotiations. We should take that approach in order to avoid creating a situation outside the negotiations which could prove more harmful to our interests than a demonstration of flexibility might engender. There are times when one needs to make some changes in the fundamental position in order to come to closure on an outcome which despite the change of position is still basically favorable to one's interest. I believed even before this round ended that we'd reached such a point.

We had held firmly to the equal-zero approach for a year. It was a strong position and served to underscore the desire of the U.S. and NATO to pursue the ultimate arms control outcome for these negotiations. But the Soviets were proving adapt at making frequent, seemingly major, shifts and concessions. We were equally adept at proving these moves were smoke and mirrors and represented no change in the basic Soviet position. Nevertheless, the dynamics of the exchange placed us on the defensive. I believed strongly that we needed to show that we too can propose a change in our basic position. Moreover, Western European political leaders were beginning to suggest that it was becoming time for the U.S. to negotiate a new move of its own.

As I said, I'd been considering the benefits of offering an interim alternative for some time. Nitze had in effect a proposed one in the walk-in-the-woods formula. While I did not believe that the Soviets would accept any outcome that we might accept, until NATO had demonstrated it could deploy, we would need to take an initiative if we were to hold our

own in the public arena. But the initiative need not, indeed ought not, to compromise our basic position of an equal outcome— in this case formulated as equal in both qualitative and quantitative terms. The change could be rather simple. We would continue to express a strong preference for double zero. Now, because of the Soviet unwillingness to go that far, we would propose any number below 572. As I said, that was the number of U.S. LRINF scheduled to be deployed in Europe. Delegation members collectively and individually carried this concept back to Washington after the end of this round on November 30, 1982.

We also had our traditional end-of-round party. As I've said, there was a sense frustration of among the members of the delegation—a feeling that the negotiations were treading water at best— and that the Soviets were scoring their propaganda points by their disingenuous policy. The skits and the parodies reflected this attitude. Chris and I did one as well. Chris played Nitze, while I played Kvitsinsky. To the tune of “Let's take an old fashioned walk” we sang:

I'll say the idea came from you. You say the concept was mine. Maybe we'll both end up in the stew. If you get burned, that's just fine.

Let's take an old fashioned walk. I'm just bursting with talk. What a tale could be told. If we both took an old fashioned walk.

Kvitsinsky got the last word in this exchange.

When we finally got back to Washington, there was, as expected, resistance to moving off an exclusive zero option approach. The opposition to a change was based in part on the grounds that it was not what the president wanted and this view was accompanied by the implication that any deviation would be disloyal. Some argued that the situation was, in fact, well in hand, and we did not need to make any moves. In the end, the agreement was reached that the U.S. position would remain based on the double zero outcome. However, we would be authorized to say that while it was our preferred solution, and surely the

best for all concerned, we were prepared to consider alternate outcomes at numbers above zero but below 572. So from here on, we were able to come back and show some flexibility on our part. And I am confident it helped us in our public relations as well as the internal USG back-and-forth within the negotiations.

The next round began on January 26, 1983. That was Round Four. We actually put this proposal out. We also, in saying that we were ready to consider reasonable alternatives, set up five criteria based, as was our position, essentially on the 1979 NATO decision, by which we would judge any proposed outcome. First, an agreement must entail equal rights and limits between the U.S. and the USSR. Second, an agreement should address only the systems of the U.S. and the USSR. Third, an agreement should apply limits to INF systems, regardless of location and should not result in an exportation of a security problem in Europe to the Far East. This was a way of letting our Japanese and Korean allies know that we were not going to see this situation put them—as the outcome of the negotiation—in a worse security situation, but preferably in a better one. Fourth, an agreement should not weaken the U.S. contribution to NATO's conventional deterrence and defense. (A side note on that: this was to make sure that we let the Soviets know that we were not going to countenance an agreement that impacted on our conventional aircraft, in their effort to get the nuclear warheads out of the way.) And finally, an agreement must be verifiable. The five points covered the key issues for the U.S., and they all essentially harkened back to the 1979 NATO decision, so we kept in sync with our allies on these points.

The Soviets chose not to take up our offer to explore the possibility of reaching an agreement at an equal number above zero. Rather, they continued to offer their variations on the principal theme of an outcome at which the Soviet INF systems would be set at a level that would match U.K. and French forces. They made clear that if the U.K. and/or France should increase the quality or quantity of their forces, the Soviets would be authorized to increase their LRINF systems in Europe. We expressed a wonderment at how the Soviets could expect the U.S. to participate in such an agreement with them and

why the U.K. and France would approve such a scheme. They repeated their positions, occasionally citing the Russian proverb that repetition is the mother of learning. If so, we proved to be unwilling students.

This unproductive round ground on and, perhaps buoyed by the continued anti-nuclear demonstrations, the Soviets in fact displayed even more intransigence and brought to a halt productive work on secondary issues. They also set out their own prerequisites for the main issues. First, an agreement could not entail deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe. In other words, we couldn't deploy. Second, negotiations must address only the most urgent and acute problems of the situation in Europe. Third, negotiations should encompass all types of medium range systems, land and sea-based aircraft, as well as missiles. Fourth, negotiations must take into account British and French forces.

The first one was of course the basic Soviet demand, it essentially claimed that the U.S./ NATO position was illegitimate and provided no grounds for negotiations. The second sought to leave SS-20s in the eastern portion of the Soviet Union free from any limitations and free to attack and intimidate NATO Europe because they had the range to do it. Point three sought to use the INF negotiations to eviscerate U.S. conventional aviation in Europe. Point four seemed to provide a rational for an unequal outcome in which there would be no U.S. deployments in Europe and the U.K. and France would find their entire nuclear force equated with only a small portion of the overall Soviet nuclear arsenal. That's why we had to go back, just as I did now, point by point, with the Soviets. We were using the same points outside the negotiations, setting out the Soviet position and showing where the flaws were in it.

We were always somewhat on a defensive when we had to do this because we would be coming, in this case, at a “new” proposal on their part which turned out not to be so new in reality. We did, as this round drew to a close on March 29, 1983, formally table our interim proposal. And in doing so, we established for all to see that the U.S. and its NATO allies were willing to modify a major element of our initial position: the zero outcome. While the

Soviets and the Western opponents of the deployment downplayed the move, they could not deny that the U.S. had shown flexibility. That did not, however, deflect the 500,000 marchers who turned out for an anti-deployment demonstration in West Germany a few days after the round had ended.

On the other hand—and this was a major development—the right-of-center pro-deployment Christian Democratic Union under Helmut Kohl, had defeated the increasingly anti-deployment left-of-center Social Democrats in elections held on March 30. With a prospect of the Bundestag majority in favor of deployments, the real political situation had in fact improved for NATO and the U.S.

We returned to Geneva on May 17, 1983, for Round Five. Our delegation had tabled a new draft treaty based on this interim approach. In other words, we wouldn't go to zero immediately, but we'd have this other number with zero as a preferred outcome and, hopefully down the line, the final outcome. The Soviets, perhaps still pumped up by the continued demonstrations and clearly not mindful of the changed political situation in the Bundestag, refused to participate in the process effectively. We were determined to press ahead and to make progress wherever possible, even if the main issues remained deadlocked. Accordingly, we indicated we could accept collateral constraints on U.S. SRINF missiles and specifically the Pershing-I missile, on a reciprocal basis with similar constraints on Soviet SRINF, and we even talked a little about a freeze. By making this proposal, the U.S. had chosen to consider an SRINF freeze in an unequal outcome. This would have been justified because the SRINF constraints were collateral to an agreement on LRINF, which would have been based on an equal outcome. But as I said earlier, we were beginning to move more and more in the direction of insisting on equal outcome in both SRINF and LRINF.

Nevertheless, the Soviets limited their response to their standard argument that no progress could be made on collateral or secondary issues unless the central issue had been resolved. The same response was made to our efforts to move on verification, data

exchanges, and even on work on the non-controversial elements of the treaty text. Some of these non-controversial elements were boiler-plate that you would find in almost any treaty. That is, “standard” language. To my recollection, the Soviets did not attempt to use our mid-1980s SRINF proposal as an argument for seeking to obtain an unequal outcome in SRINF when that issue came under serious discussion, later in the negotiations.

The Soviets continued to offer variations on their basic themes. One of these proposals was worth examining, and you will see why I thought that when I get to it. This was a proposal put forward by May 3, 1982, by Soviet Communist Party Secretary General Yuri Andropov. He had succeeded Brezhnev upon the latter's death in November 1982. His proposal was to negotiate on the basis of warheads as well as missiles. The keystone of this proposal, which was introduced at the opening of the round, was an equal number for only the Soviet Union's LRINF warheads and the combined total of all of the warheads of U.K. and French nuclear forces. The Soviets again, demanded the right to increase the size of their LRINF systems, should the U.K. and/or France increase the number of their warheads on their nuclear systems. There was no room for U.S. deployments and no equal outcome. The absurdity of the U.S. and the Soviet Union signing a treaty whose foundation rested upon the action of non-signatories, who had already stated that they would not be bound by such an agreement, remained as glaring as the fact that what was once again an offer of old wine in a new bottle.

The Soviets also introduced confidence building measures, such as the prior notification of missile launchings and the takeoffs of large number of aircraft. We did a few things like that, but they refused to participate in the confidence building working group or to negotiate such measures until major issues were resolved. So they raised it as a possibility, but they didn't want to talk about it yet. One could conclude that all of these new ideas were meant more for public consumption than for serious negotiation. From the Soviet standpoint, given the great stock they had placed in the peace demonstrators ability to block the deployments and grievously damage NATO, it was understandable that they didn't wish to let it appear that an agreement might be possible after all. From

their standpoint, the worse the situation looked, the better the climate for inducing demonstrations. And indeed, we now know from writings by Soviets who were involved either directly or indirectly in the negotiations, in fact they had the peace movement in mind and there were times when they failed to move ahead in negotiations for fear that they would undercut their friends in the peace movement. It was an important factor.

We also began to sense a change in the Soviets' demeanor. It was almost as if an order had been given to be particularly difficult and unpleasant and a bit imperious. Indeed we, and not just myself but all of us, had come back from a reception, from meetings with them, from post plenary discussions, with this sense that I have just described. They had sort of taken charge. Indeed, we had on occasion noted that the Soviets not only followed the same policy line, that was to be expected, but they also seemed to coordinate the personal attitude they would adopt on a given day. These displays of what looked like deliberate efforts at psychological manipulation, did not contribute to developing that degree of trust which even cautious and sometimes cynical negotiators must have in order to work together. In any event, the moment of truth was not far off.

Round Six would begin on September 6, 1983. It was quite likely that we would still be in session when the first U.S. INF missiles were deployed in Europe. Even before the round began, Andropov on August 26 tried to give an impression of Soviet flexibility by offering to destroy all SS-20 missiles above the number of French and British missiles, if the U.S. did not deploy new missiles in Europe. Most of this will sound familiar and ought not to require any further rebuttal. What appeared new at first blush was the offer to “destroy” SS-20s as part of an agreement. Once we began to prod the Soviets on this point, its newness began to evaporate as they were unable to give a clear understanding of precisely what the U.S.S.R. had in mind. It particularly appeared that their proposal would allow them to build and stockpile new missiles without constraints.

A few days before the scheduled opening of the round, Soviet fighter aircraft shot down a Korean Airlines Boeing 747 transport. The U.S. took some steps to underscore our

abhorrence of this action; nevertheless, while Ambassador Nitze, under instructions, raised the issue with Kvitsinsky during the first meeting of the round, the U.S. did not break off the negotiations. The Soviets did not reciprocate. They emphasized that there could be no agreement if the U.S. deployed and that any agreement had to take British and French forces into account. They began to point out that it would be fruitless to negotiate if there were any deployments. To underscore that point, they began to refuse to schedule meetings past October 12 and eventually only on a one-by-one basis. As the negotiations were clearly moving toward a climatic moment, the U.S. increased the frequency of its consultations with the allies. Thanks to the support of the U.S. Air Force, I was able to attend SCG meetings and visit Allied leaders in capitals in Europe and return to Geneva on the same day. As a consequence, we could give the Allies timely briefings of the state of the negotiations and receive their reactions first hand as well as those of Washington officials at the meetings. These close and frequent consultations helped further cement the solidarity among the U.S. and its NATO allies as we prepared for the arrival of the U.S. missiles in Europe.

One of the consequences of the consultations was the tabling of three new U.S. proposals which we did on September 22, 1983. Within the context of an agreement providing the right to equal levels of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missile warheads globally, the U.S. would consider not offsetting the entire worldwide Soviet LRINF deployment by U.S. LRINF. In other words, we had a right to deploy other LRINF elsewhere up to the global level of SS-20 deployments, thus maintaining the principle of an equal global outcome. But we wouldn't put them all in Europe, so we would be prepared to offset some of the numbers by having them elsewhere. In the context of an agreement involving significant reductions from current Soviet and planned U.S. deployment levels, we said we were prepared for the proportionate reductions between the Pershing II and the Ground-Launched Cruise Missile in an appropriate manner. This proposal could have met specific Soviet concerns regarding the P-II and, while awaiting an appropriate definition, it did indicate U.S. willingness to take those concerns into account. And we finally said that the U.S. would

be prepared to explore equal, verifiable limits on specific types of U.S. land-based aircraft consistent with the Allied criteria for an INF agreement—the point was of course not to have any diminution in equality of our aircraft, both numbers and abilities. We didn't want to see our conventional forces hurt by this agreement. The U.S. had been less enthusiastic about including aircraft in the negotiations and this was, therefore, a major move on our part. However, as we noted before, given the size of Soviet airplane inventory, compared with that of the U.S., they were quite likely to face greater reductions to an equal level than we would. Nevertheless, this offer did move toward their position.

The Soviet reaction to these proposals was swift and negative. They would not discuss any proposals which were based on the deployment of the new U.S. INF systems in Europe. To do so would legitimatize deployments. The U.S. in response to the Soviet reaction noted that we had negotiated while the Soviets were deploying SS-20s, and we pointed out that our positions envisaged limiting all LRINF missiles in the context of an equal agreement. But time was getting short, and the Soviets must have been aware that we were moving towards the actual physical deployment of these missiles. They remained adamant. There was nothing to discuss as long as the U.S. continued to pursue deployments.

On October 22, well over 1,000,000 people participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations in West Germany, Britain, and Italy. Once again, as we now know, the Soviet position was shaped at least in part by their consideration of the role of the peace demonstrators. And once again, the Soviets failed to consider that governing parties at most NATO countries and particularly in basing countries were supporting deployments. On October 24, the effort to intimidate NATO into abandoning the 1979 decision took an additional step. The Soviets announced that they had begun to deploy nuclear missiles in Eastern Europe and would complete the process if new U.S. missiles were deployed in Western Europe.

October 26, I saw General Secretary Andropov, proposing in a TV interview that the USSR would reduce SS-20s in Europe to about 120 missiles, each of which carries

three warheads. This would bring the SS-20 warhead count to 420, which equated to the number of warheads the Soviets attributed to the U.K. and France. Andropov also offered to freeze SS-20 deployments in the eastern USSR and to be flexible as regards aircraft. The package was dependent, however, on no U.S. LRINF deployments in Europe. The following day in Geneva, the Soviets tabled the full TASS article. The details did not make the package any more attractive. The freeze in the east was contingent on a vague “no change in the strategic situation” and would not go into effect until the treaty had entered into force. Until then, they would have time to increase the number of missiles in that region. The offer to reduce SS-20 warheads to combined British and French levels was based on an inflated estimate of the size of those forces. Indeed, the Soviets acknowledged that given their projections, the future growth in British and French growth in warhead numbers, they would not have to reduce any or only few of their SS-20s and could even increase that number as the U.K. and France modernized their forces. The airplane offer was also deeply flawed. Based on their aggregating U.S., U.K., and French aircraft, the Soviets acknowledged that only one type of the non-U.S. aircraft would be affected by the proposed reductions. This meant that the full rate of the cuts would apply to the U.S. forces. Finally, none of this would be possible if U.S. LRINF missiles were deployed.

With the deployments of Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) and Pershing II missiles scheduled to begin in Europe within weeks, the room to maneuver within the negotiation was rather limited, and the number of options had shrunk. But there was still some time left for carrying out the struggle in the public arena, before the Bundestag took its final vote on deployment and the first Pershing II arrived in West Germany. This took the form of a Soviet ploy to derail the decision. In essence it was another unacceptable equal reductions to an unequal outcome scheme, but with a strange twist. In parallel with the formal negotiations which the sides continued, to exchange views and proposals, an informal channel was opened by Kvitsinsky on Sunday, November 13, during a meeting

with Nitze. The conversation took place in the Geneva Botanical Garden and the resulting episode would be known as the “walk-in-the-park.”

The Soviet approach involved the U.S. reducing its proposed INF deployments by 572—that is to zero. The Soviets would reduce their INF deployments by an equal amount—that is to a 120 triple warhead SS-20s. The Soviets would not demand any compensation for British and French forces, which would be the subject of future negotiations. However, Kvitsinsky added the Soviets wanted the proposal to be made formally by the U.S. Nitze's reaction was noncommittal but not promising. He did not believe Washington would accept it, and he insisted Kvitsinsky make it clear to Moscow that idea was Kvitsinsky's and not Nitze's.

On the next day, November 14, the U.S. announced a proposal that each side limits its LRINF to 420 warheads world-wide, a level which corresponded to the number of warheads that Soviet Secretary General Andropov had suggested the Soviets would limit themselves in Europe. Also, and this is significant, that day, November 14, the first cruise missiles arrived at Greenham Commons air base in the United Kingdom, under the angry eyes of the woman peace demonstrators who had been camping at the sight for some time. The deployments had begun. The evening of the 14th, the Soviets, without any explanation, sent to us the traditional end-of-round farewell gifts for the U.S. counterparts. But the Soviets continued to participate in the negotiations. At a scheduled plenary on November 15, the U.S. formally tabled its 420 warhead proposal. The Soviet reaction was negative. Our proposal, while meeting the oft repeated Soviet call for equal reductions, allowed U.S. deployments. The Soviets equal reductions argument was thus exposed as bogus. What was left was unbending opposition to either eliminating their own INF weapons or to permitting the U.S., on behalf of NATO, to match Soviet warheads at any number from zero on up.

Chris and I had offered to host a reception for Soviet delegation on November 15. The date had been chosen with the GLCM deployments in mind. I had mentioned to Chris

that we would, of course, be wondering how the Soviets would react when the first U.S. INF missiles arrived in Europe. She suggested we invite them to a reception timed for the anticipated arrival. If they came, it would suggest that both formal and informal talks could continue at least for a while. If they turned down the invitation or did not show up, we could hold the traditional end-of-round party. The Soviets came. In so doing, and in continuing to negotiate after the GLCMs had arrived in the U.K., they once again demonstrated that their real target was not deployments per se, but rather where the deployments took place and perhaps also the particular missile being deployed. Our conversations with the Soviets reinforced this analysis. It was Germany and the Pershing II, which coincidentally had only been deployed in Germany as replacements for Pershing I. Germany and Pershing-II, those were at the sensitive core of the Soviet political and military position. The final vote of approval by the Bundestag was yet to take place. Until then, the Soviets would stay in Geneva. But I believed that once the Bundestag had given its approval, they would, as Kvitsinsky had predicted at that dinner shortly before the walk-in-the-woods, walk out of the negotiations in indignation.

We kept Washington informed; we had been keeping Washington and through Washington our allies, I should say, fully abreast of the Soviet moves, both in the negotiations and in the informal walk-in-the-park channel. Kvitsinsky's continued effort to suggest that, while he had put forth a proposal, Nitze should be seen as the originator had put us on our guard. Thus, when on November 17 the Soviet Ambassador at Bonn, Vladimir Seminov, delivered a note to the Foreign Ministry, claiming that Nitze had put forward an equal reduction scheme, that Moscow had accepted it, but that Washington had turned it down, the Germans and the other Allies already had the real story. The Soviets also leaked their story to the press, but here as well, Allied spokespersons were ready to refute the false tale. The effort to entrap us failed. Indeed, once exposed, their deception backfired. This led to another memorable moment in these negotiations. On Saturday, November 19, Nitze asked Kvitsinsky to meet him in our delegation's offices. There he delivered to Kvitsinsky the official U.S. rejection of the very unequal Soviet

proposal to maintain the force of 120 SS-20s, with the U.S. INF set at zero. He also confronted Kvitsinsky with the evidence of Soviet duplicity during the walk-in-the-park episode. At that point, Kvitsinsky got up and walked out of Nitze's office. I looked up from my desk, and I saw Kvitsinsky leaving Nitze's office in a somewhat disoriented daze. I was aware of the message he would receive, but assumed that while he would not like it, he could hardly have expected otherwise. I was surprised, therefore, by his pale and downcast mien. He seemed to be taking the outcome very personally.

I wondered whether Kvitsinsky felt that the failure of the walk-in-the-park, following the failure of the walk-in-the-woods, in which I believed he must have gone well beyond the basic Soviet position of not accepting any U.S. deployments, and even further beyond his prediction to me that the negotiations would ultimately fail, could have deep and negative personal repercussions for him. I escorted him out of the Botanic building. He remained crest-fallen and unusually quiet on the way out except to say, “Everything is finished.” When we reached the front door, the fog was as thick as Kvitsinsky's gloom. The forecast had called for the clear skies in the mountains. “The sun is probably shining in the Jura,” I said, “perhaps you can take some time off after you file your report and take your wife up there with you.” I never found out if he did.

The time was coming when we would see whether the Soviets really were going to walk out, but there was some activity to take place before then. One of those was a meeting on November 19 of the German Social Democrats to hold an internal vote on the INF question. The party voted overwhelmingly to condemn deployment of U.S. LRINF in West Germany. One of the consequences was that the Soviets could really look upon this as a major accomplishment because it demonstrated the extent to which the NATO defense consensus had been broken. Obviously, this was unfortunate, particularly for Helmut Schmidt, who I though had done a splendid job as Chancellor. But the SPD had clearly taken a move to the left as a result of this decision. Everyone involved with the INF issue realized that the outcome of the Bundestag debate, which would begin on November 21,

would be decisive for the future of the deployments, the negotiations, and frankly for the Alliance. It was a very important moment.

On November 22, I flew to Brussels to meet with NATO SCG members who had come from their capitals to gather at this obviously momentous occasion. The purpose of the meeting was to prepare for whatever was going to happen, however it would work out. I was able to give them a first hand status report including our estimate of what would happen next. I pointed out that it had been over a week since GLCMs had arrived in the U.K., and the Soviets had nevertheless continued to meet with us. Again, I emphasized that Germany was the key for the Soviets. I said that NATO members should be ready, by the end of the day, with an agreed Allied public position, predicated on the Soviet walk-out, following a positive Bundestag vote for deployment. By the time I got back to Geneva from Brussels that night, the Bundestag had made a decision. The vote was 286 to 226, in favor of deploying Pershing II and GLCMs on German soil. The next day, the first Pershing II missile parts arrived in West Germany.

According to our standard negotiating procedures, a plenary was scheduled for that day, the 23rd, and in keeping with protocol, Kvitsinsky as a guest would speak first. At Nitze's suggestion, we put together possible responses based on what the Soviets might say. And we really had three contingencies. One was clear-cut walk-out. Another was a somewhat ambiguous position. And the third basic one, what did we say if to our surprise, they continued to negotiate?

The plenary didn't take very long when it actually happened. The statement appeared clear although I did sense that there might be a little something there, but nothing sufficient to really change opinions. So basically, Nitze went with the statement we had prepared, which was based on the Soviet walk-out and clearly no prospect for beginning the negotiations again. The Soviet language, as I have said, may have had some possible give in it, but in the end that was it. As usual, I went down the elevator with Kvitsinsky and Detinov. I expressed hope that they would eventually return to the table. Kvitsinsky was

not at all hopeful. We got to the front door of the Botanique and were immediately engulfed by a sea of journalists and cameras. I stayed around long enough to hear Kvitsinsky's comments to the media, which tracked the plenary statement and sought to place the blame for the breakdown on the U.S. I went back upstairs to our delegation meeting room, where the team was already preparing our own statement for the media and our report to Washington.

The next day Andropov made a statement which really closed off any prospect for further talk. He basically said that there was no hope of discussion, and talks could only resume when the U.S. missiles were withdrawn from Europe. And of course, that was an unrealistic demand.

The Soviets were in a bit of a quandary at this point. If they continued to negotiate despite the threats they had made and the warnings of negative consequences, they would have been seen as having fully legitimized those deployments and that action would have cut the rug out from under the peace movement. Even worse, it would have appeared NATO had successfully called their bluff. The same logic applied to the Soviet statement ending the talks. If they had a softer statement, which held open the prospect of further negotiations without placing an unrealistic demand for withdrawal on us, it would have encouraged strong competition from Soviet hardliners and from those who could argue that a more nuanced Soviet approach would undercut the anti-deployment peace movement. Let me say here, as I may have mentioned earlier, that we now know that in fact these concerns about undercutting the peace movement played a role in Soviet considerations and usually led to the Soviets taking a harder line, rather then appearing to make concessions to the U.S. which would in their view undercut the peace movement.

The day after the negotiations ended was also Thanksgiving. I spent part of the holiday preparing for a series of briefings which were going to begin on Friday at NATO headquarters and then continuing with Allied leaders and media in Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and Norway.

I should note that at this point that neither Belgium nor the Netherlands had voted on deployments. Eventually they would, and they would vote in favor, but there were still two countries that hadn't taken that final vote. In my view, what this meant was that the negotiations had broken down, but the INF battle would continue. We have already seen that the main lines were clear, and we understood where the differences lay.

Despite all the problems, I was rather confident that Soviets would eventually return to the negotiating table. If they stayed away, they would be seen as the uncooperative party, while in the meantime the deployments would continue. If they returned to the negotiations, their political flank could be covered while they pursued their efforts to weaken the resolve of those NATO governments that had not yet formally accepted deployments. Although the peace movement had failed to prevent the deployment in Germany, there was still a possibility the Soviets might succeed somewhere else. But there would be no chance of this outcome if the Soviets continued to boycott the Geneva negotiations. So I was quite persuaded that they would return. And when the moment came, they did. But it did take a little while.

Obviously, eventually we left Geneva. We stayed on a little while, a bit more than a little while. Essentially we stated to demonstrate that the U.S. was prepared to continue negotiating. I traveled from Geneva again on “the circuit,” to lots of conferences. I'd visit different NATO capitals as the issue continued to bubble. It didn't go away, and I sought to demonstrate and reinforce our determination to continue the negotiations and to get an arms control settlement to this issue.

I also realized that we were now going to face another house move. We had, actually, lived in two different places in Geneva during this time that I was discussing. First, Servacerie House, which was under a lease to the U.S. government when we arrived, and we stayed in it till the lease ran out. The government was going to have to pay for it anyway. We concluded in the end that the house was probably too far gone to purchase. The grounds were magnificent but the building itself was not in a good state of repair. The

rent was probably going to be more then we should pay. So, we felt that the government should not continue the lease. In fact the owners eventually were going to sell. We found another place, not too far away from this area, a smaller house, fairly new and also very pleasant. We would have receptions there for the Soviets, dinners, and so on. There was a fair amount of socializing, not nearly as much as you would find in a normal diplomatic situation, or at NATO, but a fair amount with the Soviets. We didn't do much spreading out beyond that. I think it was a full time job just dealing with the negotiations. I should also point out that we worked very hard within the delegation, as I think I mentioned earlier, to maintain good morale so that certainly was one of the things that sticks with me from that period and the subsequent time in Geneva. The building of the team was very important to that work.

We knew we would face another house move after Geneva. Sure enough, it was going to come. That would be to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Vienna. Mort Abramowitz was the Ambassador at MBFR, head of the delegation, and I guess he wanted a change of venue. He was going to leave and he eventually found another position. I think at that point became Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (INR). That left the MBFR job open. That negotiation, as you know, was dealing with conventional weapons and forces in Europe. I think it had been going on for about 13 years when I arrived there. It would be where the next move would come.

Before I leave Geneva entirely, I guess I should mention a couple of incidents that were kind of amusing (I know that because other people have enjoyed them). We had a dog, Hercules was his name, that we acquired in Brussels. His mother we knew was a malamute, husky, very big dog, and the father was clearly a black lab, and there was a large black lab in the area. Chris announced that she was going to take the children over to see this dog, would I want to come along; we knew it was a pup. I realized that there would be no returning from this place without a dog. He was a cute little guy at the time. He grew up to about 100 pounds—and quite a character. One of the amusing things that happened with him was when we had the Soviets, General Detinov, I think, and General

Medvedev, and their wives over for dinner. We were living at that house by the lake, and Herkie was underneath the table. The discussion turned to food and somehow or other, to Chinese food, and then one of the participants said, “They actually eat dogs in China.” And from underneath the table came “Oughgoughgough.” He understood it! He had a way of being around at receptions and on one occasion one of the Soviet ladies was at a buffet table and she had picked up some kind of a meat dish and was eating it. She would take a bite and put her hand down, take a bite, put her hand down, but she was putting her hand down in front of his nose. Eventually, he couldn't resist, she put her hand down and he snatched the dish away from her. He was a real character and we had him till he died at age 13. He came back to Vermont after traveling around Europe with us, but didn't live much longer after that. We had a good time with him there.

Q: In your social life in Geneva was their any cause for your folks to be involved with the U.S. Mission to the UN European office there? Did you deal with them in any way?

GLITMAN: Only on administrative matters. They really were handling administration for our ACDA activities. ACDA had its own people there, nominally we were working for ACDA, so ACDA had a support staff and they were very good people. They were really very helpful. But the Mission also played a role in supporting us, with cars and drivers and that sort of assistance. At that point, we were still in the Botanic building, but when we came back to Geneva, ACDA and the delegations decided that the building was really simply not secure enough, so, like a group of pirates that had left one ship and boarded another, we took over several floors of the U.S. Mission to Geneva, again because of the security issue.

Q: We now move to the year 1984 and you are the Chief U.S. Representative to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Vienna.

GLITMAN: Right. We moved to Vienna essentially by car. I mentioned the Jeep Wagoneer that we had, with all the changes in the wiring. This was one of those moves when everything was going to be changed again. We drove over the Alps to Vienna from

Geneva, probably had the dog with us. There we had quarters ready, I think they were Abramowitz's; he had found a wonderful apartment, not far from the Opera and the K#rntnerstrasse, which is the main walking street. The cathedral was within a walking distance and above all the Musikverein was within walking distance. It was a nice place. It was kind of a spooky building in some ways. It was half empty, and there were Hungarians also located in one of these apartments in this building. It was not very clear why it was this way. But, the apartment itself was quite interesting. The building had been spared from bombing, the front of it had, but the rear parts had been bombed and had been reconstructed. We were across the street from a palace and one of the main museums. We were not too far from one of the churches where there was music every Sunday at mass. So it was all within walking distance, lots of shops and so on, the Asch-Markt was also within walking distance.

There were some security problems with the place, in addition to the Hungarian representatives, essentially the terrorism aspect. Again, this had become a great problem. There was only one way in and one way out of the building. I searched for back doors and was unable to find any. One thing I could vary was where I picked up the car. Usually I would try not to be picked up right in front but I might get out, walk out the door, quickly walk in a preselected direction and then the driver would know where to pick me up. Coming home I could reverse that, not necessarily be driven to the front door, I'd be dropped off somewhere else and just walk back. We never had any problems, thank goodness, but again the threat was there and we were aware of it.

MBFR had been in existence at this point for 12-13 years almost. Many people felt that it was a waste of time and money. I didn't. I thought that it was useful just being there and just taking place. It was one of the venues where we and the Soviets, the Warsaw Pact and NATO, had an opportunity to discuss important and serious issues—the goal being to try to effect a reduction in mutual balanced forces. Reduction by its very title. But it had

been going on long enough that there were already people wondering, and the voices questioning the value of these talks were getting particularly louder.

I tried to make a few changes in the way we proceeded. One of them was to try to have a little more opportunity for informal discussions after the plenaries. They had the same arrangements that we had in Geneva. Once or twice a week there would be a plenary meeting, in the largest room in the palace. Then there were efforts at informal meetings, but they just didn't work as well as those in Geneva. So I tried, since by then the Vienna talks were almost stilted, to make some adjustments. We'd be sitting across a formal table from one another, rather than at ease, and I tried to introduce an additional session which would be similar to the informal post-plenaries we had in Geneva. The Soviets were not very interested in doing that, and particularly didn't like the idea that the military might somehow not sit with the diplomats. That kind of right down troubled them. I guess they really wanted to just check on one another. There were various efforts going on, trying to configure the talks. But I learned that there was going to be another meeting in Vienna, of another European body, coming out of the CSCE, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Helsinki final act. There was yet another set of actors, if you will, including Americans, who were going to come to Vienna, and there would be a conference to talk about the future activities in that particular operation, which was looking at mutual confidence building measures, ways to try to watch one another's exercises and so on. And it really sort of overlapped with MBFR. There was no question that there was some overlap with MBFR.

As I began to think what the future for MBFR held, it seemed to me that the fact that these two organizations dealing with so much similar matter, both going to be meeting in Vienna at the same time, could quite rightly focus attention on the fact that MBFR had been there for all these years and obviously hadn't reached any fruition. I decided to call the staff together and discuss this a bit with them and concluded that what we ought to do is prepare a rather full paper, essentially looking at the options for the future of the MBFR, recognizing that it would come into question. Leo Reddy was the Political Counselor there,

Vlad Lehovich was the DCM, both of them had been there with Mort Abramowitz and they stayed on with me. I'd met them before and they both were very able. I asked Leo to undertake the job of preparing this paper. It was a major effort and a very thick paper. Its nickname was “Fat Paper” because it got so big. But Washington was interested in receiving something like this.

What we did was lay out all these various options. We gave them all names. One of them we called “Quick and Dirty.” That was an option which would have the U.S. and the Soviets agree to a 10% reduction in forces and that would be the achievement, that would be the end of the negotiations on MBFR, and we could move on to some other approach. Another I called, “Fold, Spindle, and Mutilate” was just a clear “It's not working, let's leave.” My favorite I called “Death and Transfiguration.” And that was an option which would allow MBFR to come to a sort of conclusion, but would effectively transform it into a new negotiation with perhaps somewhat different guidelines. That is in fact what happened. It did end, and it was replaced by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations, and that negotiation achieved a treaty. We do now have agreed levels of reductions, where forces can be stationed, etc., in Europe, both with former Warsaw Pact and with NATO.

At about that point (we arrived in Vienna in August and this was probably somewhere in November or so), meetings had begun at a senior level between the U.S. and the Soviets about rejuvenating INF, about bringing it back together. I was obviously aware of this, and interested in them, but I didn't lobby for anything. I had been assigned to Vienna, I had a job to do, and I would not try to do otherwise. Out of the blue, totally unexpected, I received a phone call from Secretary Shultz—asking me if I would be willing to go back to Geneva. Of course I said, “Yes, sir, I would.” Subsequently I received a phone call from President Reagan, following up on this and adding he knew that we had just moved to Vienna from Geneva, and this would be a move back, and he appreciated that. I told him I

would be more than happy to serve as his representative to INF negotiations again—that I appreciated the opportunity.

The only one who was unhappy about this was our daughter Becky, our youngest daughter. She had been reasonably happy with the school in Geneva, but it was British and run under British rules, so to speak, and some of this bothered her. She really liked the American school in Vienna and the day that I got the phone call from the secretary and then the president, we were at a reception that night. Becky had gone off to a party at the school. I was able to tell to Chris, whisper to her about this, but we couldn't say anything in the car, because I didn't want the driver to know anything about it. So Chris and I got in the car, the driver was going to take us to the school, pick Becky up, and then bring her home. So we did that, picked her up, asked her how the party was. She was bubbling with joy, how much fun it had been and how great this school this was, and we had to contain ourselves. I couldn't say anything to her until we finally got out of the car and back into the apartment. Then I had to tell her I had some bad news for her. But she is a good trooper, and obviously agreed and back we went to Geneva.

So it was a short time at MBFR. I did come back after Christmas; I think we were there for Christmas and New Year's Day. At that point, the Austrians had invited the diplomatic corps to a outing at Schladming for skiing. Chris and I of course were not going to pass that up, so we went on that excursion. They took us on a train, we got there, and I'll brag a little bit now. There was a journalist along on this trip and he was watching all of the diplomats skiing. Afterwards, he wrote an article in one of the Vienna newspapers about this diplomatic outing and the skiing. He said most of these ambassadors weren't very good, but only two were of “renner qualitat,” which is racing quality, and that was the Australian and the American, Glitman. So I'd clipped that out, it was a total exaggeration, but it's nice to have an Austrian paper say something like that. Of course this guy wasn't a sports journalist, he was in politics, but anyway, I enjoyed that, it was a nice way to leave

there. It was about six months in all. Then back to Geneva, but first, we had to go through Washington. That is another story.

The phone calls that I received from the Secretary Shultz and subsequently from President Reagan telling me that I would be coming back to head the INF delegation were made on the 18th of January. By the 21st of January I had already flown back to Washington and begun a series of meetings with senior officials, including the president.

Q: This is in 1985?

GLITMAN: 1985. I had a whole week of those meetings, in which I was preparing for the job and getting ready for hearings as well, which were obviously a part of the process. What I found when I got back was that the negotiations were going to be set up in a somewhat different way than we had carried on during the first set of INF negotiations. For the first set, we had our own INF delegation—our own negotiation. At the same time as we were meeting, the strategic arms reduction talks, START people, that were headed by former General Rowny and the deputy negotiator was Jim Goodby. They were also meeting, but these were two separate negotiations with two separate communication channels. We kept a very similar time-table, maybe we'd start a week earlier than they did and end a week earlier, or vice-versa. But essentially, although we were occupying the same office building, they were separate talks.

In the work-up to come back to the negotiating table, the Soviets, Gromyko and others working with Secretary Shultz, ultimately came together on a different approach for this set of new negotiations. The fundamental reason for the difference was the arrival of the Space Defense Initiative, popularly and incorrectly known as “Star Wars.” The Soviets very leery of that approach; they made a very strong case that given the relationship between the strategic offense and strategic defense, you really ought to conduct a single negotiation. But they would be prepared to see the talks broken up in three segments, all of which would, at the same time, try to come together into a final package. And there

would therefore be the strategic arms reduction talks, the defense and space talk, dealing with the space defense initiative, and INF. The formula that they agreed upon made it possible to have a grand package, but it did not exclude the possibility that there might be separate agreements. I personally believed that in fact, the best way to deal with the space defense question and the strategic question is to put the two together in some fashion. Because in the end you can have trade offs between, “Alright, if you want so many offensive missiles, that would allow me to have some many defensive missiles,” and vice-versa. So one could get it down to numbers and talk about the balance that each side would have and allow the other side to have between the offensive and defensive systems.

The problem for INF, however, was that it really didn't fit neatly into this package. There was obviously some relationship because of the overlaying ranges between INF systems and strategic systems, but essentially they did serve different purposes. It was particularly true of the Soviet SS-20s. What made them such a politically charged weapon was the fact that from their normal bases, where Soviets were placing them, they really could not strike the U.S. proper. I had mentioned earlier that if they put them in a base way up north they could, but from where they were putting them, they couldn't strike the U.S.—or maybe just the corner of Alaska—but essentially not reach too deeply into the U.S. But they could strike Europe and much of Asia. If you look at some of the charts we had prepared to show the range arcs from the SS-20s, a fairly high percentage of human beings were in the range of those weapons. The fact, therefore, was that it was a system about which the Soviets could tell the Europeans, “We've got these weapons, they are for you. The Americans, they can't protect you in the same way as they could before.” We tried, I think as I mentioned before, to persuade the Europeans earlier that our strategic systems in the region were sufficient to provide deterrence; they were not so sure. We had agreed with them and began the process that lead to the 1979 decision on the deployment and negotiations. But there was still this factor about the SS-20s that made them particularly politically dangerous, the ability to say that these systems were the ones which the Soviets

had and which were capable of striking Europe but not really a threat to the U.S. That was really an effort to try to break up the linkage that we had between our systems in Europe, our defense of NATO, and our strategic forces. It had that effect, the Soviet effort, to split the Alliance in a very sensitive way.

That being said, I felt that U.S. SDI deployments were not a particular threat to the Soviet INF missiles, so the link between SDI and INF was not as salient as that between SDI and Strategic Offensive Forces. It would therefore be difficult for us to explain to our NATO allies why an INF agreement was being held up for lack of an agreement on SDI—particularly when the Allies were somewhat skeptical of the concept and the utility of SDI. You see, my concern here was that you could argue that the more issues you had to deal with in the grand package, the more room you had for reaching an agreement. Trading this off against that. The problem here was that we could not and certainly could not be seen as trading off something which was of interest to our allies in the INF area, in order to get something in the strategic side. This would be seen as our leaving them in the lurch, so to speak, and would have enormous political repercussions. So it seemed to me that we really needed to try our best to se if we could not work out a separate arrangement for INF; without having INF held up because of this back and forth on the SDI and strategic side.

In any case, the way that the U.S. delegation was set up reflected the fact that there were these three separate negotiations under one sort of umbrella organization. The responsibility for the conduct of the negotiations in each group appeared clear. It would rest with the chief negotiator for that group: Max Kampelman for the strategic defense group; former Senator John Tower for START; and me for INF. It soon became apparent, that answering the question of how, when, or if to consider and resolve the three subject areas and their relationship was less clear. That interrelationship came out of the communiqu# following Secretary Shultz's meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko which opened the way to resume the negotiations.

Kampelman was designated as head of delegation for the Nuclear and Space Talks, which was the title given to the umbrella organization. And he carried the additional title of Chief of Mission. Tower and I both received ambassadorial rank, as well as Kampelman, but he received the additional title of Chief of Mission. This was very beneficial to us in administrative terms, because it meant that the NST delegation would be afforded the same type of administrative arrangements as an Embassy. There was a press conference following the announcement of the U.S. negotiators. Secretary Shultz was asked about the duties of the head of the delegation and the relationship of the head of the delegation to the specific negotiation. And the question was, “Would you say then that Senator Tower and Mr. Glitman would report to Mr. Kampelman who in turn would report to you? Who will report to the president? Is that the chain of command?” And the Secretary replied that the chain of command is that each of these heads of delegations, or heads of these groups, would get their instructions directly from the president. Now, the process of developing the instructions for each session is obviously something that we all participate in. But in the end there will be separate instructions for each one of these talks. And then he said, “I think it has been very clear to us for quite some time,” and the Soviets had put a lot of emphasis on this too, “That there are very clear relationships among these different sets of issues. We expect that it will be important in their conduct that there will be a lot of comparing notes across different groups. And Ambassador Kampelman on the spot would be the person who's responsibility it is to coordinate that and be sort of a convener.” That was how he reacted to those sorts of questions about how this is going to work. He made clear in that statement that all of the negotiators would bear responsibility for their negotiations, have their own channel of communications with Washington, but what would be coordinated and the role of the head of delegation as a convener was less clear, especially if it turned out there was no grand package to coordinate. In fact, you could not put together a single arrangement.

As you saw, the head of delegation, in Secretary Shultz's words, “would convene meetings of all three groups when and if these were considered desirable.” In practice, while there

were two or three joint plenary sessions per round involving all three groups, where we'd all sit at the table, there was never any real overlap between INF and the other groups, except for the Soviets on-again, off-again, linking of the INF agreement with a satisfactory conclusion of START and SDI agreements. The joint plenaries did not have a remarkably positive impact on resolving INF issues or the START-SDI relationship. Neither John Tower, Ron Lehman, who succeeded Tower as the START negotiator, nor I, considered joint plenaries very useful. We recognized they were in essence mandated by the Shultz-Gromyko agreement, but we did seek to minimize their content and frequency. Each of the three negotiations was complex and detailed; this was true for INF and later for START, it was even more so as the talks drew closer towards a resolution. Putting an agreement together in even one of the areas would be difficult enough. Trying to trade off concessions between them, I felt as did Tower and later Lehman, would greatly delay or even block our final agreement. The Soviets on the other hand were rather anxious to have these joint plenary meetings. In part because they improved the prospect of embroiling the U.S. and NATO in an effort to roll up the three negotiations in a grand package, at least, that is my view of it.

One of the reasons that I preferred serving abroad rather than in Washington was the near constant battles over turf at the seat of the national government. It is not my intention to belabor bureaucratic intricacies, as I have done in a way now, but in this instance the forum had a potential for becoming substance. And I felt very strongly that the manner in which the INF agreement was sought, including its relationship with the strategic and defense and space issues, would have a major impact on many of its elements, and on how it and the process of negotiation was perceived by our Allies and the Soviets. As I said, my basic concern was that we not find ourselves in a position where we would be seen at least to have made some sort of trade-off which was not favorable to the Allies, in order to obtain something that would be favorable to us. I was conscious, given the way that the negotiations had gone up to this point, that the Soviets would do their best, and they certainly wouldn't pass up an opportunity to do this, and I believed that they would try

to figure out some way to achieve this result. As I've tried to make clear before, INF was probably more of a political issue than an arms control issue. The basic issue at stake was the future of the Alliance, and solidarity of the Alliance. And up until this point we had been doing rather well. I think on the very day that the talks had reopened in Geneva, that the Belgian parliament accepted the deployments. Only the Dutch Parliament had yet to act.

I had differences with Kampelman, and they were real, in this whole question of a separate INF negotiation or a grand package. They were purely substantive and by no means personal. I liked him very much and had great respect for his abilities. I saw him at work and particularly I remember one occasion when a group of Senators were visiting us and they got into a discussion about some problem they were having on defense and space issues in the Congress, particularly in the Senate. And Max, brilliantly, listened to both sides and then came together with a way that they could compromise their differences. He was an excellent mediator. But on this issue, we just had different views. He told me and General William Burns, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a member of the INF group, that he didn't think we would ever get a separate INF agreement; that the grand package was the only way to resolve this. I felt differently, but I had to work within the arrangements that were made. He was the head of the delegation; it was set up the way it was set up. But at the same time, I would do my best to see whether we could move ahead separately if possible because there was no bar to that approach. So it was just a difference of opinion on how best to move ahead on this area. In the end, I know he came around to the view that a separate INF agreement was possible and the way to go. But at this juncture, as we began the talks, there were these differences. Again I want to emphasize, they were not personal. The personal side was good.

In any case, we had to work with these sorts of differences. There was a hope of continuing the negotiations by the three individual groups, and those who thought that we could arrive at a grand package continued working in that direction. I certainly did my best and emphasized the separate nature of INF. I preferred to hold the whole so-called social events, which were a continuation of negotiations in a different format, with the Soviet INF

members, rather than to encourage large group meetings. I felt it didn't seem very practical for all three groups to meet socially, because I certainly would not expect someone from the INF team to go ahead and try to begin negotiating informally with someone from the Soviet START team, and vice-versa. So we tried to work on social events with the Soviet INF team, in order that we could carry-on our negotiations in a somewhat more informal way. Hopefully, we would find some way to open possibilities to reach an agreement. During the first week of negotiations, I met alone for lunch with my Soviet counterpart, Ambassador Alexi Obukhov.

I might say a word now about Obukhov. He had a reputation as a younger officer, when he was dealing with the SALT negotiations, for being a very forthcoming, open-minded, flexible fellow. Subsequently, those who dealt with him during the first set of negotiations, the START negotiations that ended in 1983 when Soviets walked out of START just as they walked out of INF, had a different impression. Obukhov was dealing with START during that period and his reputation was quite different. He was extremely cautious and very careful; he didn't seem to want to engage in any “what-if “type of discussion. He had tendency to be rather long-winded as well. In any case, he was the man that I sat across from throughout most of this period. There were periods when someone else would come and take his place, but he was there most of the time.

Q: Did you get to know his family, have any kind of relationship with him socially?

GLITMAN: No. His wife was there, and we did meet her. He did not have any youngsters with him. I know that he had some. Perhaps an anecdote or two will sort of capsulate the difficulties I had dealing with him, as I saw them.

One was during one of our early meetings. I suggested to him that it might be interesting Ambassador to see how the world would look from another capital. I said, for example, if you were sitting in an Eastern European capital, and looked out and saw the Soviet Union, you might very well see a huge, powerful country, one with which you had had difficulties

in history. On the other hand, I could see, if you were sitting in Moscow, looking out over the world, you would see on all sides countries who at one time or another had invaded you. He got very angry. I said, “Can you not put yourself in someone else's shoes that way? Try to put yourself in our shoes, or our European ally shoes. I just put my self in your shoes; I can see how you look at the world.” And he said. “That's very unprofessional. I would have expected that from a political appointee, but not from a career officer.” I was dumbfounded. Anyway, that was one example.

The other was a little more humorous. Ambassador John Woodworth, my deputy and also the Defense Department representative on our delegation, and I would have once a week, or every so often, a lunch with Ambassador Obukhov and General Medvedev, who had been in the earlier negotiation, as had John. At one of those lunches I thought, “Why don't we go to a Chinese restaurant?” I must admit there was a little mischievousness in selecting the Chinese restaurant, because the Soviets and the Chinese were having some difficulties at the time. So okay, I plead guilty to that. But I thought it would be interesting change anyway. We went to this Chinese restaurant. As we sat down, I think neither he nor General Medvedev seemed to have much knowledge of Chinese food, I am certainly no expert, but anyway, we ordered the meal. Then I said, “Well, what to drink? I hear beer goes very well with Chinese food. And they have Tsingtao beer here,” which is Chinese beer, and it's quite good. Why don't you try some of that?” He said, “No, no, I don't want that. I'll have a Cardinal,” which was a Swiss beer. I tried once more and I said, “This Tsingtao brewery was built by the Germans, who also know a lot about beer making. It is Chinese owned now. I've had it, and it's good.” And he said, “No. I never try anything I haven't had before.”

We did actually have some very serious discussions, obviously. Most of them were serious. I wish we could have had a little more humor in them. During one of those early luncheons with him, I tried something out. I said, “Look. I could see the logic (in linkage), I think I may see the link between the strategic and the defense questions, but it wasn't as compelling in INF.” And he came back in a rather didactic manner, which I had been told to

expect, and said that logic had some merits but there were other ways of considering what was logical. Then I asked him “Would the Soviet Union agree to a separate INF treaty in a situation where the U.S. had accepted the Soviet position in INF?” In other words, “We accept your INF position, would you then agree on a separate treaty?” And he though about it and allowed that in such an unlikely event, it probably would. His reply carried with it the implication that the same conclusion would logically apply in the case where the two sides had reached a mutually acceptable agreement. With that point made, I did not belabor it further. But that conversation and his response left me with a distinct impression that the Soviets could, and ultimately would, accept a separate INF agreement. Part of my sense that this would be necessary, again on the political side, was that we could find ourselves at a point in the negotiations where their unwillingness to accept what our allies and allied populations agreed, was a very generous offer, very fair offer from us, and for them to turn it down because of a link to SDI or START would then be held against them. So that sort of strengthened my sense that we could probably achieve this type of an agreement.

Again, as the talks proceeded, there were some indications that there might be a possible shift in the Soviet policy on this topic. Some of it, I admit it, was grasping at straws in a way, but this was from a Pravda editorial, I won't go into all the details, but I could see that in the editorial there were rather sharp distinctions drawn between the linkage between the SDI and START and the linkage with INF. There was a phrase, for example, “INF could be self-contained” and related INF to the situation in the European continent and outside of it. But they didn't mention linkage to SDI in the editorial. But Pravda editorials are one thing. Statements by the leader of the country are another. During Gorbachev's October 1985 visit to Paris, he spoke of the possibility of a separate INF agreement. He said something like, “Concerning medium range nuclear weapons in Europe, with the aim of making easier agreement, we consider it possible to conclude a corresponding agreement separately, outside of direct connection with the problem of space and strategic arms.” This road, as it appears, turned out to be practical. That was a breakthrough in a

sense. The Soviets would, after that speech, sometimes reinforce the idea of a separate INF agreement and we have Gorbachev doing that, and in other times they might pull it back. As the negotiations developed, we are going to see, on more than one occasion, where Gorbachev said something which would have moved the talks forward, and then suddenly later on it got pulled back. This was beginning of that element of the negotiations. As I said, we'll see later as I go through this process that I will be able to show you other examples.

Indeed, in this instance, January 16, 1986, Gorbachev made a very major speech on the whole broad arms control approach. I would say it was one of the best pieces of work the Soviets did in this era. It was very comprehensive and very compelling; you really needed to know the intricacies of the negotiation to find the flaws in it. But, they were there. It was a well done job by them.

In this speech, Gorbachev seemed to put linkage back into effect. In other words, he referred to the settlement of the SDI question as a precondition for moving ahead on his proposal on eliminating all offensive nuclear weapons by the year 2000. It was a major thing then—all offensive weapons out by 2000. The specific linkage with SDI was contained in a sweeping proposal dealing with nuclear arms which can reach each other's territories—that is strategic arms. A separate portion of the speech called for the complete liquidation of Soviet and U.S. medium range missiles in the European zone. Again, this is a “zero” coming from their side, but limited to the European zone, and, as we've seen, the Soviet SS-20s outside of Europe were still capable of hitting targets in most of NATO Europe.

And then, after January 16, there was a press conference, and one of the Soviet deputy Foreign Ministers, Korniyenko, made clear that the fate of SDI would apply to INF. Korniyenko had a reputation as a very hard liner and again, we sensed that Gorbachev talked a bit about linkage, but it was someone else who came in and really made a strong case that there will be linkage. My feeling at that point was that the linkage issue was a

non-winner for them. And that they would ultimately drop it, so it was merely a matter of time before they would come back to what Gorbachev had said in Paris.

Let me see if I can run through linking and de-linking that had occurred during this period of several years. I noted they started out linking, then in the 1985 visit to Paris we had Gorbachev's de-linking, then in January 1986 a re-linking, and then again in February 1986 Gorbachev used the media-worthy event of a visit by Senator Ted Kennedy to suggest once again that a separate INF treaty was possible. Then on February 25th Gorbachev announced that the Star Wars program must not be allowed to be used both as a stimulus for a further arms race and as an obstruction on a road to radical disarmament. There he seemed to be de-linking it again. That de-linking would last until the Reykjavik summit, and at the Reykjavik summit, the Soviets once again re-linked. I was confident that in the end, they were going to have to de-link. The political negatives of their trying to tie up INF with SDI and START were going to be so strong that they would back off in the end. And in fact they did.

That was on February 28, 1987. On that date, Gorbachev announced the Soviet Union “proposes taking the problem of medium range missiles in Europe out of the block of issues and concluding a separate agreement on this subject.” Gorbachev also noted that de-linkage would remove, and this is a very important point to make, de-linkage would remove much of the nuclear burden from our common home, which is Europe. This became a major theme for Gorbachev at this point. “Our common European home.” And guess who doesn't live in that home? That's right, the U.S. is outside of this picture. In his memoirs, Gorbachev later says, “Well, I didn't mean to exclude the U.S.” But I think it is clear from the way this began that this was his move in that direction. And this has broad strategic significance as well, in the sense of political policy. He is backing off of the hard-nosed line. He is seeing, rightly, that he can be more effective by taking a warm approach, than by a cold one. You could see once he took over, even before maturing in this common European home theme, that all of the initiatives that he took after January 16 and so on, were part of a war of maneuver. This was a war of movement on his side.

He hadn't given up the objective, but he was pursuing it by showing in a sense a very real flexibility. Again, we can find flaws in what he was saying, from our standpoint, but he was very good at portraying this willingness to move forward. Perestroika, democratization, openness, etc. All of these slogans were designed not only to have an impact internally but also to send a message out to the Europeans and particularly the NATO Europeans. So, this “common home” theme fits, and this is an example why, in my view, there would be no further re-linking. This fact was happily recognized and supported by all on the SDI delegations. President Reagan welcomed this announcement. He made reference to the European political aspect of this event by stressing the importance of close cooperation between the U.S. and its European allies. And I'll quote this because I have it in my notes here. “As we proceed, it is well to remember that nothing is more important to the cause of peace than the credibility of our commitment to NATO and our other allies and the vitality of these alliances of free nations.” The President's statement was well attuned to the “common European home” theme and presented our side. But this was a qualitative change in the discussion at this junction. We were going to get a treaty, and this was the beginning of a sign that we might get that treaty, but the contest was not over. The contest was seen, basically, as the Soviets trying to split the alliance or to move the allies closer to the Soviet Union. The Soviets had not given up on that objective. With the agreement on a separate INF treaty, we also had to turn to some other issues and I want to work our way through some of those.

But before I do that, I should have mentioned earlier, one of the things that set the INF group apart from how the U.S. had put forward negotiating teams in the past. That was the continuity we had. The people who were involved in the first set of negotiations, obviously Ambassador Nitze, myself, John Woodworth, the Department of Defense Representative General William Burns, the JSC representative, three key players, and people from ACDA, various people, Lucas Fisher and others at different times. Our lawyers were also from ACDA, Tom Graham and Karen Lawson at the time, now Karen Look. These same people came back to the INF negotiations where we reopened. Nitze left and I took over as a

head of the group, but General Burns was there and John Woodworth was there. Also there was Tom Graham, like so many others, such as Lucas Fisher, and Stan Riveles. I'd better stop because I will leave somebody out, and I already have, but it made a difference. Usually the Soviets kept the continuity and we changed the teams, but in this instance we had the same folks. So there was no breaking-in period, we all knew each other, we all worked together, we all had the same memories of what had happened in the past, and we could build on those. It really made a tremendous difference. I should add that not only did this team have continuity, but these were very, very able people. All of them. We had put together a wonderful group. Good back-stopping in Washington as well, and also a degree of continuity there.

The other point that I think I should make is, I mentioned and I will probably mention again, the numbers of trips that I made to NATO capitals during this period. I have already commented that the Air Force made much of this possible. But I also want to emphasize the importance of the assistance I received from the American Embassies on these visits. They were the ones who would select the journalists that I ought to meet, they were the ones who set up the lunches or the dinners or the cocktails or whatever, the venues of the places, and the ones who would indicate, “these are the officials that you really ought to meet and the senior people, and here are some of the more junior ones who are more active on this issue, etc.” They made those trips very fruitful for all of us, and I appreciated that effort on their part.

I want to talk next about some issues. We are sort of skipping around, not necessarily n chronological order, and I am going to work on this subject by issues. We just dealt with the separate INF treaty. The next issue that we need to turn to is something we referred to as “Asia and how we got to a global zero.” INF was, as you've seen, principally about our relations with our NATO allies. But, it also had an impact on our Asian allies, and we did take that into account. It didn't start out quite like that. There was a tendency to look at INF as essentially a European issue. Fortunately, we had John Woodworth to remind us about Asia. Frequently, when we would start talking about problems, we were focusing on

how it was going to impact on NATO Europe, for example, the way we would treat SS-20s located east of the Urals and so on. John would be there to remind us that we did, in fact, have Asian allies, principally Japan and South Korea, and that there was also a Chinese impact here. As a consequence, we were always able to factor Asian considerations into these issues. Because, John would be there to say, “Hey, don't forget this.” After a while he didn't have to say that any longer; we all were attuned to that subject as an issue.

As the negotiations went on, our policy line also began to broaden to make Asian concerns an important part of the argument that the INF treaty needed a global basis, and that it would be better to deal with limitations on these weapons not just as they applied to Europe, but indeed globally. No matter where they were deployed, they really ought to be eliminated. That was a major step, because I don't think there had been many instances before in arms control history where, for example, you looked at chemical and biological weapons, but no real program to actually carry out this elimination. They were to be banned, but this was basically going to eliminate them, and no more production, no more testing, no more missiles. Our feeling, our belief was that it would be easier to make the agreement durable and sound if the ban, the elimination, took place on a global basis. And it had a side effect of making clear to our Asian allies and friends their benefits from this treaty as well as those for our European allies and friends. In any case, the Soviets began most of their deployment in the European side, but as the negotiations went on, we saw more and more new deployments, new bases being set up in the east. I think someone had estimated that the SS-20 could target 62% of the world's population, including all of Europe, China, the Middle East, the Near East, most of India, much of Southeast Asia, and a large portion of northern Africa. And yet, they were not, strictly speaking, strategic weapons; they could not reach 5,500 kilometers, which is the beginning range for strategic weapons. They were a different category, but as you can see, they needed control. Because of the impact they had on security and stability across a large part of the world.

We began fairly early in the process to explore a little bit with the Soviets, what might be done, explicitly in behalf of Asia, as opposed to eliminating them as a consequence of

eliminating weapons, SS-20s that were capable of striking Europe, that would obviously have some impact on the SS-20s not being there, therefore, they would not be able to strike some of these other targets in say North Africa or Middle East. So we began to think about how to bring Soviet-Asian INF missiles into an agreement. I would probe my Soviet counterparts on their views of the political aspects of INF in Asia and particularly China's role in this equation. They were very leery of even discussing the subject. Only General Nikolai Detinov, who was my counterpart in the first set of negotiations, was prepared to engage on this topic, and his comments, while elliptical, left me with an impression that a deeply ingrained Soviet concern rooted in fear over China would be a factor in their decision, on whether and to what extent, they would be prepared to reduce their Asian INF missiles in the context of a bilateral negotiation with us. And, interestingly enough, one of the Soviet interpreters, Pavel Pavlishenko, a very able man, wrote some memoirs, after the INF treaty. He ended being an interpreter for Shevardnadze and then Gorbachev. He noted in his book that fear of China was widely spread in Soviet Union—and this is a quote from his book— “including the country's leaders” and “it often reached the point of hysteria.” That was very telling. As I said, I sensed that attitude from my discussion, and it was interesting to have it confirmed. But you can see how that impacted on their seeing what we were doing, trying to reduce the SS-20s in Asia. From there, while NATO concerns remained in the forefront, increasingly Japan and South Korea came into the picture, and we had our eyes open to the fact. Now from a Soviet stand-point, it would have been China that they would have been most concerned about. So, trying to get them to go to zero globally was not going to be easy.

There was one other great advantage in going to zero globally. And that was, verification would be far easier to carry out. If you allow 100 large missile systems, you have to make sure that the next one you see is not the 101st. And we had come up with all kinds of technical ways of trying to deal with this. One was tags. These would be sort of like a license plate that you couldn't fiddle with, that you couldn't remove. And these would be placed on Soviet launchers. On ours too. Then when the inspectors came, they would

run some kind of electric beam over it, and they would say, “This is the right tag for this vehicle, fine.” Or if they didn't they'd say, “Something is wrong here.” We were looking at things like that. Actually we even produced a couple of models; I was given one of those tags as a sort of a memento after this was all over. But we wouldn't need those if there was zero. Because if you see one, it's a violation. There is no question of whether this is “the104th,” it is a missile launcher. That would make it much easier to do and that would reduce the amount of control, the number of inspections we would need, and so forth. That was a big plus from going to zero. We did anticipate that verification would be a major issue during the Senate hearings on the treaty, as indeed it turned out to be.

The Soviets eventually began to get the sense that the political nature of this issue for them was as well with countries in Asia and Europe. One sign of that was a proposal in October 1983 by Soviet General Secretary Andropov, which added to one of the many proposals to reduce SS-20s, to match the Soviet count with British and French warheads, we've seen that constant theme. But he added to that and offered to freeze a number of SS-20s in Asia, as long as the U.S. deployed no similar weapons in the region. But it really wouldn't be until Gorbachev took over the reins that the Soviets began a more serious effort to improve relations with the Asians and to recognize how their INF deployments in Asia impacted on that effort. They walked out of the negotiations before we had any real exploration of INF in Asia, let alone any practice, but when they came back to Geneva, that issue came back with them. And here we were looking at their deployment pattern, and we could see that the Asian element took on growing importance after the negotiations resumed.

One of the things we did in the INF negotiations—it had been done before—was to set up a Senate and House Observer Group. The Senate Observer Group was headed by Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska. He was a co-chair I think along with Senator Nunn. The fact that he was from Alaska also played a role in focusing our attention on Soviet Asian SS-20 deployments. He lost no time in reminding us that the SS-20s could reach portions of his state. To keep him abreast of our efforts to obtain reductions and eventually the

elimination of SS-20s in Asia, I encouraged him to take his concerns to the Soviets during his frequent visits to Geneva.

And let me talk for a moment here about the Observer Group. We had visitors frequently during the first set of negotiations which ended with Soviet walk-out. But when we came back in 1985, the Senate and then the House set up a somewhat formal observer group. And Senator Stephens was a co-chair, as I said, with Senator Nunn on the Senate side. I am pretty sure it was Senator Nunn; I am positive about Senator Stevens. They would come over, at least once during every round, and join us. I had an earlier experience with congressional staff that made me really very leery of this operation at first. That experience, to describe it just briefly, involved Senate and House staffers, joining us in a negotiation—I think it was with Argentina. It was a bizarre sort of situation, where the administration was negotiating with the Argentineans and the Senate staffers were in the room. As the discussion began, the staffers joined in, effectively becoming a part of the negotiation. It wasn't clear for whom they were speaking. In fact, they began to argue among themselves, whether this or that might be the result. It occurred to me at that point, this is why you have an administration, an executive branch to do the negotiating, because the House and the Senate are too large and too unwieldy bodies to conduct negotiation. As I said, they were arguing among themselves in front of the Argentineans about what they should be doing. As I said, it led me to a realization that this is a dangerous approach. The INF Observer Groups, the Senate and House groups, never did that. There was only one example, and I am not going to say who it was, when they sort of said something and I felt it was injurious to the position that we were taking. Otherwise, I thought that they were very helpful; they were not in Geneva on vacation, they worked, we did not invite them to the plenary meetings, but they had ample opportunities at receptions and at dinners to sit down with the Soviet negotiators and discuss issues with them. Obviously, we would brief them before every event, so that they would have an idea of where we were coming from, where we were at in negotiations, what our goals were, how we would try practically to move things. In this instance, I don't think there was ever, except for that one exception

early on, any problem. On the contrary, Senator Stevens was very helpful. And I, in fact, encouraged him to make his concerns known. He saw where we were coming from and where we were working together towards the same goal. I think they played a useful role.

Another item had occurred, which made dealing with the situation all the more urgent. In August 1986, we had a series of meetings with the Soviets outside the Geneva negotiations which involved people from capitals, Washington and Moscow, and the chief negotiators on both the U.S. and Soviet side. The first meeting was held in Moscow, and it was supposed to go through all three negotiations. Let me just concentrate on the INF portion of it. The most important part of the Moscow meeting was a question that General Chervov, who was the Soviet Defense Ministry's lead individual for arms control, asked me. It sort of came out of the blue; it didn't follow any sequence. He said, “Would you be willing to accept an outcome in which there were 100 missiles left in Europe?” I had to think about it for a moment, everyone looked at me because the question was addressed to me and they expected me to answer. Fortunately I had a pretty good idea at what point we still had a viable military force, so I went ahead and said, “Yes.”

Then I asked him a couple of other question. The first one was, “We are talking about U.S. and Soviet systems, but nobody else's, no British, no French?” And he said, “That's correct.” Then I said, “Secondly, this is not going to impact British or French in any way what so ever?” And they said, “Yes, that's correct.” And I said, “Well then probably, we could work something out.”

When we came back, the Reykjavik summit had been set up. We came back from Moscow. We had preparation meetings, and I was able to say for INF that I anticipated that we would hear from the Soviets something along these lines: 100 in Europe; and we'd have to determine what the right number would be for Asia. My thinking was that it would have to be a proportional cut. So whatever proportional cuts we took in Europe, the same proportion would be cut in Asia. If it was a 50% cut in Europe, it would be a 50% cut in Asia; and we would have to look at our own numbers to adjust accordingly. What

happened in Reykjavik was a variation on this. I won't go through the negotiation itself, between the President and Gorbachev, Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. But what came out of it was an agreement to have zero in Europe and 100 elsewhere in the world. That was where they were. The problem at that junction was that we didn't have anything in Asia. So that would have allowed the Soviets to have that hundred but, for our part, we didn't have any deployments planned, so we might find ourselves in a situation. There were possibilities that it might be placed in Alaska, but that was also an issue that hadn't been broached. We were certainly prepared when we got to Reykjavik to deal with the number of 100 in Europe and leave open the question in Asia, but it came as quite a surprise, I have to say, the way it worked out. We were ready for something, but this twist was unusual. It was not anticipated by us. I am not sure that it was anticipated by the Soviets either. This was Gorbachev just moving in that direction. That left us with the question as to how we get down to zero. I began to look around for ways for some kind of leverage that could keep open the prospects of deployment somewhere in Asia, but that was not very likely and there was the possibility of Alaska, but that was sort of lost in several ways. Some of the positions that we had taken (and others had taken on the fringes of the negotiation, concerning the possibility of our deployment in Alaska) suggested that there was not any support. I think the Soviets were probably aware of that. So we needed to find some other way.

But the basic arrangement, especially the willingness to drop the British and French systems that we heard from Chervov, struck me as really significant. This was one of the toughest issues that we had faced in the negotiation and, at this point, it looked as if this issue was now going to be resolved and in a way which would not in fact put the British and French missiles on our side of the ledger. So the issue now was could we get to global zero at this point. I have already pointed out the advantages to us, verification simplification, etc. that would flow if we could get a double, global zero.

There were some other caveats that came at this point. The Soviets continued to try to affect the mix between the GLCMS and Pershings and so on. We said that we were

prepared to discuss the mix, but Pershing was going to be part of the force—one way or the other. I also went back to this, as I mentioned earlier we tried this equal percentage reductions approach when this was done with Chervov, but again when the President, Gorbachev, Shultz, and Shevardnadze were together at Reykjavik, all that sort of got pushed aside and we were left with how to get the remaining 100 out—what that would take. It occurred to me that there were some pretty good arguments to deal with this problem. Around this time, Gorbachev began a campaign to show that the Soviet Union wanted friendlier relations with Asian countries, in particular with China. I, in effect, said to Obukhov during some of the negotiating sessions, “You know, if you are taking a position that you want to improve relations with Asia, then you really need to take a good hard look at your position to keep 100 missiles in Asia and zero in Europe. You know, it looks as if, in fact, you are favoring Europe over Asia.” I wasn't too subtle about the way I phrased this. I wanted them to recognize that there was an incompatibility there between seeking better relations and keeping the 100 missiles.

Let's pick up on getting rid of the remaining 100 missiles, which would have been in Soviet Asia, while we would theoretically have been able to put some in Alaska. There was a place in Alaska where cruise missiles could have reached Soviet targets. Out aim was to try to get it down to zero. I kept pressing the case for zero, noting that the world and especially the Asian nations would know that it was the Soviet Union alone that was preventing the removal of the INF threat from the region. And that everyone knew that we were ready to go to zero. But the Soviets, I think, really had an abiding concern for the security situation in Asia. That concern remained an impediment to an agreement to reach global zero. So we began thinking about whether there was some kind of additional sweetener which might provide an impetus to move to zero. And fortuitously, one appeared—a little complicated, but here is the essence of it.

While we had agreed to zero level for LRINF in Europe, established patterns of cooperation, sometimes called “patterns of cooperation,” or “POC,” involving nuclear weapons provided to our allies were not affected. The argument we made was that we

have effectively signed contracts with our allies to support their nuclear programs, that we provided them with nuclear weapons which they would place on their airplanes or, in case of Germany, on their Pershing missiles, and that these actions would bind us together in this nuclear world. It was a way of sharing the responsibilities of being a nuclear power. And those responsibilities included, obviously, being a target. That action linked the U.S. strategic force directly to the Allies' nuclear forces. That was called the “linkage” issue. And it was another way of assuring them that we were in it together with them. That if there was going to be a war we would all be in it, it wouldn't necessarily be fought only in Europe, and it would not only be fought over the heads of Europeans. We would be in it together and that was how we would deter it from happening because the Soviets would recognize that they would have to take on the whole Alliance. In any case, that was really what these patterns of cooperation involved.

The Federal Republic of Germany had purchased and deployed U.S. manufactured Pershing IA missiles, for which the U.S. provided nuclear warheads. It was technically possible to upgrade a Pershing IA by converting the first stage of the Pershing II missile into what would be called a Pershing IB. Pershing II had two stages. Basically, you drop off the second stage and what you are left with is another missile—a new missile which we would call Pershing IB. It would be much longer in range than the IA, which was roughly I believe 700 kilometers, less than 1,000 kilometers. Its improvement wouldn't be so much in range, however, all the electronics would be new, and the guidance system would also be new. It would be qualitatively an improved missile. And since under the INF agreement we were going to have to destroy a lot of our Pershing IIs, all of them would have to be destroyed if we went to zero globally, we had these Pershing IIs there. Thus you can eliminate the missile—it ceases to exist by removing that second stage and converting it to IB. We argued that this would be elimination. There would be no more Pershing IIs.

The Soviets didn't like that argument. They were quite concerned about the Pershing IB. They let us know that position. Time and again they would raise it. Our concern was that we were not going to upset the contract that we had with the Germans, the POC, in a

context of a bilateral negotiation. That contract had been in effect for decades so we had a very delicate problem here. But the Soviets were quite concerned about the PIB. So what I was looking at was some way to put these things together. Their concern was the potential conversion; ours was the desire to get zero LRINF missiles.

In time we began to hear from the Germans that prospects for this conversion were dim at best. And they were concerned for a number of reasons. First, they didn't want to be singularized. In other words, they didn't want to be the only country holding significant INF systems in Europe following an INF treaty. And second, they didn't want to give the Soviet elements in their domestic body politic a high profile focal point for attacking the government of the Federal Republic. In other words, everyone else has gotten rid of their INF missiles; in such a world, why are we still keeping ours in Germany? So you can see the political pressures were there, not to go ahead and accept this PIB. Nevertheless the Germans were going to be our good allies and certainly not damage either the Alliance negotiating position or NATO's military posture should the INF negotiations fail. We didn't want this issue to be a treaty breaker nor, I believe, did the Germans want to open another debate over the deployment of nuclear weapon system. If they were to remain a nuclear weapon power, their missile force would, without conversion, be obsolete. The Pershing IA was clearly obsolescent at this point. I don't want to say that it was useless or ineffective, but it was not “state of the art.”

The near certainty that conversion would not take place seemed to me to provide an opportunity to trade off our agreement to forgo conversion of the German Pershing in return for a Soviet willingness to join us in a global zero. I contacted Washington and laid out the basic proposition and suggested that I float it past the Soviets as a personal idea, which at that point it was. If it elicited interest we could follow up by making it more concrete, and if the Soviets treated it as a non-starter we could drop it. And in any case, I could be disowned. I got a general green light. I met with Obukhov around this time, June 1, to be precise, of 1987. We had a conversation. He began to hint about this, and I began to hint about it. It was clear to me that there were some possibilities here. I asked him if

he'd be prepared to go a little deeper on some of the points he raised. He was interested to know whether we would also agree not to convert the ground launched cruise missiles, the GLCM, to the sea launched cruise missiles, the SLCM. At that point I said, “Are you ready to talk informally now?” And he said, “Not yet.” So we couldn't go any further on that discussion. He said he would make a sign when he was ready to go further. Therefore, I took this as being possible.

Shortly afterwards the Soviets told us that Colonel General Nikolai Chervov, I think I mentioned him previously; he was the man who asked those questions about 100 missiles in Europe at the meeting in Moscow. They told us he'd be visiting Geneva. This really provided an exceptional opportunity to put this concept directly to a Moscow player. The first meeting I had with Chervov took place on June 17. It was a luncheon meeting. General Medvedev was there, Ambassador Obukhov was there, and John Woodworth on our side was with me. I think that was the main group that we had there—plus the interpreters. The luncheon danced around this issue. He was clearly interested in it. And, in fact, he kind of raised it himself; he brought it up almost as I was going to do. So we kind of came together on this. The sticking point was the German Pershings and POC. The Soviets were quite opposed to allowing that program to continue; even if it had been in existence for years. They felt that it was going to be unjust for everyone to stop having these weapons except for the West Germans, who would be able to have PIB if we insisted on the POC. Otherwise, it looked as if we would be in a pretty good shape. That was a big stumbling block but the atmosphere was good. My broad hints that we needed to find trade-offs were well received, as were his. He said he would be leaving on Saturday, June 20, in the morning, and would be prepared to talk again with me. I informed Washington about that planned meeting and set up the talking points I intended to use for it. I was given an informal go-ahead on a secure line, but told to expect a more definitive and detailed response after the U.S. officials had an opportunity to review the talking points more carefully.

There was one comment that Chervov made during that discussion that amused me. He said that the U.S. approach contains logic, and he said “I'm in favor of the U.S. side.” I am not sure how to take that. Again, this was not an angry meeting; this was one of the better ones we had. He did sum up his understanding of our position as follows: zero globally on short range INF (I have not discussed that here but that was also coming along); the U.S. would abandon conversion for the U.S. of Pershing II to Pershing IB, but would maintain its program of cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany.

I hope that distinction is clear. We couldn't do it for ourselves, but we argued that we had this existing contract, and we would fulfill it if we were asked to do so by the Germans. And he said our position as he saw it was if the Germans should ask for it, the U.S. could convert PIIs to PIBs.

After we went over the PII to PIB conversion, we went through it again, and he summed up the Soviet position this way: If the Soviet side were to accept the double global zero, SRINF, LRINF, in other words, no missiles between 500 and 5,500 kilometers would exist, they would all be gone. If the Soviet side were to accept the double global zero, U.S. must in turn physically destroy all PIIs, no conversions and physically destroy all GLCMs, the ground launching cruise missiles, with no conversion. He hinted the Soviets might be willing to accept retention of the existing German PI missiles. As I said, at this point, he told me, “I am leaving for Moscow on June 20, and let me know what you think.” But you can see, we had a very general agreement. The sticking point was again about the conversion of the German Pershing.

I'll say a brief bit now about GLCMs and their “no conversion” issue. I was aware of the fact that ground launch cruise missiles, which are covered by the INF treaty, and the sea launched cruise missiles, which are not, were almost identical. I won't go through how I knew this, but I had a visual proof of it on one occasion, let's put it that way. What seemed to me to be a possible solution to this problem, if we couldn't convert the whole missile, because we really didn't want the Soviets going through a lot of conversions

either, we might have been suspicious of how those might have worked out, even with good verification, monitoring, on-site inspection, etc., one thing we could do, and in the end we did do, was to set up the elimination in such way that the exterior, the airframe, would be crushed and destroyed, but everything inside, electronics, the guidance system, obviously the warhead, the engine and the little rocket motor at the back for missile which propelled it off the launcher in the first place, all of those would be kept. And in the end we did that. We agreed that we would destroy the airframe but we would keep all the innards. I was told by someone that this arrangement, for us saved about 250 million dollars. It would have been cheaper if we could convert whole thing, but that ran the risk of having them do something of the sort themselves. That is how that eventually worked its way out. I noted at the end of this luncheon meeting that the farewell handshakes were heartier than usual.

Anyway, I informed Washington of the other meeting, the planned meeting on Saturday, and set out the talking points for me to use. Basically they outlined how the thing should work. Which included the Soviets Union understands the U.S. retains the right to continue this established pattern of cooperation with Germans regarding the Pershing missiles. And that, if they would agree to that, we would agree basically to get global double zero and we wouldn't transfer any existing U.S. INF missiles to any third parties. Those that were actually in our force, and PIIs, we wouldn't transfer but that did not happen, and of course we kept open the idea of conversion. That was crucial in this issue. I was very forceful, privately forceful I think too, that simply we were not going to break a contract. We just could not accept an outcome in which that contract would be broken unilaterally by us. That of course left it open if the Germans were to say no. And that would be the end of it. Ultimately, a month or so later, in August, I have the exact date somewhere here, Chancellor Kohl did say Germany was not going to continue with this program. But that was further on.

When I got to the U.S. mission on Saturday morning, I was told that there were no messages for me. Chervov, accompanied by Lieutenant General Medvedev, the official

Soviet INF negotiator at that point, was at the door, and I decided to proceed along the line that I had sent to Washington. I had gotten verbal clearance over the phone. I would just proceed without a cable. It turned out in fact that the message was in Geneva, but it was serving no practical purpose at this point. We were still saddled with this combined delegation superstructure we were talking about. The message had been given to the combined delegation duty officer, who worked on the defense space group and had no knowledge of the INF issues. It had been put aside for the combined delegation executive officer, who would be in on Saturday, but who came in later in the morning. The message gave me a green light to go ahead and called for only one relatively minor change in the talking points.

The discussion with Chervov was obviously very intense. Both in terms of the time constraints and the need to get our figures worked out. I reiterated our arguments for double global zero. And made the point once more that we were aware of Soviet concern over the modernization of German Pershing IA force, and he saw where I was heading and that it might be possible to reach a solution to both of the problems—that we have a trade-off. I also took the occasion to put forward the concept of destroying the airframes and keeping the innards, so to speak, of the missiles. He didn't have any specific reaction to that but, as I said, eventually they did accept it. At the same time, I suggested the both sides would make it clear that neither would transfer to third countries any existing U.S. or Soviet LRINF or SRINF missiles, and that meant those in the force now. And this would include the Federal Republic. However, I made it equally clear that it was a matter of principle for the U.S. that the German Pershings were not part of this agreement. We would retain the right to continue the established pattern of cooperation for the Pershing systems. However, I did say I did not envisage that support for that program would go beyond the framework of the existing pattern. In other words, the numbers would not change and the types wouldn't change.

Chervov again expressed concern over the possibility that under what I had proposed, the U.S. had the right to convert the PII to PIB for the West Germans. He believed that

his authorities would find this difficult to accept since it would be seen as an inequity. Having laid out our respective positions, we both came to an informal agreement, stressing that we were speaking informally and unofficially. There would be Soviet commitment to eliminate the remaining INF systems in Asia, in essence a double global zero and the U.S. would not convert any of its PIIs into PIBs. The Soviets could accept the retention of the existing German PIA force. The one part of which we had to agree to disagree concerned the continued application of the U.S. pattern of cooperation with the Germans. I made it clear that we would not abandon that arrangement without German agreement. Chervov commented that this would pose a major difficulty for the Soviet side. Nevertheless I think we both understood that each of us would present the informal agreement to our respective capitals. As I bid farewell to Chervov, I was more confident than ever that we would get a sound and durable INF agreement, incorporating the principles we had worked out with our NATO allies back in 1979. As it was, that confidence would soon be tested.

What happened there was that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Yuri Vorontsov and Ambassador Max Kampelman came to Geneva about the time Chervov had left. On June 23, John Woodworth and I met with Vorontsov, Obukhov, and Medvedev. Vorontsov had been rather pessimistic and negative, and in response I noted that we made progress during Chervov's visit and expressed a hope that we could move further with Vorontsov. When I outlined the discussion with Chervov, Vorontsov exploded. “Decisions on such issues are made by us in the Foreign Ministry and not in the Defense Ministry,” he said. “Chervov's views and suggestions are not our policy and have no standing.” Neither Medvedev, who had been present during my conversation with Chervov, nor Obukhov, who had been present at the luncheon meeting with Chervov, made any comment. Both carefully controlled their body language. Well, despite, or perhaps even more, because of Vorontsov's reaction I concluded that of the two, Chervov's was the more authentic voice. In any event, we continued our efforts to move the Soviets to accept our global zero approach and patiently awaited developments. Again, I have to underscore how strongly we made the point that we had these agreements with the Germans and, while

we wouldn't be converting for ourselves, we had to retain the right to continue that pattern of cooperation. We could not unilaterally remove it. And that was obviously a very serious sticking point for them. It eventually got resolved.

On July 22, we got our answer. One of my staff came into my office and said, “There is an article here that you need to see right away. It's an Indonesian newspaper, Merdeka.” I thought to myself, “I know what this is.” It was Gorbachev's acceptance of double global zero. He sought to present it as his own and as a Soviet contribution to improving security in Asia. His choice of an Asian newspaper I believe was also meant to send an obvious message. Nevertheless, the incompatibility between his call for closer Soviet-Asian ties and Soviet insistence on keeping SS-20s targeted on most of Asia had forced the change in Soviet policy. He simply couldn't argue in favor of closer relations and then maintain the SS-20s. That had forced the change. As well as, I hope, some of our efforts to give him further reasons to move forward in this area; including, bringing this incompatibility to their attention.

The next day in Geneva, the Soviets formally tabled the proposal outlined in the Merdeka interview. The Soviets, however, made agreement contingent on the inclusion not of the new Pershings, but of the old Pershings IA in an INF agreement. Now, suddenly this arises. Our argument was that these were German Pershings and not ours; we had basically sold them to them. We did have the warheads. But they then began to argue that the existing German Pershings should go under any U.S.-Soviet INF treaty.

After the formal session, Obukhov took me aside and expressed the Soviet expectation that we would now follow through on the accord reached with Chervov. I knew that we had been in close contact with the Germans on the issue of conversion, conversion was not in the cards, and I said it will work out. On the other hand, I said the existing German PIA would have to remain outside any U.S.-Soviet agreement. I had trouble trying, well not trouble, but I began to question why Vorontsov had reacted the way he did. And it makes me wonder whether there was simply not full coordination within the Soviet bureaucracy.

It's also possible that Vorontsov may have been aware that something like the Merdeka article was underway within the Soviet government and he felt that getting into the issue, in the way that Chervov had, would make it look as if the U.S. had some role in this move.

In any case, I would put down my conversations with Chervov as win-win on both sides. The Soviets would avoid the risk of a modern NATO-FRG nuclear missile force. We'd get the global zero that we sought to benefit of ourselves, our Asian and NATO allies, and both parties would gain from the improved prospect for effective verification that the zero outcome would create. I have explained why the verification would be easier.

If you look back at this juncture in the negotiations, we had obtained the zero outcome, which President Reagan had made his primary goal six years earlier. We had secured Soviet agreement to the NATO principles, which had guided us from 1979. We had obtained Soviet recognition of the legitimacy of U.S. deployments of nuclear weapons in Europe. And by extension, we had obtained their acceptance of our military presence in Europe as a counter to Soviet deployments threatening our NATO allies. Additionally, we had defended the interests of our Asian allies by obtaining the elimination of the Soviet INF threat against them.

We have talked a little bit about the short range INF systems, and I think it would now be a good time to discuss the evolution of that aspect of the negotiations. I think, as I pointed out, we had started by asking for collateral constraints, not otherwise specified, on those systems, both Soviet and U.S., their ranges were 500-1,000 kilometers, and I think there we and the Soviets reached agreement pretty quickly. We listed some systems, specifically the SS-23, which they at first claimed did not exist. They eventually agreed it did exist but then claimed it could not reach 500 kilometers and should, therefore, be kept out of the treaty. Those were sort of the main parameters of it. We had very few of these types of missile systems, although there was always a possibility of building some. We did have shorter range missiles with ranges below 500 kilometers in Europe. And we had artillery. Again, we had a large number of nuclear weapons there; the value of some of

them, frankly, I questioned when I was in the Army early in my career. But, in any case, these were all being removed from the inventory. And by now are all out of the inventory.

From the beginning, we realized we would have to constrain Soviet missiles with ranges below 1,000 kilometers because from bases in East Germany they could strike well into West Germany and possibly some of the other neighboring countries. Therefore, they were as effective for the Soviets as their INF missiles in certain situations. As you see, we didn't have anything quite like it. The Soviet rationale for the 1,000 kilometers was that this was how much capability it would take to reach from West German bases to Soviet territory (a round trip in case of aircraft); that is where that number came from. It made sense just in general terms as a good point at which to break off short range INF and move into longer range INF systems.

Throughout most of these early days, SRINF was not a major consideration, but as we got closer to the end of negotiations, as we began to make progress on other areas, of course then SRINF moved up to be a more important factor. This issue really got moving during a meeting—a luncheon in Geneva with Viktor Karpov. This session would have been in spring of 1987. I have the exact date somewhere but, in any case, Karpov, a senior Foreign Ministry arms control official, joined us for a working lunch. During that lunch I believe Ambassador Kampelman and, at that point, probably Ambassador Lehman also were present along with our Soviet counterparts. During that lunch, I took the opportunity to raise SRINF. Essentially I put down a marker that we remained determined to constrain SRINF as part of any agreement. Karpov responded (and this in presence of Vorontsov and other Soviet negotiators) that if SRINF issue represents an obstacle to an early INF accord, the Soviet side would be prepared to eliminate SRINF at the same time as LRINF missiles are reduced to 100 warheads globally and eliminated in Europe. When I asked what Soviet systems he was referring to, Karpov indicated the “Scale Board” also known as the SS-12/22, and the SS-23, which, as I said, until fairly recently at that point, the

Soviets had argued did not exist. They now recognized that it existed, and not only that it existed but Karpov was saying it would be included in the elimination.

While noting that a global outcome, rather than retaining the 100 warheads, would be the most appropriate result, I urged Karpov to come to Geneva more often with proposals of this sort. It was noteworthy here that neither Karpov nor the other Soviets made reference to the statement Gorbachev had made on February 28, in which Gorbachev had suggested a zero SRINF outcome. Around this time and after Reykjavik, we began to wonder what was happening in Moscow. We began to have a sense that there was some lack of communication. You can't help but wonder. Look at what happened here!

The Soviet leader Gorbachev puts forward a proposal on February 28: zero SRINF. His senior Foreign Ministry officials are unable to discuss it in any detail with us when we asked them about it. And yet one of them floats a trial balloon, a proposal similar to that their president had made in public only days before but about which they seemed rather uninformed. Nonetheless, there was something about Karpov's presentation that led me to conclude that it was serious. In fact, while I didn't state that for obvious reasons, I had misgivings about the effect of Karpov's trial balloon on NATO's internal relations. The prospect of removing all U.S. SRINF from Europe could be seen as a major Soviet interest insofar as it could be a major step towards a Soviet goal of eliminating— undermining rather—the linkage or the strategic interest of the U.S. and the European NATO members. U.S. nuclear capable aircraft would remain in Europe (the Soviets had dropped their effort to include aircraft back in the fall of 1985), but they would not provide the same amount of deterrent value as the missiles. Unlike the missiles, the aircraft had conventional roles and would encounter Soviet aircraft. Considering that the leaders in Europe had been in the forefront of supporting the U.S. INF approach, and who had considered the maintenance of the U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe crucial to their countries' security, they were likely to raise concerns over a double zero outcome. Karpov's hint carried with it, therefore, the potential for a serious NATO debate on how to respond. In addition to the potential of stirring up disagreement in NATO, Karpov might have had another motivation for trotting

out a possible zero level SRINF outcome. The Soviets saw both political and military advantage in stopping the conversion of PII to PIB, and, therefore, this was another way of getting at that objective. As I pointed out, there were some values, economic and military, attractions I should say, for conversion. We've been through this so I won't go any further in that topic. But I thought that it was a factor in their mind. We did our best to make sure the Soviets understood that there would be no agreement without constraints on SRINF and, at this point, in March 1987, I went on the David Brinkley show, “This Week with David Brinkley,” and was asked about SRINF. I said it that was a sine qua non for a solid agreement. We would not have an agreement which did not include this. I made similar remarks during a press briefing held at the White House on March 6 and carried by USIA to European diplomatic posts.

Over the next two or three weeks, Karpov's hot air balloon seemed to float away. Soviet negotiators didn't broach the subject or respond to our careful probing. Bonn, however, was growing restive over SRINF. German officials were increasingly concerned both over the prospect of Germany's deploying modernized PIA missiles and conversely concerned about the possibility of zero level for U.S. SRINF in Europe. The reaction of German officials at NATO meetings that I attended to brief them on Karpov's trial balloon led me to suggest a visit to Bonn to explain the situation directly at cabinet level meetings.

On March 30, accompanied by John Woodworth, I met separately with Foreign Minister Genscher, Defense Minister W#rner, and German Socialist Party Bundestag Group Deputy Chairman Horst Emka. W#rner was in solid support of the Alliance, of the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM in Germany, and of our negotiating position. I explained to him that I believed Karpov's zero level SRINF trial balloon could well be serious and that, while it was not being pressed by the Soviets, we needed to prepare for a formal introduction. The problem, I acknowledged, was that accepting zero SRINF could be construed as a step towards ultimate elimination of all U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, with the clear implication that the linkage between NATO European defense and U.S. nuclear forces could be seriously weakened, if not broken. The potential fracture could,

however, be mitigated if NATO moved ahead to modernize its remaining short range nuclear forces, that is weapons with ranges below 500 kilometers. I pointed out that this could be accomplished by deploying a follow-on to the surface to surface LANCE missile, which was called FOTL. And a new air to surface missile, TASM, that is Tactical Air to Surface Missile. On the other hand, if we did not accept the zero level for the SRINF, we would certainly incur criticism for having turned down the Soviet offer to go to zero and at the same time we would need to modernize NATO's SRINF. Not to modernize would place us at a military and political/psychological disadvantage vis-#-vis the Soviets. And there was the problem. We would have turned down an offer for an equal zero, an outcome at zero, and willingly accepted an unequal outcome, providing the Soviets with a distinct advantage. If we didn't do anything, there would be an unequal outcome. The alternative there would be to start building up. We would have been left holding obsolete systems, solely in German hands, if we turned this proposal down. And the ability of the Alliance to deter Soviet political intimidation and aggression would be greatly weakened. W#rner responded by arguing that the negative sides of moving to zero SRINF would have more serious consequences than turning down any Soviet offer. Zero SRINF on top of the zero already agreed on LRINF would negatively affect the linkage with U.S. strategic systems and hence between the U.S. and other member of the Alliance. I am going over this again, so you can see the nature of this issue. It was a situation where we did not have a perfect answer. If we relied on SRINF alone, W#rner argued, to provide the linkage that position would have the major disadvantage of leaving Germany particularly exposed and singled out as a potential nuclear battlefield. At the same time, he questioned any possibility of modernizing NATO's SRINF if we turned down the zero offer. I told him that we understood and shared the German concerns. The logic of the situation made it very difficult to defend refusing a Soviet offer to move to zero SRINF but not to take steps to update U.S. and NATO SRINF systems in an environment where SRINF would remain present. We parted amicably, but it was clear that there had not been a complete meeting of the minds and that further discussion would be required.

Genscher for his part stressed the importance of completing an INF treaty along the lines agreed in Reykjavik or calling for immediate follow-on negotiations on SRINF, which he called a paramount interest of the German government. At the end of the day, it seemed increasingly likely to me that, if the Soviets adopted a zero SRINF position and we turned it down, we would find ourselves both unable to deploy SRINF to match the Soviets and in an indefensible position back home. Under the circumstances, a zero SRINF outcome, with some prospect of upgrading remaining shorter range nuclear forces, was probably the best outcome. While this outcome would leave the U.S. and its NATO allies with the least desirable nuclear systems in Europe, missiles and artillery with ranges below 500 kilometers and air-delivered weapons, it would still pack a punch and provoke visible evidence of the linkage between NATO and the U.S. nuclear deterrent. But we first had to persuade W#rner and his cabinet colleagues of this judgment.

Well, it turned out we were not going to have much time to do this. A day after visiting Bonn, I went back to Washington and began to help preparations for meetings in Moscow between Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. It was obvious that INF was certainly going to be on the agenda. I emphasized that we might be confronted at that meeting with the Soviet zero SRINF proposal and that we would have to move very carefully, given the German concerns. I reinforced these points during the pre-ministerial meetings, which were held in Helsinki prior to going to Moscow.

In fact, as we anticipated, SRINF was a prominent element at the April 14, 1987, Moscow ministerial meeting. I think Secretary Shultz raised the topic during the meeting with Gorbachev. The Soviet leader first suggested that Soviets would withdraw nuclear systems in East Germany and Czechoslovakia and that both sides would then freeze SRINF levels. Secretary Shultz responded by citing our cardinal principle: any agreement must be based on an equal outcome and a freeze at current levels would not be equal. Gorbachev then suggested the SRINF be treated in the same manner as was agreed at Reykjavik for LRINF. Zero in Europe and 100 in Soviet Asia and the U.S. The Secretary

rejected this approach, and he pointed out that these missiles can be moved rather easily. And he added that the only sensible outcome is equality on a global basis. Finally, Gorbachev proposed a global zero. Secretary Shultz was well aware of the sensitivities with our Allies and made it clear he would have to consult with the Allies before responding to Gorbachev's offer.

Well, we were scheduled to meet with our NATO allies in Brussels directly after the meeting in Moscow. I had been working on other issues; obviously, during the ministerial, I had been busy, but I wrote up talking points for the Secretary on the airplane as we flew to Brussels. Essentially, I used the arguments that I had used with Defense Minister W#rner to form the basis of the talking points. We could accept global zero for SRINF or an equal finite number for both sides, but to accept an outcome in which we turn down a Soviet offer for a global zero for SRINF while not deploying modern SRINF on our side, would create a military imbalance, a politically indefensible result. If NATO did not accept zero then it must deploy SRINF to match the Soviets.

I had some interesting times with this paper. As we flew to Moscow I had cleared it with the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, Roz Ridgway, several other members of the party, and Richard Pearle. Pearle was busy working on a message of his own, but once we got to Brussels I showed him this, and he gave a quick green light. We were in a hotel at this point. I went ahead and took it to the secretaries that would come with Secretary Shultz and went ahead and asked them to type up the paper and have it ready for the Secretary to read the next morning. I thought I'd go to bed. In Moscow, we had gone around the clock a couple of days so I was ready to sleep. But in not too long a time, I got a call from Charlie Thomas, who was at that point the Director of State Department's NATO office, and a good friend. Unfortunately, he is now gone. Charlie said, “You'd better get back downstairs to the delegation's office. A group of officials who had just joined the party had taken the talking points paper from the Secretariat Staff and were arguing that its entire premise was wrong and that it had to be entirely rewritten.” So I went down there. There was a sort of intellectual turmoil. These new arrivals were

insisting that the zero offer must be turned down because it would undermine nuclear linkage and the overall deterrent. As for the considerable likelihood that Germany and other allies would not support deployment of new U.S. SRINF, they argued it would be sufficient to leave open the possibility of deployment at some future time. In other words, our unexercised right to deploy would balance the existing Soviet force. I went over the argument with the folks there. But before any conclusion could be reached, it was announced that a press backgrounder, which Ridgway was asked to give, would be held in a few minutes. I guess the lure of seeing or being seen by the media proved more powerful than dealing with the SRINF issue. The crowd, Richard Pearle aside, surged towards the doors. I looked at a way to bar the exit and said something like “Look we need to wrap up the paper for the secretary now.” Ridgway said, “I've already cleared the draft.” Others in effect said they would leave their proxy with Richard Pearle, and they made for the media. Once they left the room, Richard and I sat down and went over the paper. As I've said, we had already gone over it once before. He made a couple more suggestions, which didn't affect the substance and which I readily accepted. By the time the others had returned, the paper was retyped and back with the Secretary's staff, awaiting delivery. And Secretary Shultz used the paper to good affect. The Germans, as expected and understandably, agonized at length over the decision. In the end, they and the other Allies recognized that the global zero SRINF outcome was in NATO's overall interest, it presaged global zero for INF, and it would make verification easier and relatively more certain in verifying the final number. On the other hand, going to zero did, as I pointed out in my Brinkley Show interview, carried with it, or required that, “to ensure that the remaining nuclear weapons in Europe are high-tech.” This reflected my concern that we needed to lay the groundwork for such action in order to meet concerns of those Europeans who believed an INF agreement would undermine linkage and deterrence and my uneasiness over the prospects for obtaining broad enough European support for the deployment of such systems. The uneasiness was intensified by growing signs that a there would be a follow-on SNF negotiation, with the possibility of pressure for another third zero outcome could be in the offing if we succeeded in INF. Genscher's call

for follow-on negotiation certainly strengthened the prospect of another round—if not this outcome. Remember, the Cold War was still a factor at this time. Therefore, there was the prospect of the removal of all U.S. nuclear forces from Europe while the Soviet Union would continue to hold European cities hostage to its remaining strategic nuclear forces —these were not going away. And the effect that outcome would have on our ability to deter Soviet attack on the Alliance was not particularly agreeable to contemplate. But there would still be some more obstacles on SRINF before we would reach that point. All of these obstacles would be interrelated and Germany figured prominently in all of them.

On June 1, 1987, the Germans informed the U.S. that they were prepared to accept a global zero level SRINF outcome. The NATO ministerial meeting in Reykjavik on June 12 put the Alliance on that decision, and we tabled it in Geneva on June 16 as a formal U.S. proposal for SRINF. Thus at this point, the U.S. and the Soviet Union had reached an agreement on an INF treaty which would eliminate all INF missiles except the 100 Soviet LRINF in the Asian part of Russia and 100 U.S. LRINF missiles on U.S. territory. We appeared close to reaching an agreement on eliminating SRINF on a global basis.

That same NATO ministerial meeting in Reykjavik on June 12, in its communiqu# called for “adequate and effective” U.S. nuclear forces in Europe. This was meant to be a clear signal that modern U.S. SNF systems should remain in Europe even if a double global zero INF treaty was successfully negotiated. As Prime Minister Thatcher put it, “A firebreak was thus in place to ensure that zero would not be extended to cover all U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.” However, while conservative Germans supported this approach as essential for maintaining deterrence, other Germans believed that, as they would put it, “the shorter the missile, the deader the German.” In this climate, support was growing stronger in favor of a new negotiation to cover SNF. No doubt Mrs. Thatcher would not have been happy with that. But at this juncture, the Soviets began turning the spot-light of their public attention to those German Pershing-IAs, these are the old, obsolescent missiles that I discussed previously. Chervov, in effect, had said, “Let them keep them if they want. You just can't convert them or improve them.” What led the Soviets to do

this was I suspect a treaty outcome more to their liking and the prospect of exacerbating divisiveness within, among the allied nations. What was the situation?

At the time of the 1979 INF decision, the Germans had 72 PIA missiles. Like their 108 U.S. PIA counterparts, they had been first deployed in 1962. We saw the 1979 decision as calling for the modernization on a one-for-one basis of 108 U.S. Pershing IA to Pershing II. These, of course, were going to disappear with the signing of the INF treaty. But the modernization involved more than this, and this point gets us back to the value of conversion, and the modernization included other important improvements. But we have already seen that it was not going to be possible to convert. That still left these old PIAs. And there were 72 of them at this point. Their range was substantively within the definition of a SRINF missile. But they weren't U.S.-owned and controlled; they were outside the scope of a bilateral U.S.-Soviet INF agreement.

The Soviets however, had other ideas. They began increasingly to bring up what they considered the anomaly in maintaining any missiles with INF ranges in Germany. They tabled a draft treaty on April 23, 1987, which contained a proposal to include American warheads on the German Pershings as part of the agreement. Obukhov, during private meetings with me in early June, because we were getting into this conversion issue, made a specific point of arguing that the retention of the German Pershings would put the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies at a distinct disadvantage, because none of them would have a comparable system. This is going to lead to an issue in the future, that is, the point that neither the Soviet Union nor its Warsaw Pact allies had a comparable system.

Our side objected to this position, noting that we had made clear that these patterns of cooperation would not be affected by any agreement. We couldn't accept an agreement with them that had that sort of an effect. I also pointed out that the Soviet negotiators told us they had no existing programs of cooperation with their Warsaw Pact allies, and Obukhov continued to argue that the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact would be at a disadvantage because they didn't have anything similar to the German Pershings. I

noted that the Soviets were not restricted to their SRINF or LRINF missiles when it came to targeting NATO Europe. I was of course referring to the strategic systems. On one occasion, Obukhov cited the Soviet agreement to eliminate its SS-23 missiles as a factor in their view that the retention of German Pershings would put the Warsaw Pact at a disadvantage. As we know, the Soviets had fought hard to keep the SS-23 out of the INF agreement. And the arguing was over range. In the end, it was Gorbachev personally, who made the decision to include the SS-23, and, as we shell see, that decision may have had historic consequences.

Following the April ministerial meeting in Moscow, Gorbachev included the SS-23. We'd seen that Karpov had earlier included it. At this April meeting with Secretary Shultz, Gorbachev specified that the SS-23 would be a part of the agreement. Nevertheless, although Gorbachev had done it, Soviet officials that we dealt with were rather unhappy that their leadership had agreed to the inclusion of the SS-23. And they would raise it from time to time as a concession. We know now that in fact it was not very popular with Soviet officials. We have found that from Soviet sources that it was seen as a great mistake by Gorbachev. It might account for some of what we saw were inconsistencies, at least in timing if not in content, between things we would hear from Gorbachev and then, only after a time, were picked up by the Soviet negotiators.

On August 6, 1987, Shevardnadze raised the issue of the German Pershings at length, in a sometimes impassioned speech that he gave to the UN in Geneva. He called the German Pershings “the main snag” preventing the conclusion of an INF agreement. He argued that the agreement to global double zero must include all U.S. and Soviet INF, including those on the old IA Pershing missiles that the Germans had. But if the U.S. does not want the zero option, as it's clear from its present 72-0 formula, that would be a different ball game. He was really upset by this. And Shevardnadze also said, similar to what Obukhov was saying, “We too have allies; we are concerned over the fact that the Germans are going to maintain the shorter range missiles which would pose a threat to their security.” He was quite concerned about the Germans being able to keep these

systems. With this argument Shevardnadze neatly twisted the facts to make it appear that Germany and the U.S. were colluding to turn Germany into a nuclear power. They were putting maximum pressure on the German government, and Shevardnadze placed the full burden on reaching an INF agreement on Germany's giving up its Pershing IA missiles. Once again, you can see the intense Soviet desire to use those negotiations to create dissension within Germany, and between Germany and the other Allies. It had been a hallmark of the Soviet approach to the INF from the outset. This issue continued to fester for about 20 more days and then on August 26, 1987, Chancellor Kohl put it to rest by announcing Germany would eliminate its PIA missiles after the INF treaty was signed. With PIA missiles gone, it was only logical for the U.S. to state it would withdraw their nuclear warheads.

You would think the Soviets would leave it at that. But they were not content to do so. I mean, they had gotten what they wanted. They argued that the disposition of the German Pershings and their warheads must be made an integral part of any INF treaty. I objected that the treaty was strictly bilateral in nature, no other country was a party to it, and no other country's missile systems could be made a part of it. Nevertheless, the Soviets continued to press their demands in Geneva and raised it in Washington on September 17, during a ministerial level meeting chaired by Shultz and Shevardnadze. The Soviet foreign minister pushed exceptionally hard on this point. Frank Carlucci, who had become President's Reagan National Security Advisor, came out of the meeting with Shevardnadze, and told me that the issue has become a major obstacle to reaching an agreement. The Soviets felt that without some formal mention in the agreement with us that the warheads on the German Pershings would be removed from Europe, they would have no legal basis for a complaint that the U.S. was not in compliance with the treaty if we did not withdraw the warheads from the German Pershings. Carlucci asked if it would be possible to meet the Soviets' concerns by including some mention of the warheads on the German Pershings in the treaty. The effort to keep third party systems out of the INF issue had been a critical component of our position, and we had not budged

on it, recognizing that to do so would open the way for the Soviets to argue that British and French nuclear forces should be included on the U.S. side of the ledger. It would undercut our key philosophical point. An INF treaty must lead to an equal outcome for the U.S. and the Soviet Union. While it bothered me to have to move even a millimeter towards the Soviets on this issue, I recognized that neither Shultz nor Carlucci would raise the possibility if they had not judged the solution was essential to the conclusion of a treaty, which would meet all the basic goals of the U.S. and its NATO allies that we set out to achieve in December 1979. I told Carlucci we should not make any reference to the Germans Pershings and the U.S. warheads in the treaty, but I did think I could find a place to indirectly refer to them in one of the treaty annexes.

Shortly thereafter, Karpov and I were called to join the ministers. We went there and they instructed us to find some place in the formal documents, which we were preparing in Geneva, in which to refer to the problem posed by the German Pershings and their U.S. warheads. Having known what to expect, I had already located the place and prepared the words to accomplish this task. When Karpov and I convened, I suggested that the protocol on elimination would be appropriate place to refer to the elimination of the U.S. or Soviet re-entry vehicles on INF missiles owned by other countries, which had by unilateral decision of those countries, been released from an existing protocol of cooperation. There was no specific reference to German Pershings. This section was drafted in a manner which made it applicable to both sides. It also accommodated the treaty requirement that the U.S. and the Soviet Union eliminate all of their INF missile systems 15 days prior to the end of the overall period of elimination. This was a rather convoluted procedure, but it was required so that the U.S. could withdraw the re-entry vehicles, which had been placed on the German Pershings, to the U.S. for elimination before the elimination period called for in the treaty. Karpov and I reported back to the ministers and they agreed with our proposal. The wording was subsequently included in the appropriate part of the treaty, Section 2, Paragraph 9 of the Protocol on Elimination, and implemented accordingly.

Now we come to another incident. Three years before the elimination period had run its course, an eliminated SRINF system, the SS-23 returned to prominence. As foretold by the June 27 NATO ministerial meeting, the U.S. and its Allies began the process of modernizing the remaining SNF in Europe. These systems had been reduced in numbers over the course of the INF negotiations in Europe, in part because of obsolescence and in part in order to underscore our bona fides in arms control. The modernization plans called for an improved artillery warhead, a Follow On to the LANCE Missile, FOTL, and a new surface to air missile, the tactical air to surface missile or TASM. As anticipated, these plans were seen as essential by some of our European allies and contrary to the INF spirit by others.

As this modernization process became controversial, the Soviets once again geared up their propaganda machine, seeing in this issue yet a new opportunity to split the Alliance. Gorbachev's popularity was high, and his call for “common European home” seemed to resonate with many Germans. Soviet spokesmen began to attack NATO modernization plans. Ambassador Kvitsinsky, who was then Soviet Ambassador to Bonn, likened the proposed FOTL missile as going beyond modernization, because the Soviets under the INF treaty sacrificed their comparable SS-23, so that weapons of this kind would disappear completely from Europe. He said, “If NATO now builds a missile that has a range of perhaps 20 or 50 (kilometers) less than our SS-23, this is a fraud.” More impressive was a comment by Marshall of the Soviet Union, Akhromeyev, which aired in Pravda on April 19th. He said, “NATO leaders are claiming that the Soviet Union and the countries of the Warsaw Pact as a whole, while opposing the so-called modernization of NATO's tactical nuclear missiles,” that is SNF, “have themselves already carried out such a modernization of their own missiles and are misleading the public in an effort to align it against the NATO block. The reality is that the Warsaw Pact armies are equipped with missiles created between 15 and 27 years ago. It is true that the Soviet Army has a modern missile with a range of up to 500 kilometers. It is the SS-23 missile, being eliminated in accordance with the INF treaty. The Soviet Union deliberately took this step so there would be no more

nuclear missiles of this range in any country. Now, however, completely unembarrassed by the fact that the U.S. representatives at the talks sought the elimination of the SS-23 missile, the U.S. intends to deploy in Europe a modernized LANCE nuclear missile with a range up to 450 kilometers, virtually identical to the range of the Soviet SS-23 missile being eliminated."

Well, what happened? On March 6, 1990, a news report from Germany revealed that the Soviet Union had provided SS-23 missiles to East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. With the GDR collapsing, the secret was out of the bag. My immediate reaction was one of anger at Soviet duplicity and concern that the U.S. had not unearthed these developments during the course of the negotiations. Upon reflection, I recalled the several conversations that I had with Obukhov, which I have just recounted, in which he argued that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact would be at a disadvantage if the Germans kept their PIA force since they had no comparable missile. I called Washington and passed on my recollections. I promised to provide some specific citations.

That night I awoke with a startle and I called out "Akhromeyev and Shevardnadze!" I woke Chris up in the process. I said, "I think I kept some of their statements about LANCE modernization and the SS-23 and German Pershings." The next morning, I did indeed find the articles noted above as well as the dates of the conversations with Obukhov. The articles which I read from were of particular value obviously, because they were on the public record. No one reading them, then or now, can come to any conclusion other than that the Soviet foreign minister, the leading Soviet military officer, and a former Soviet chief INF negotiator and well plugged-in ambassador were either unaware of the transfer of the SS-23s to GDR, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia, or were knowingly falsifying, or to put it bluntly lying, by claiming that their Warsaw Pact allies would be at a disadvantage if the Germans kept their PIA missiles or modernized its LANCE missiles because the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies had no comparable missile. The Soviets also argued that the SS-23 missiles provided to the three Warsaw Pact states were not subject to the INF treaty because they were non-nuclear. But as they well knew, the treaty applies to all INF

missiles, whether conventional or nuclear armed. Moreover, with the East German SS-23 available for inspection, it became clear that these missiles were configured to accept nuclear warheads. Yet, the Soviets continued to argue that the transferred SS-23s were conventional weapons and thus not subject to the treaty.

I did have some further discussions, well afterwards, with some Soviets about how this could happen. Some speculated that there was bad blood between Akhromeyev and some of the Soviet field commanders, but clearly orders from Gorbachev were not followed out. I think that Shevardnadze basically said, “I believe that comrade Gorbachev was not aware of this, and I can assure you personally that I was not aware of it.” Again, it reflects the situation inside the Kremlin; that this sort of thing would happen and the leadership would be unaware of it, and placed in the position of making the sort of statements that they did make. I think there was more; I could go on and on about this issue, but we have taken long enough. I clearly was quite angry about it, and I suggested to Washington that we ought to refer to this as deliberate deception, but I guessed people back there had a better feel of the overall situation and opted for “bad faith,” as a way to describe it. It was an interesting affair I think. There was no doubt that Gorbachev's decision to include the SS-23 had ramifications. Clearly things happened as a result of that decision which undermined him and were a sign of the growing weakness of his power within the Soviet Union.

Q: Let me ask this question. Our intelligence did not know that these had been placed in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria?

GLITMAN: No. And in my view, regardless of how you look at the rest of it, this was a failure of intelligence. We did not know. From what I understand now, I think this was all in the press, we knew once our German allies had the missiles. The Soviets were able to place these missiles with other missiles that were not covered by the agreement and were very careful about when they would take them out and so on. All that being said, it was a failure of intelligence—and worrisome in that regard. We had as good an

inspection regime as we could have. But they had found places to put these missiles. Whether they were in a position to use them as a force, as opposed to having them there but not being coordinated, I don't have the answer to that. But, yes, it was a failure of the intelligence; we have to face up to that and bear that in mind as we go forward in comparable assessments.

I guess the other thing we have to recognize is that as time went by, very soon after the fall of Berlin Wall and all that followed from that, and the end of the Soviet Union, that Margaret Thatcher's effort to set up a “firebreak,” against total denuclearization of NATO, that began to crumble within 24 months. We did not go ahead with the follow-on to LANCE; we did not go ahead with TASM; and what remains now are essentially gravity bombs on aircraft. It is the same situation. We own the bombs and some of the aircraft, and the allies provide the rest of the aircraft. The strategic link back to the U.S. strategic system is thus still there.

But at this juncture at least, NATO is now looking at this whole question of what's left and what to do with these residual systems. I think there are committees set up to examine it. The Russians are being brought into the discussion on how to handle that. It would be interesting to see how it plays out. To some extent, the Allies may still welcome having these systems around, as providing a visual proof of a linkage to our nuclear strategic forces and that they, in turn, are prepared to share with us the responsibility of nuclear weapons. I don't know how it will all turn out.

The whole issue was an interesting one. Beyond that, I think there is probably a lot more for researchers and historians to uncover just what happened inside the Soviet government at this juncture because, as we've seen, there were some problems there. Gorbachev comments about what his delegation was doing in Geneva at this point. He sort of complained about the Soviet military and diplomats not really working. And that began after Reykjavik. There was that sense that there was a coming apart there. He notes that he was having trouble getting our counterparts to move. That's in his memoirs.

At one point he makes a comment along the lines of “These guys were finding life too cushy in Geneva and they didn't want to leave. They were enjoying being paid in hard currency,” etc. They were just dragging their feet. Obviously, he sounds very bitter. Again, this is in his memoirs. He had gone through a difficult time himself. As I say, I think historians should have an interesting time going further into this to determine exactly what happened.

Let's go back a little bit now and take a look at how the negotiation itself ended. We've already seen some of the consequences later years.

The last group of issues we had to work on were verification questions. We had for years been trying to get the Soviets to move ahead seriously. Eventually, and slowly they came along. What they began to do after a while, however, was to take positions which were seemingly more open than ours. And I don't believe that they were really prepared to carry some out of these positions, but it was a way of trying to score propaganda points—to suggest that they would be more open than we were. We got caught up in this in a way. Verification is a difficult enough subject, extremely technical. We've already discussed the consequences of the SS-23s and the verification regime not working as it should. What I found as we got into this topic was that, the people working on it and including myself when I got into it, got caught up in what I refer to as “nightmare, dream, nightmare, dream, nightmare, dream” syndrome. What do I mean by that? You start looking at an issue. How do we verify that these missiles are actually being destroyed? Then you begin to have nightmares. “My God, what we are proposing isn't good enough.” So you try to think about how to improve it. And that's the dream. The dream comes along, and now you dream “how you are going to verify it?” And the next day it's another nightmare. As a result of this “nightmare, dream, nightmare, dream” syndrome, we couldn't get anywhere. Because it never ended. Every time you thought you were closing a loophole, our team, we ourselves, would find ways around that, closing one loophole, and then opening another one. The result is no action is taken. You are paralyzed because you cannot come to closure on the

issue. You cannot recognize that “this is as good as we can get.” The issue got to the point where we were beginning to look at the prospect of going to inspect anywhere at any time.

Colonel Bob Linhard, who was the NSC point man on the INF treaty, a wonderful man and a very easy guy to work with, dubbed this the “Fruit-Loops problem” as in Fruit Loops cereal. Because, as he pointed out, we had reached the point in our proposal in which the Soviets could demand access to a Kellogg's Fruit Loops factory in case something was being built there, and we would have to grant it to them—and of course that was nonsense. We reached the point where the more stringent we made the verification and inspections on the Soviets, the more stringent they would be on us. So beyond Fruit Loops, we can get serious and talk about plants that we would let them into, in order to get into their plants. The Soviets saw that we were getting caught up in this and they tried to up the ante, so that they would show that they were more interested in verification than we were. In the end, we were able to say to them, “We know you are not serious, let's both get serious about this and stop playing games.” It was very difficult for those in Washington who were working on this problem, to come to closure with the issue, because of that “dream, nightmare” syndrome.

But eventually we did so. The program that we have is the most stringent verification program ever. Again, obviously it is not perfect. It did involve site inspection; it involved continuous monitoring of the Soviet factory in Votkinsk, where the SS-20s were being made and where some missiles are still being made, although there are no more SS-20s coming out. We still have people there. This regime will all come to an end this year. The treaty permitted 13 years of inspection. That was based on the experts' view that was about the time it would take for the missiles to become obsolescent and, therefore, their value would be reduced even if they were producing them. We had gotten rights to come on site to all their INF bases. There was an exchange of data, photographs, and diagrams and charts. By and large the verification system worked quite well in terms of the way

they were seeing problems and working them out. I attended the destruction of the last Pershing missile. General Medvedev was also there.

Q: Where was that?

GLITMAN: That was in Texas, in Marshall, Texas, we had a factory there, and that was where they were being destroyed. They just destroyed it by running the engine. It sort of died down, if you will, the flames coming out the back, and the rocket engine is gone. Then machines came and crushed the airframe. That's how those were destroyed. Others were destroyed in different ways. We had at the end of the negotiation a number of highly trained technical people, because we had to discuss such technical things as, “If we are going to allow the Soviets to keep this particular piece of equipment, how can we cut it apart so that the launcher can no longer raise the missile?” And we had technical experts who were engineers and were obviously familiar with the Soviet systems. They would guide the negotiators; they would point out, in effect, “this is what you can accept and this is what you can't accept.”

The treaty sets up a body to discuss questions and problems. The Special Consultative Group is a type of committee; it continues to meet regularly. They had a lot of work to do. We got down into details about what you could and couldn't bring in on an inspection. We put things in there, in verification, which didn't exist. For example, we wanted to look inside the Soviet canisters, since missiles come out in canisters from the factory. How can we be sure what is in there? And how do we assure that they were bringing out an SS-25, which is very similar to SS-20, and not an SS-20. There are ways that we could measure. We got them to agree that we could pop open a canister, I think it was three of four times a year, and look inside the canister to determine that this had to be an SS-25 and not an SS-20. In addition to that, whatever the number of times was, the people who did sampling theory said that we had a very good sample number. It was enough to be fairly confident that we would be able to catch one if it was ever to come out.

In addition, the question was raised about the canisters that can't be opened? I, half-jokingly, half-seriously had said, “What about an x-ray machine?” One of the scientists said, “Anything big enough to see through that skin would have to cook everything between Votkinsk and the Urals.” And I said “Better yet!” It turned out that we put that provision into the treaty—about the machine—but it didn't exist. And the scientists and the engineers did create such a machine. Another thing that was foreseen was related to the SS-20 having three warheads, while its near relative, the SS-25 had only one. So in addition to various things that we could do and look at, we felt we needed some permission, agreement in the treaty, to take radioactive detectors of some sort with us into those bases and to pass the detector over the warhead, over the nosecone, and say, “This has got a single one and this has got one, and oops! this one here has three.” It shouldn't have three. We got that in there. Again, this is part of where that “dream, nightmare” syndrome can lead you to. It is not all bad—the syndrome—if it comes up with some provisions that we would be able to put into the treaty. But Fruit Loops, just to get back to them, that marked the extreme, and I think after that we began to calm down.

A couple of other things that we need to talk about. We did find out, as we got near the end, that there were systems which we had not heard of previously. We had them and the Soviets had similar systems. These are systems which launch satellites and things like that, but they could look a lot like eliminated system. So we had to find ways to incorporate that subject. This was really a lack of communication within the U.S. government, and it was the same on their side. The people who were running these systems seemed to be unaware that we were dealing with missiles that had their range, and we were certainly unaware of their systems. Their stuff is probably fairly highly classified, and I am sure they didn't want everyone to know that they have test vehicles of these sorts. But, the Soviets had the same and we exchanged diagrams of what they look like and so on, and they finally did get included.

A few interesting things happened at the end. These concern the final ending of the negotiation, when we were heading towards the 8th of December when the treaty was to be signed. As late as Thanksgiving, Secretary Shultz and some of his people had to come to Geneva to deal with detail questions. I really felt badly about his having to come, but in fact what was left suddenly became the most important thing on Earth. Three weeks earlier, three months earlier, it wouldn't have been given the same prominence, but now was what was left. So we had all kinds of problems. Let me give you one quick example. And it's instructive in other ways.

We wanted to be able to drive away, the cabs, the front ends of a semi-trailer, as all of our systems were set up as a semi-trailer arrangement with the back of the semi-trailer being where the missiles were carried. And you could drive away the front part. So our view for how to destroy the front part was to just drive it away. There was no sense in tearing it up; it was the same kind of tractor that we use for tank transporters. The Soviets did not use semi-trailers. They all had one long body. So when we said that we wanted to drive away the front, they said, “That is good for you but we can't; so you've got to figure out some way to let us keep the whole thing together.” That's where the experts had to come in. But we got hung up here. One of the issues in which Secretary Shultz and Akhromeyev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze got into this discussion was on how they were going to do it. It turned out that in some instances, we found that for us it was cheaper to destroy some of the back-ends, the trailers, rather than try to convert them to put tanks on them. It was cheaper to buy the new ones than to convert the old ones. And Akhromeyev said, “You must be a very rich country to be able to blow these things away.” And of course, the point was that we are a very wealthy country, but it also demonstrated that we can come up with another system, one which made it possible to drive away the front and keep the back, or not keep the back. These were some of the things that the senior officials were forced to address. As it was, near the end we began to look at what was left in brackets. We'd go through the treaty and we'd put the brackets around the words or phrases that were not agreed upon. That's how we proceeded. There were a fair number of brackets. I

remember cabling back that we had 120 brackets. Many of them were interrelated. If you solved problem A, you'd solve B, C, D, E, F and G. So you might get rid of 10 brackets by solving one problem. But the people in Washington were quite concerned when we sent that cable. I just asked them to calm down, but wanted them to know that we had it all tracked. We knew that if we got “A” solved, here is what our B, C, D, and E are, and we will remove the brackets from them.

Near the very end, we had a terrible confrontation with the Soviets. It involved who gets to look inside what. The treaty is set up so that each side can look at the other side's smallest object. And the Soviets wanted to see inside a container which could include the smallest part. And of course they wanted to get into the smallest stage of a Pershing missile. And we wanted, therefore, to see inside a canister which could hold the smallest stage of the SS-20. And they said, “No, you can't do that; that is not correct, etc., etc.” They just wouldn't give on it. At this point, I had been going day and night, and the Soviets had begun double-teaming me as we were getting into this issue. One time I'd have Medvedev opposite me, then I'd have Obukhov, and I was there alone. Finally after we caught on to what was going on, we'd look out the window if they came to our place, and if Medvedev got out of the car, I'd go back to the office and work on other issues. John Woodworth would take over that meeting. But I got very tired. Not quite ill, but what really happened was that I began to get angry. Obukhov, on one occasion, went on and on without translation, and I said to him, “How about stopping and letting us have a translation?” And he just wouldn't listen. He just kept going on and on in Russian. I got up and left the table. I went back and got a glass of orange juice. He suddenly went into English, I brought the orange juice back, and he stayed in English. But I could feel myself really getting at the point where I was going to loose my temper. He had a tendency to go on at great length. He was covering every flank. He couldn't just discuss this “chair.” He was afraid that you might conclude that by not discussing the location of the chair in the room, you were leaving open the fact that maybe the chair could be somewhere else. You see what I am getting at? It's probably a technique that you need to survive in a society

like that of the USSR; it could back you up in a corner if you didn't. Make sure that every flank in your argument was covered. But, this went on and on.

On one occasion, this again in the last couple of days of going through this approach, I said to him, “Look, can't you stop this dance of the seven veils and get to your position?” He turned to the Soviet interpreter and said, “What is this 'dance of the seven veils'?” The interpreter said, “It's an Oriental dance.” I looked at Woodworth and said, “Now we are going to hear an explosion.” And he did explode. “What do you mean, Oriental?” And I said, “Look, it's a dance, that's all, veils are removed,” anyway, he was quite unhappy about that word.

Another episode—all or this action coming near the end. We had a couple of days, Saturday, Sunday, or whatever it was, and we were supposed to go to the Soviet mission. But then they would call us and say, “No don't come now we are not ready yet. Don't come now, but in another two or three hours.” It went on like that for the whole day and on into the next day. It was obvious they didn't have their instructions, they were missing their guidance. But they didn't tell us that, they just kept putting us off. Finally, we went over there, and I forget what the issues were. Could have been some of this stuff we were just mentioning, verification stuff, which was mostly all that was left. Finally we go over there, as we were leaving the place, Obukhov said to me, “I am really sorry about yesterday and earlier today.”

Let me back up here. What happened in fact, was I just said “Let's go over there, ready or not.” So we did. And there they were. As we left, he said, “I am sorry that we had to carry on the way we did today, but in fact we simply didn't have our guidance.” I said, “I assumed you didn't have your guidance, why didn't you just tell us that and tell us that you would let us know when you are ready?” But then he let drop that they had gone up to the Jura to ski on that day. He couldn't have chosen a subject that was more likely to make me really furious. That they had kept us in the office waiting for them, while they had gone off

and skied. So I grew angrier. This began to take a toll on me physically. My blood pressure is normally low, but it must have been going through the roof at this point.

Anyway years later when I began to think about it, I said to myself, “Wait a minute. They may not have gone skiing at all.” He may have just known or been told that one way to get my goat was to do something like that. I don't know what the truth to that is, but in any case, I felt that I was getting angrier and began to question my judgment frankly. In addition to that, I got a phone call, four a.m., our time, from Jim Timbie, who was one of the people in the State Department who was sort of behind the scenes, deeply involved in all arms control issues, very able fellow, physicist by background. He called me and said, “What are you guys doing there? You are changing some of the time arrangements; you are making it possible for the inspections regime to end before 13 years.” And so on. Normally, he is a very calm person, but he wasn't calm on this occasion. He said, “The Secretary has told everyone that it was going to go 13 years and now you've made it possible that it might not be 13 years,” and I could feel myself getting upset. I explained to him that what we did essentially was to set it up in such a way that we couldn't, we wouldn't find ourselves in the position where the Soviets would have us no longer inspecting their place, while they could still inspect at ours. This was designed to protect us from getting into that kind of spot. He said, “Okay” at the end of it. That night I had gone home, Leo Reddy drove me back, I remember, it was cold, and I was really feeling badly, didn't really sleep well that day, came back the next day, and at that point I realized that if they continued with their tactics I was ready to jump across the table and slug them. It was really getting to me. Therefore, I took myself out. I said, “John take over. I will be back tomorrow, I've got to leave or I am going to do something stupid if I stay here. It might be gratifying to do it, but it would be stupid.” John Woodworth took over and he worked again, late night. Next day I did come back. I had calmed down enough.

John Woodward was furious at the Soviets. He thought that he made a deal with them in which we could look into a container which could hold the smallest stage of a SS-20 and they could look at a container which could hold the smallest stage of a P-II. Obukhov

suddenly said, “No, that's not at all possible.” That's when I came back in; he was backing away from it. So I went through it again with Obukhov, I said, “Look, we can't have the situation where you get to open a box which can hold the smallest stage of our missile, but we don't get to look into a box which can hold your equivalent. That is just not going to wash—especially with the SS-20 involved.” I knew that we could look at the box size of their smallest missile, which was their cruise missile, a box that could hold that. But I did not think Congress would appreciate coming back and saying, “They get to look at the smallest stage of the Pershing and we can't look at a box that will hold the smallest stage of SS-20.” They tried to argue “Well, we don't have stages.” I said, “Oh, yeah? Look here in the Memorandum of Understanding, the MOU,” which had all the data exchange in there. “It shows you have stages; here is what size it is, and it says so right here.” “Well, we don't take them apart.” “It doesn't matter whether you take them apart or not,” I said. “You just list that.” He was being very obstinate.

At that point, it was getting late. We were scheduled to leave the next day for Washington. We had an Air Force plane. They were going to have to fly commercial. We had time, an Air Force plane would wait for us, but a commercial flight would not wait for them. We were doing the U.S. copy of the treaty, typing it in Geneva. Helen Moses from ACDA did the typing and did a wonderful job. We were ready to go, we had a way to get back, but they didn't. I said at that point, “Look, we are all tired. Why don't we take a break, come back at four a.m. or five a.m. and conclude with that?” And I walked out. Picked up my books and walked out. And the delegation followed me. He came running afterwards. “What's wrong? What's wrong?” I said, “I told you what's wrong. If you get to look at the box that could hold the smallest stages of our missile, we are going to be able to look inside a box which would be small enough to hold the smallest stage of the SS-20.” I felt it just wouldn't be fair. He thought about it for a moment and said, “Look, if that's all there is to it, we can work it out. You want to be able to say that you can open a box that would hold no more than the smallest stage of our missile.” “That's right,” I said, “We want to be able look in something that small.” Both sides were trying to get into the smaller box, not to be

looking into a bigger box. He agreed to that. We went back to the room together and the delegation reassembled, we put that together very quickly, and it was over.

That still left a couple of problems. One was that we had to initial the treaty. I received authorization earlier from Washington to initial for the U.S., and we had one outstanding issue. That was which Russian word we would use to interpret the English word “undertakings.” That was the very last thing we resolved.

Let me set out a little background on that. It is very interesting in light of the recent question how do you say “I apologize” in Chinese. At one point—and I'll try to stay away from names in this discussion—near the end of the negotiating sessions (it would have been in November), we had a visit from someone from Washington and a similar visit from someone from Moscow. Both wanted to help us reach a conclusion of the treaty. The visitors sat down and began going over various parts of the treaty, which we had been working on. The Soviet visitor focused on a section of the treaty—sort of normal “boiler plate”—it has to do with what we call non- circumvention arrangements. If I had my copy of the treaty here I could find it. Since I don't have my copy of the treaty, I will have to wing it a bit. Basically, we were dealing with the part of the treaty that we had picked up from the old SALT agreement. It was boiler plate; it was not controversial. The purpose of this section was, in effect, to say, that you think it is common sense that if you sign a treaty—and you intend to carry it out—that you won't do anything to contravene it, to “circumvent” it. Those were the kind of concepts being reviewed.

The Soviet visitor wanted to change that. He wanted to make it a little more open, looser. What was the issue here? The issue gets back to those programs of cooperation. We wanted that part of the treaty to read in a way which would make it possible for us to continue our programs of cooperation. We did not want to place ourselves in a situation where the Soviets could argue that if an American and a Brit sat down and began to discuss the possibility of setting up some new program, under the pattern of cooperation, maybe a new missile or a new part for an old missile, the Soviets could wind up saying

this is contrary to the INF agreement. In addition to that possibility, as I said, that language had been approved in earlier treaties. Congress was used to it; Congress had seen the language previously. The Soviet began to probe. Maybe we could add something else that could meet these concerns of ours. The American visitor said, “Well, what about adding the word 'undertakings' to this?” That we would not engage in any activities or undertakings which would not be consistent with the treaty. Something like that. I said to the visitor, quietly, “That's an awful word. We can't use that.” And the visitor said, “I know what I am doing.” So it stayed in there. I went back to the office, I saw our lawyer, again, Karen Lawson at the time, now Karen Look. I told her about this and she said, “Oh my Gosh.” I said, “Look, we are going to have to find a way around this.” She said, “Go back in the afternoon and try to get Obukhov to back off of this.” I said, “I'll try.” I did but I didn't have much hope for that.

The next thing I did, however, before I went back down to the afternoon meeting, was to get a hold of a thesaurus, and look up the word “undertakings.” As I suspected, it had five different meanings. And it's not all bad. It went from a discussion or undertaking as something you arrive at over a cup of coffee, to something very formal, like an act. Like the Helsinki Final Act. I called in our interpreter, our head translator, Dimitri Erensburger. I said, “Dimitri, see this word? Here is the thesaurus. See this English version of it? Please find a Russian word that equates to this very formal activity. I don't want it to be loose; it has got to be a very formal activity, something like the Formal Act of Helsinki.” He said, “I will try.” He came back and he said, “I found a Russian word that equates to something like an undertaking, something like the Final Act of Helsinki.” I said, “Good.” He said, “It's an archaic word.” I said, “It's in the dictionary?” “Yes, it's in the great Bolshoi Dictionary.” I said, “Fine. When the time comes to translate from English into Russian, we must have that word in Russian.” I said, “Don't give in on that point.” And he didn't. And at the end, the very last thing Obukhov said to me, of substance, was “You have your Russian word.” This issue came up frequently enough during the hearings, I was asked about it. “Why did you get something new here? What is this new word?” I was just able to say, “Yes it's a

new word, it was placed there, but here is how I dealt with it. I found a Russian word that equates to a formal act, and therefore it cannot apply just to some general conversation." And subsequently, one of the Senators came up to me and said (because we had to turn over all of our transcripts to them, that's another story linked to SDI actually), in any case, he looked it up and he said, "I understand what you did. I see what happened. And why you did what you did." So that's how we did it; that was the last thing we settled.

The next morning we arranged to take the Soviets, Obukhov, General Medvedev, and one of their secretaries, along with their computer on the Air Force plane with us. Bringing them with us was cleared with Washington; we could do that. As we left Geneva, at least officially for the last time, the whole delegation piled in the buses, and we left for the airport. Before leaving, I went up to the office that I occupied and the floor that we were on. It was filled with plastic bags of left-over pizzas and so on. I got to the point where I had eaten so many pizzas during that period that I couldn't eat pizza for months afterwards. And all of us, as I mentioned I gotten to a point where I wasn't feeling well, every one of us had sleep deprivation. I called a doctor over at one point, and he said, "It's nothing, you are just exhausted." That's when I pulled myself out of it for a bit. He said, "You are just exhausted." But I noticed I wasn't eating. The guys all said afterwards, the reason there were all these empty pizzas and stuff, most of the folks figured that those of us who were over 40 or 50 (the younger ones were fine) just stopped eating. We were working 24-hours a day, day after day, and it was a strange phenomena. We couldn't look at food. It quickly ended— that phenomenon of not eating. But, in any case, there were all of these mounds of stuff that we threw out. The shredding machine was working over time. It was a bit like a disaster zone that we had left behind us.

We had the treaty paper sent over to us. It was beautiful, fine, "meant to last," paper. The Department of State, I guess, hadn't really prepared for this negotiation, so they didn't have a lot of paper available, but they sent us all they had. Helen Moses couldn't make a mistake. Thank goodness Helen Moses didn't make any mistakes—or only a very few. A few things that turned up may not have been her doing; it may have been the people

who plugged in some geographic coordinates for location 73W 21S or something like that, and it was 22S, whatever. A few of those things, we corrected when we got back to Washington. But we made it through with the paper on hand. We did start initialing the treaties that night instead of going to bed and getting up at 4 a.m., we went ahead and initialed the treaty. I don't have any photos; some of the guys were taking photos; people were taking pictures at the time, but I never got a picture of that.

Jeff Ankley went ahead and bought a bunch of pens, INF treaty pens, which he handed out. I was using them. I would sign with the pen and then hand it back to the folks. Good move on his part. Ankley had been in Vietnam. He was our executive officer; he did a fine job at keeping morale up during this period. He said this was closest, in terms of stress, the closest he'd ever seen to combat. He's a big fellow, but could fall asleep in the strangest places. He was surviving on Cokes and cigarettes and his own energy.

We had that “ceremony” and then on the airplane as we flew back, we initialed some of the annexes. We began one of them over Chartres, and the pilot sent back to say “here is where you are as you initial this.” As I mentioned, we flew back with the Soviets and, after a bit, everybody went to sleep—including the Soviets. They were hoping to arrive in Washington before Gorbachev, but we didn't. We just missed and his plane landed just before ours at Andrews. I guess the Soviets wanted to be there to meet him when he arrived. At the end of the flight, we got near Andrews, and as I mentioned the Soviets brought along a secretary. It was the first time any of us had laid any eyes on the Soviet staff. We always would invite everybody to U.S. functions, but they only invited the officers, not the staff. Anyway, this was a nice young lady. They also brought with them their computer. It was in a box, tied up with the most magnificent knots. Everyone commented on what a beautiful way they tied it together with these knots. We had already moved to “floppy disks,” but they had not gotten to that stage. They basically had to bring their computer; it was the hard drive and a good size box. Anyway, as we approached Andrews, a little before landing, the Soviets were awake and suddenly a pillow fight broke out among the Americans. And the Soviets were wondering, “What the heck are these guys and gals

up to?" But anyway, the plane landed. That leaves us with a very long ratification process, and then we are finished with this part of the narrative.

The treaty was set to come up for hearings very soon after we arrived there, following Christmas. But it wasn't until May, I forget the exact date, when the treaty was finally accepted by the Senate. I spent full time on that. Chris and Herkie the dog came over. They flew at our own expense, and we found sort of a temporary one-bedroom apartment to stay in with the dog. We just settled down to live there until the treaty got done. We just left everything behind in Geneva, and that's all that we could do at that point; there was no time to go back to Geneva to mess with it. We both got a chance to go to Washington, and I got a chance to see to some extent how the Congress works. We were very well received and treated. There were lots of events that we attended. The President had me over for the signing of the treaty and other things like that. I felt good about it. I was given an office on the Hill. Dave Jones and others came and helped, such as Ron Bartek, another guy who was active in the agreement, in the treaty. I should back up and make a point about Ron and some of the others.

Each one of these annexes required someone to work on it. And people like Ron Bartek and others, I should have all their names, I will try to eventually get them all into the transcript and not leave them out. I assigned each one of them. Someone else looked at this part of the acts, on verification, the annex on elimination. Leo Reddy already had a really tough job. He had to get the treaties that we wrote with all of the five basing countries. What we did with the treaty, in effect, was allowing the Soviets to come onto let's say Germany, or the Netherlands, or Belgium or Italy, or the U.K.; to come into our base; and inspect to see what is in our base. However, it was on their sovereign territory, and the Soviets had to come through their customs and all. So Leo had to work on these arrangements between each of the countries and with the Soviets who were going in there. And that took quite a task. Obviously, we had full cooperation from Allies, and we worked it out completely, but it was a painstaking effort. He did an excellent job on that. I don't think there was ever any negative repercussion from that project. So we had that

done. And the same thing with the annexes, as I said. Individuals were put in charge of them. John Woodworth and I didn't go to all of those, we just couldn't we were working with Obukhov on the treaty itself. As events occurred, one or the other of us would find out about it; if we had to make a decision, we would. And we were always in constant contact. John was really a good friend, and he and his family became really close to us. We had lot of good times together. He was a good, calm fellow in a tough situation. And quite smart, able to deal with the Soviets. Between us we managed to keep abreast of what was going on. At that point five or six were in the circle, as we were coming to a conclusion.

The hearings usually begin with the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and other principle speakers on the U.S. side, and then the negotiators go next. We had to meet with both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee. I felt pretty much in command of the subject, frankly. So I was reasonably comfortable going through this. There were a couple of times when it got a little difficult early on, but most of the questions, we had anticipated. The most difficult period, one which continues to have ramifications today, involved the Armed Services Committee. We had some questions from Senator Nunn over the legal language. I remember there was a clause in the treaty—it is still there—that begins with “Not withstanding,” and he said that his professor at law school told him never to use that phrase, and he didn't want to see it there. It was a complex grammatical sentence, trying to deal with issues that were not easy to state simply. I think he eventually agreed with it. Some of the other senators—I remember Senator Levin—seemed to agree with us, that it made sense, but to Senator Nunn it did not. I know eventually, he signed it, he agreed to the treaty, and I am sure it satisfied him in the end. The toughest group of questions was from Senator Quayle. Here again, I mention to you things like these test missiles that sort of popped up late in the day; we were not even aware of them. During the hearings, Senator Quayle began to talk about systems that could be considered INF systems, and he made reference to some of them, and they sounded like what are called “black systems,” that is, systems that are not covered under the normal course of business. They are not in the budget; they are like the

U2. It was a black system before it came out and the people learned about it. I had no idea what Quayle was talking about. He began to describe some of these things, and he kept pushing me to respond to “is this covered or isn't it.” I kept trying to tell him, I finally said, “I feel very uncomfortable answering the question. Talking about systems that you know about and I don't. And you are asking me to say whether or not they'd be covered and I frankly can not be considered authoritative on this subject.” That word “authoritative” came up frequently in the context of the ABM treaty, who was authoritative and who wasn't, and then they said in INF that they were going to make us all say that we were authoritative, which I was prepared to do, but not on this one—because I had no idea what he was talking about. But I do now. Years later I finally found out what it was all about. It was a difficult moment.

At one point, I kind of saw what he was getting at. He seemed to want to leave open a loop-hole for us, basically. We had a break at one point, and I remember saying to him, “Look, I think I know what you are after, but please don't keep pushing me for a more and more precise response, because it's going to make it harder to achieve what you would like to achieve.” Which was as I said, try to leave it more open. But he kept going after it, and eventually got into a long argument about what is a weapon. Of course, the other senators joined in. I finally said to Senator Quayle, “There is a simple definition.” He then asked, “Why didn't you define a weapon?” I said, “Look, we can't define it. It's a commonly understood word, international law permits that, commonly understood words. If you start getting into that, you'll end up having to attach what is Roget's Unabridged Thesaurus and the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, as annex to the treaty so you can define every word.” He kept pushing, and I told him, as I said, “If you keep pushing you are going to get an answer you don't want. I think I know what you want, and I am somewhat sympathetic to trying to keep it open for a new system, but don't push me.” He did and consequently I gave a simple definition of a weapon as something that damages or destroys. We talked about, well is it a weapon if it does this and it does that, finally I said, “I can't be authoritative on this.”

It was a tough time. Of course the transcript is available and I have it. Books have come out, but even when I read it today, I get upset. I realize that it wasn't helpful to this cause as I saw it. I think most of the senators—I could tell from their comments—they understood what I was up against. But, everyone has the right to ask questions; they ought to ask questions, senatorial courtesy is there as it should be. I did my best to give him the answers, and the Department of State Washington lawyers backed me up. They came back with a definition which pretty much tracked what I just gave you now. That would be it. It was in some ways quite frustrating, not knowing what he was talking about. It was one of those things that could have been done better.

We negotiators didn't know about what these guys were doing, this black system, because we didn't have access to it, but they should have known what we were doing. And they should have been aware that we could be impinging on the systems. But that connection was not made. It's okay. As far as I can tell, it worked out all right. We passed it, but it was a difficult moment.

The treaty was ratified and there were only five who voted against. I think I can still name them, but I won't. We had a very good outcome in terms of support for which we were appreciative. To wrap it up, I would give Gorbachev the last word. In his memoirs, he says it was the INF treaty that made it all possible afterwards. That's what ended the Cold War. It was the last battle, and we ended it. If we had not succeeded, God knows what we would be facing today. It might not be NATO any longer; it might have turned out very badly. But we did it. It took both diplomacy and the potential of force. You couldn't do without it. And that's again where the peace movement, I felt, had missed the point. The Soviets were not going to give us something for nothing. We had to prove, to demonstrate on the ground that we could get the missiles in, and that NATO was going to do this. That made the difference. All of the logic in the world won't help you if you can't, in fact, carry this thing out. As I said, the question about the continuation of basing some of these systems in Europe is another issue. There were some problems with SS-23s as

we discussed earlier. In the end none of that really mattered. We wouldn't be where we are now if it hadn't been for the treaty coming out—the whole activity—not just the treaty coming out where it did.

The next little bit is what happens when we go back to Brussels.

Q: Okay, on July 15, 1988, you were appointed Ambassador to the Kingdom of Belgium. You presented your credentials on September 28, 1988. How was it that you received this appointment?

GLITMAN: The process of appointment is, in some way, a mystery to those who are not directly involved. I think in each case, there is some factor that you cannot account for. In this case, I was finished with the INF treaty and the exchange of ratification had taken place; documents of ratification had been exchanged. That job was done. Just as an example, getting back to the factor of luck, when I was in front of the congressional committees, it would have been a very inopportune moment to be appointed to anywhere, because then there would be combination of the treaty and my appointment. The two would be seen as a single unit by some senators. And you really don't want to mix the two. The treaty was far more important to have any side elements brought into it. So, there was no possibility of appointment during that time. But, that was over in May, certainly by June.

Geoffrey Swaebe, who was the Ambassador in Brussels, asked to be relieved. I was open and the post was open. I believe that's how it happened. I also, of course, knew Belgium; we had lived there for several years. And I visited there from Paris. I had some knowledge of the country. I met many Belgians during my time in NATO. We lived in Brussels when I was at NATO. There was a lot of background that I had to bring to the job.

Q: The presentation of credentials to the King. Do you want to tell us what it's like? Did the chief of protocol come to the Embassy to pick you up? What was the procedure?

GLITMAN: The Chief of the Defense Staff accompanied me. I was, of course, told in advance what would happen. They came to the residence, which was within walking distance of the formal palace in Brussels. The King and the Queen didn't live there; they live in a smaller palace in Laeken, just a little bit outside, a nice little section of Brussels. He showed up with a very long Mercedes, escorted by a horse cavalry unit. It was a short ride to the palace. We were ushered in from the vehicle, taken up the formal staircase. The audience with the King was held at that time. As I said before, I felt very strongly about him; he was a wonderful person. The King represented Belgium extremely well, along with the Queen. So we had a non-substantive talk, in a sense, but it was a pleasant meeting. That was it. They escorted me back to the residence.

Q: Was your conversation in French or both in French and English?

GLITMAN: I think we spoke in English mostly. I was very comfortable in French at that point in my life; we could have done that. Both Chris and I also tried to learn Dutch while we were there. And we made a little headway with that. It's a language that is, sort of, half way between English and German in many respects.

Q: Would you want to talk about some relationships, during your service there, the King and the Queen, the royal family, aristocracy, what was the relationship like?

GLITMAN: It was obviously mostly on formal occasions. We were invited frequently to events at which the King was present, and the Queen. On some occasions, there were very few diplomats at these. Often we would go to music concerts, particularly if an American orchestra was there. We always wanted to go to those in order to try to make an arrangement to meet with the conductor and, if possible, to arrange contact with the musicians at our residence. I know that there was more than one occasion when the King and Queen were at one of these concerts in Brussels. Chris and I would often be brought to the area where he would be talking to people during the intermissions. So we would have a chance to discuss that. I remember talking to him about Tiananmen Square,

in China. He raised it with me, and I discussed it a bit with him. And then before we left Brussels, we went to the palace where they lived in Laeken, and we met with him there.

Q: Did the Queen participate in any of these affairs?

GLITMAN: Oh, yes.

Q: Did she speak English?

GLITMAN: I'm sure she did. Again, language wasn't an issue. Because I could go back and forth between English and French easily. As I used to put it, I could spend a whole day in French and wouldn't know the difference. It reached the point where it was very comfortable.

Q: How about the Belgian aristocracy? Was there any opportunity for you to deal with them? Did they come to the embassy ever? Was someone in the Foreign Ministry a count or a baron?

GLITMAN: People of that rank in the aristocracy were in all walks of life. They were in the Foreign Ministry, banking, business, and finance, so you were with them constantly. I think certainly many of them received titles as a result of prominence and inventions. For example, I recall the Solvay family. They were prominent in chemicals, and the initial founder had made a major chemical discovery—I wish I could remember exactly what it was. They had continued to run their business, but they also had wonderful estates. Some of them were quite generous in making their places available for NATO meetings, etc. There were some interesting stories of how they managed to survive the Second World War, with their wine cellars intact. They were really just a part of regular life fare for us.

Q: What about your relationship with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, persons at the Foreign Ministry? Other Belgian government figures?

GLITMAN: I saw a lot of them. Either we had a demarche to make or a request to make of them. I often would go to see the Foreign Minister and occasionally the Prime Minister. There was a lot of professional contact and a fair amount of social contact as well. Likewise, there was contact with the Defense Minister and the heads of the parties. And the journalists. We entertained at the residence a lot. And we tried to bring in as many people from as many different walks of life and many different types of activities as we could. We would often have small events, Chris and myself, plus maybe the Prime Minister and his wife, occasions like that. It was all part of normal work. Again, as I mentioned before, there were a lot of business people as well that we'd meet frequently. It's a fairly small country. Brussels is a relatively small city, so as American ambassador, you get to meet just about everybody.

I should say a word about the residence. The building was built in the late 1700s. We purchased it at a very nice price immediately after the Second World War. In the process, we purchased, with the house, land behind it, which actually fronts one of the main streets. That's where the office building went, the Chancery. So we could walk from the residence to the Chancery, through the basements, so to speak. You didn't even have to go outdoors. The downside was that the office became an extension of the house. If you had any work to do late at night, you'd just go on over there; it was no different than being in the house, just a few more steps going down.

The residence was a beautiful building. I think Americans should feel proud of it. It really showed off the U.S. in a positive way. It was a Belgian building, and we had taken a good care of it. It had been furnished very well over the years; and while we were there maintenance continued. There were several large reception rooms, all on ground floor. For cocktail parties or an occasional musical evening (and rarely, but once in a while, a dance), it was set up so you could handle all of those things. If you had a large number of people for dinner, maybe a very large number of people for dinner or lunch, then the ball room could be turned into a dining room with some round tables. You could probably

fit 100 people there, seated. Then there was another dinning room that could seat about 20-30, separate from that larger room. There were two reception rooms on the ground floor. These were formal reception rooms. They are all tied in very nicely, permitting good circulation during a cocktail party, a reception, or even at a dinner. It was easy for people to circulate from one room to another. And there was a winter garden. This was glass-enclosed, the roof is all glass, which was wonderful for a very small lunch or a breakfast.

And then there was a roof garden, which had fallen into certain amount of disrepair, and the roof had to be redone. Chris went ahead and thought that maybe it would be appropriate for a Japanese garden or something along those lines. We had been to Japan earlier. So we worked that out, and it became even more usable, that roof garden. Brussels is noted for its gray weather, but there are plenty of nice days. This was a wonderful place to have someone over for lunch, in the middle of the city. We could sit outside and it was quite private where we were seated. There was only the Flemish social club across the street, so somebody in one or two of those windows might see us, but otherwise, we were quite private there. It was a fine building.

I have to also point out, as sometimes you'd find a sense, or some people would say, “Why do you have this great place?” And I had to make clear, and I will now again, we didn't live in those wonderful reception rooms. We didn't even use the smaller set of reception rooms on the second floor, which consisted of a bedroom, a living room and a small dinning room. Those were all used for smaller dinners or lunches, more intimate affairs. We lived on the third floor (in our system of labeling floors—the second floor in European terminology). And essentially we had a bedroom, an office/sitting room, and the TV; all that were in a corridor. At the end of that corridor, we had a small kitchen and a little table where we would have our meals on the weekends. We preferred not to have staff on the weekend, and we'd ask them to prepare something in advance.

Q: Were there guest bedrooms?

GLITMAN: There were guest bedrooms available. The one on the second floor was the most elegant room. It was all wood-paneled. Some guests preferred that. Then we had a somewhat smaller room, also very nice, on the floor where we were. And then up stairs again, the floor where normally the servants would stay, those rooms were transformed into other bedrooms. I never counted how many people you could house at any time.

Q: Who were among your distinguished guests?

GLITMAN: We had lots of visitors come through and stay with us. Governors and the Bush relatives stayed with us when they were on a business trip promoting U.S. activities, so I though that was good.

Q: Did you ever have a presidential visit?

GLITMAN: Yes, we did. That was with President Bush. Of course we all were deeply involved with that. Chris was very much involved with Mrs. Bush's schedule, and held a large luncheon at the residence, for Mrs. Bush. She asked, “What are Mrs. Bush's interests?” We heard a few things back. Then she found out where in Belgium we could find activities going on that corresponded to her interests. Then she went and visited all of these places on her own, as the wife of the American ambassador, interested in this activity. Was able to get some sense of how it would work. After that she put together a schedule. People of course came from Washington to do finishing touches, advance team, and so on. But she did put a lot of effort into that.

Q: Congressional delegations?

GLITMAN: Oh yes. Plenty of those. Again, they would come to NATO or the European Union. There are three missions in Brussels. And one combined administrative service, which was under me. We had to be careful, and I instructed the head of the administrative side of the embassy to treat each one of these missions equally and fairly. And we did our

best to do so. In an inspection report, inspectors wrote in a comment, in fact, during the period that I was there, that it had been done well.

Q: What about major incidents while you were there as ambassador?

GLITMAN: There were two really large incidents, events, which occurred during the time we were in Brussels. One of them was the end of the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and so on. And there were enormous questions raised about how that would affect our relations with Europe. I commissioned a series of studies to be done by the political section and one by the economic section on our future relations in NATO. The first one I labeled, I called “Coping with Success.” We knew how to win the Cold War, now can we win the peace? There were large questions, such as “What's the future of NATO in this situation?” I felt it ought to continue with the Europeans playing a larger role, if they could do that. And what sort of new military arrangements should be set up between us and the Europeans, etc? There were a whole host of issues like that. I did, as I said, send several of these messages to Washington. I know they were well received. At one point, I was asked to represent the U.S. at a meeting of East-West foreign policy planners, from foreign ministries. Our planners, people from our staff, couldn't make it from Washington, and I was called and asked, “Would you please go?” And I did.

As a sort of a side comment to that, I had been in Oberammergau talking to the Defense Department military school there and there is a NATO operation there as well now. Chris was with me and we thought we'd do some hiking, as it was a weekend after I gave my talk. I got a phone call from Washington asking if I would please go to a castle in Germany where a planning committee, policy planners, was going to meet. I said, “Fine. My wife is here and I am not going to ditch her.” We may not be able to do what we thought we were going to do, so they said they would see what they could do, if they could find room for her to join me at this castle. I said, “It's not a monastery, it's a castle, so there ought to be a room.” It did work out, we both went there. She actually, since these obviously weren't classified meetings, sat in on one of them. It was kind of fun. Her comments afterwards

were interesting and useful. In any case, that really gave me an opportunity to see how policy planners throughout Europe, both East and West, were approaching this change at the end of the Cold War. I won't go into all the details of it. Again, I did send a reporting message to Washington after the session. The end of the Cold War was an event that took up a lot of our time.

The second major event was the Gulf War. Here our main concern—actually there were two concerns—was to insure Belgian cooperation as we moved equipment through Belgium. I had no doubt they would do it, and they did. They did it splendidly and, as I mentioned earlier, this is another example of where military-to-military contact was the right way to go. After having cleared the way on the political side, again not encountering any obstacles, we turned it over to the military, and they managed it. Things flowed through Belgium as they were supposed to.

I can also say that we were concerned about terrorist activities. Again, I worked with the Belgian Ministry of Interior, and they did a fine job. To underscore that point, the war actually began late at night, after we had gone to bed. I had talked to the Minister of the Interior earlier that day about the need to look after American property, as we could be targets, and likewise for Americans in general. The way we knew that the war had begun was that we heard the police outside our windows setting up barriers in the street. That's how good Belgian security was and how quick they were. And they had done that elsewhere. I think that too was an interesting period.

Q: A subject that has been left off in most interviews, but which we should cover with senior officers, and particularly ambassadors, is their role in arms sales. How much was it used as a tool of making the country happy? How much was it a matter of selling American goods and what was the effect of these arms sales in the country?

GLITMAN: Well, in the case of Belgium, a NATO ally, it was a reason for us to try to make arms sales. Essentially, the reasons were two-fold. One, we were in an alliance together,

and it's in our interest—and in the interests of the other countries—that in the Alliance all of us be equipped with the best materials, weapons, and arms systems available. So I did work hard, with the defense attach#s and often directly with the defense minister and others to try to assure, for example, if the Belgians were trying to replace some electronic gear, that the American companies would have a fair shot at the market. The same circumstance applied (in a different way) for working out arrangements with the Belgians. They almost always wanted some Belgian company to have some part to play in this purchase. That was a relationship that had to be taken into account. I didn't negotiate these agreements myself, but the military did or officials would come from Washington. They were technical talk addressing the terms of what type of equipment would work best. I also worked hard to persuade the Belgians of the importance of keeping their equipment up to date. For example, I urged giving their pilots enough time to fly their airplanes. In that connection, I did fly on an American F-16. I was able to come back and tell the Defense Minister first hand, that their pilots were not meeting NATO standards. I think it is 120 hours of flying time a year. And my own personal reaction to being in that aircraft was that the complexity of the weapons systems was so great that the flying part had to be automatic. So if you were not flying a lot, you really couldn't do your job. I don't know if that persuaded him in any way, but it did have, I hope, some positive impact. He seemed to understand what I was saying.

I also accompanied the Chief of Staff and the Defense Minister on to the USS Eisenhower. Again, it was designed to demonstrate how we must have up to date equipment. We were not selling them any ships; that wasn't the point. But it was done to give them a sense of the U.S. presence. Some interesting things came out of that trip too, especially when I sensed some growing concern by some of the Europeans, about what was happening on the Mediterranean side of the European Union. This was particularly true regarding North Africa. That appreciation also came from that trip.

All of this activity was designed to give us a fair crack at it the arms sales market. We were trying to sell them helicopters, but the contract went to the Italians. It later developed

that there were accusations made against the Defense Minister and some of his political colleagues, that they had perhaps been influenced too much by the Italians, shall we say. I don't know how the court case ended, but they did go to court. It was a sad ending in a way.

I think the basic point is that it's perfectly legitimate for American ambassadors and senior officials to try to support American industry in this manner. It's not as if we were forcing this equipment on them. If we didn't make the sale, the French or the Germans or the British or the Italians would. Our main point was to make sure that we got a crack at the market.

Q: How about your general relationship with defense attach#s? Problems?

GLITMAN: Over the course of the years, I had frequent contacts with them, I had close contacts with them, beginning especially in Paris when Dick Walters was there as Defense Attach# for part of the time. And we exchanged notes on how we were approaching these problems. We did work as a team. There were things he could get into, being military, that I couldn't, and there were some things that I could get into as a civilian, both with the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry, that would have been more difficult for him to do. But we were all on the same team. I worked again with them in Brussels. Certainly at NATO when I was DCM, half of my staff was military. I enjoyed working with them. I think as I said before, they have a very positive attitude about getting things done. It doesn't mean that they overdo it, but they are generally easy to work with. At least I found it so.

Q: You mentioned your DCM. Would you tell us a bit about that?

GLITMAN: I meant myself as DCM at NATO.

Q: At any rate, here at this embassy setting, you had a DCM?

GLITMAN: I had two DCMs, both are good friends, were before and still are. Ron Woods was a DCM when I arrive at embassy Brussels. He and his wife Judy. We had been in

Paris together with them, so we knew them from there. They both did a splendid job representing the U.S. and served the embassy well while we were there. Ron went on to become DCM at London, a later assignment. Don McConnell and his wife Francis had been with us at NATO; when I was at NATO Don was on the staff there. They came and worked with us on the INF negotiations. When Ron was leaving, I had to make a choice. Another very able person who was with me in Brussels at the time was also a candidate. I like to pick people who don't necessarily act, react the way I do. I don't want someone reinforcing some of my habits, I want someone who looks at things differently, but Don I think is a very calm and thoughtful person. I wanted someone like that around me. I chose him and he came. His wife, Francis also with him. We still stay in touch. It worked out well. He stayed on with my replacement, Ambassador Gelb.

Q: So there were two people, Ron Woods, and Don McConnell? Alright. How about a few words on your representational allowance?

GLITMAN: We certainly used all that was allocated to us. The embassy gets a lump sum, and then it's up to the ambassador to distribute that. How much does the ambassador take of that, how much for the DCM? Then for the main sections, political, economic and others, eventually it gets down to the junior officers, and as I mentioned, when we were in Paris we were at the bottom of that line. At Brussels, we had enough. I have to say that I hope my colleagues thought they had a sufficient allowance. As far as I can recall, we certainly never had anything left over, but I think we had enough for what we were doing. I wouldn't complain about it in this case. I don't want to generalize, because I think in some posts they don't get enough. Certainly in our earlier days, Nassau, places like that, probably could have used a little more. But I have no complaints about it so far as Brussels is concerned.

Q: How about, as we are winding down on the ambassadorship in Brussels, any other comments about your embassy chancery or embassy residence? Anecdotes, whatever?

GLITMAN: Our residence, as I mentioned, is a superb building, and it helped the American image that we were in that building and that we keep it up as well as we have. I also noted that it was possible for me to go from the residence into the chancery without going outside. Well, also the incident there involving our dog Hercules demonstrates this ease of passage. Actually, the passage was not so easy. There were people watching me; Marines could see me. You didn't just walk through. In any case, Chris and I were off somewhere, I don't recall where, and when we got back we heard that Hercules had somehow managed to walk out of the residence and into the chancery, the office building, and wound up in the cafeteria, where he was busily caging food from everybody. After the initial shock, he was taken back, but that led to quite an investigation regarding how he managed to get through the building. It was a security issue. Anyway, that was another aspect of living near the office building.

Q: How about the social life at Brussels, diplomatic corps, NATO, and life in Brussels in general?

GLITMAN: Social life, as you might imagine, was constant. It was either a lunch or a dinner; if you were not giving one, you were going to one. As I tried to point out earlier, by and large it is work in another form and another forum. You are always trying to figure out how you can best make use of this event to forward U.S. interests—either in gathering information or in disseminating U.S. position and views. Or a combination of those objectives. Because most of the countries, or many, had three missions as we did, a mission to Belgium, a mission to NATO, and a mission to the European Union, that just multiplied the number of contacts and people involved in the diplomatic life. I had, as you know, worked in NATO and throughout the INF negotiations had been worked very closely with people at NATO or at capitals who would later find themselves at NATO. Earlier when I was doing trade work, I had a lot to do with the European Union. So we knew a lot of people who were at those two organizations as well. As a consequence, we spent a fair amount of time being invited to NATO events. For example, Secretary General W#rner

had us several times to his place at NATO. He was a wonderful man; he was a great supporter of the Alliance. Unfortunately, he was not able to fill his full term at NATO; he died, very sadly.

Again as I pointed out earlier, we already lived once in Brussels. So we pretty well knew our way around. The forest, For#t de Soignes that I mentioned earlier, wasn't at our back door any longer, but we did have vehicles available. We didn't bring a car to Brussels. It made no sense to have our own car because of the terrorism problem. The last thing you wanted to do was to have the same vehicle all the time. So, we would take vehicles from the embassy motor pool. We could then drive to the forest if we wanted. Basically, you went to the coast, or you went to the Ardennes, or you stayed around Brussels—those were your main choices. You could drive to Paris in a day, but it is a pretty full drive. You can get to Holland or over to Aachen. It was possible to do day trips, and we did a fair number of those on weekends. The one thing that I did work out was that I would use a different vehicle every weekend. We had no fixed itinerary on the weekend. We didn't know where we were going until we got into the car. The cars were either on the street next to the residence and the chancery (at the street there, about one block long) or they would put one in the basement of the chancery for me. The Marines would open the gate, lower the draw bridges, and then we'd shoot out. But I used a different vehicle, and I got to know lots of them. Including, on one occasion, the electrician had a little station wagon. It was okay. We took that one weekend. I could have taken the Cadillac with the body guards, and some of my predecessors had traveled that way, but I thought (a) I want some privacy, and (b) why pay for a driver? I though I had an equal chance by mixing up which vehicle we were taking and turning different directions. The alternative would have been to drive around with what I referred to as the “bull's eye,” a big black Cadillac. Because you can't sit in the “bull's eye” all the time, eventually you get to the coast or in the forest, you park it and get out and walk, anyway. The whole scene of chauffeurs with body guards was more than we wanted to put up with; so we took our chances. Fortunately, we are still here to talk about it.

We had seen a lot of Belgium. On our last weekend, we got out our Michelin Green Guide. “Where shall we go?” We could not find a place that was mentioned in there that we hadn't been to. I forget what we eventually chose.

There also was a lot of music in Brussels. As I said before, I like music a lot. We had many opportunities to enjoy it in Brussels. We had Rostropovich and his wife to lunch, along with one of our Belgian friends who had been ambassador to Moscow and was, at that point, head of one of the largest banks in Belgium. He was a remarkable man. Like many Belgians, he had excellent language skills. I don't know how many languages he spoke, but Belgians are very good at languages.

I don't know if I told you about how strong and good they were at commerce. I am sure I did tell you about chocolate. We also got to see the scientific activities that they were doing: environmental control; environmental clean-up; things that we now know must have put them ahead of their time. Different plants would take up certain chemicals and noxious, dangerous toxic chemicals, so you could grow some plants and not others; it was using nature to clean itself up. Very recently things are going on in this direction in the U.S.

Q: Certainly in theses times, an ambassador must consider terrorism. Can we have some words in this regard, especially on this issue: How recognizable would an ambassador be in a setting such as Brussels in Belgium?

GLITMAN: Given the size of the community, the answer is, especially if you are the American ambassador, very, very recognizable. We would often be out on the street or on the coast, for example, walking on the beach, and people would say hello. We didn't necessarily recognize them all the time. You have to sort of live with that. Or people sort of looking at you. They must know who you are, even if they don't say hello. I had been on television two or three times, discussing the Gulf War, for example; and an earlier talk show; and on radio as well. We would do it in French, of course, but with the Dutch language service, they had it translated. But you would become known from that as well.

And there were many speeches around town, for example, with the Belgian-American society or U.S. Chamber of Commerce; speaking was a pretty constant activity that would get me out of the embassy. You had to do your job. You just do it. I grew up in a large city so I had a certain amount of street-smarts. That was with me all the time. I never felt particularly stressed because of it, but I was always very careful.

I should just note that one of the people, who replaced me eventually in a job, the second person who replaced me at the job I had in the embassy in Paris had been followed by terrorists. We knew that. I won't go into how that was figured out, but to associate with that, other people had been shot at in Paris. This was after we had left there. But these events bring home the fact that so many of our colleagues are subject to terrorist attacks. It does bring it home. There were, while we were there, a number of events in Brussels, including bombings of diplomats. Not Americans, these were Arabs, I think, being bombed —Arab embassy people. Nevertheless, as a consequence, I suggested to Washington that we really ought to take a much closer look at Belgium. It wasn't that we were a target, but it was becoming obvious that terrorists were operating in the city, in Brussels, and also, more generally, in Belgium. We did take a hard look at it and raised the level of security, because if they can have troubles amongst themselves, they can also come after us.

One other point. After you live that way for a while, it's very hard to stop looking under the car for bombs. When we came home, there was a transition period during which I would find myself, unthinking, routinely, checking the car out. Chris would say, “You don't need to do this any longer.” Eventually, I got more or less over it. I still keep the doors locked when we leave the car.

Q: Would you know, generally speaking, do our ambassadors go through this in Oslo and Helsinki and Ankara, or does it vary widely?

GLITMAN: I think it certainly varies. If you are in certain places where there is a record of anti-American terrorist activity, you definitely are on your toes. But if you were in Kenya or

Dar es Salaam, you might not have expected anything, and that's of course where it hit, in its worst form. A lot depends on the individual, I suppose. How do you approach this threat? You see, my own approach was to live as normal a life as I could. But, I was on guard all the time. I tried not to be careless. Again, having grown up in a large city at least, you get that feel for what streets you really shouldn't turn down. You just need to look at it and say, “I am not going down this street, there is something about it. I may be wrong, but my instincts say stop.”

Q: Who replaced you as ambassador in Brussels?

GLITMAN: Gelb, Bruce S. Gelb. And Bruce Gelb had been the head of USIA. He went to Brussels and was replaced by Henry E. Catto, Jr., who was ambassador in London.

Q: Let me check dates here. You were appointed ambassador to Belgium July 15, 1988; you presented credentials on September, 28, 1988. What year did you leave post?

GLITMAN: In June 1991. It was a three-year assignment, and that was close enough to three years. We could talk a little bit about what happened afterwards?

Q: Yes.

GLITMAN: We had been overseas at this point for quite some time. As you know, I felt we hadn't gone overseas quickly enough when we came in, but at this point, we had been overseas for a while. The children were all more or less grown, but still, we missed opportunities to see them as often as we would like. I reached the point where I still didn't want very much to work in Washington. But at the same time, we really didn't want to go overseas again. So, I ended with a diplomat in residence assignment. Even there, Chris and I talked a bit about going to the University of Washington. We'd never been to the Northwest, but thought that we would like it and thought that maybe we would spend an academic year there. But, both of us concluded that we had moved enough at this point, and it was time to get closer to home, namely Vermont. So I offered to go there. Director

General Perkins was delighted that I chose Vermont because that was just the kind of place he wanted people to go: not to Ivy League schools and not in Washington area. We basically came home to Vermont. After that, the longer we stayed, the harder it was to go away. That's basically where we ended up.

Q: So you were Diplomat in Residence at the University of Vermont?

GLITMAN: Correct. That's where we stayed. I had one year, then I had a second year at it, and 1992 was an election year so nobody was going to move anywhere.

Q: You were here as Diplomat in Residence in 1991-92?

GLITMAN: Yes. Academic years. We stayed here a little longer, and eventually I retired here. We were home at that point. We had a house in Washington, and eventually we sold that. That really was the final break.

Q: I note in your curriculum vitae that you have some awards for meritorious service, distinguished public service, etc. Would you comment for us on these awards?

GLITMAN: Certainly. The Presidential Distinguished Public Service Award, which I received in 1989, was essentially for my work on INF. The Presidential Meritorious Service Awards in 1987 and 1984 had to do with NATO and, therefore, to some extent were also with the INF activity. I had two medals from the Department of Defense, during my time there. One in 1980 had to with my work on NATO issues. I am pleased that these are bi-partisan medals. The first one was from Donald Rumsfeld, who was Secretary of Defense. The second one, the Meritorious Service Medal, in 1981, was presented by Harold Brown when he was the Secretary of Defense. And that was largely my work at NATO. The 1988 Joseph C. Wilson Award, which is presented by the University of Rochester and the Rochester Association for the UN, is an award that is given once a year to the public servant who in their view made the greatest contribution to world peace and

world progress. As you can see, the award is in recognition of “distinguished and creative efforts to promote world peace.” That also was for INF. Those are the major ones.

Q: How do you see the Foreign Service as a career today?

GLITMAN: I'll answer that the way I answer my students. If you want to spend a major portion of your professional life working on foreign policy issues, in the field and/or back in Washington, then the Foreign Service as a career today is still a viable career. If you want to get to the top quickly, I would suggest you go into business or politics. Make a lot of money and buy yourself an ambassadorship. And, here is the beauty part. Lately, ambassadorships had been going for about $300,000/year. The job is now paying about $140,000/year. You get it for three years; you re-coop your expenses; and you come out ahead. I tell the students that. But you won't have spent your whole life doing this; you'd have spent your whole life on something else to accumulate the money so you could be an ambassador.

So, for an ordinary person—someone who wants to work in the field of foreign policy—the Foreign Service is an excellent option. It's not the only option. You can get into the civil service, and find jobs in foreign policy. And certainly you can get it in the military. We've had more than one general become Secretary of State. It's a different path, but you will find yourself engaged in foreign policy in the military as well. You would have to do some other things first, as a lieutenant, and so on, but eventually you could spend a good deal of your time in military service on international issues.

Let me give you an example of how things could work out. We've just gone through a serious crisis with China. Who were the three main players on the U.S. side in this crisis, the president aside? General Powell, Admiral Clear in China, and Mr. Armitage, another former military officer in the State Department as well. So there you have it. The first crisis of the Bush administration, and all three of the key players, and there might be others that I don't know about, I am only going with what I could see in the press—three key

players on the U.S. side were all former military. So, it is not an option that you should ignore; if you want to get into foreign policy, it's a viable one. But if you don't want to go that route, and again I say, if you want to spend your working life in foreign affairs, the Foreign Service is still a viable option. There are a lot of things that need to be improved—the least of which is to find some way to put a cap on political appointees.

The 1980 Foreign Service Act (although I don't have it in front of me) quite specifically singles out campaign contributions as something that must not be taken into account. It seems to me that a contribution of $300,000 followed by an appointment is prima facie evidence that the money in fact did influence the appointment. That seems to me to be contrary to the law. The law also says that, by and large, Foreign Service officers should be appointed ambassadors and, from time to time, other highly qualified people might also become ambassadors. We need to ask ourselves whether that clause of the law is being appropriately administered. Those are some of the frustrations you'd face if you chose Foreign Service. But, I still think that for many people it's the best way to get into area of enormous importance to our country and to the world, as well as being interesting work for oneself in the process.

Q: Anything you want to add?

GLITMAN: There is a French phrase: L'Esprit de l'Escalier, which effectively is usually translated as sort of the feeling you have as you are walking down the staircase after having had a conversation with someone and saying, “Oops, I wish I had thought of that!” In this case, I had a couple of those. More than a couple, but they'll be brief.

First, on the “undertakings.” I went on about that at some length about that particular word having been introduced into the treaty. I was looking through my copy of the treaty, and I couldn't find it. But I did find it at home. Just to try to make clear the issue here. The SALT II treaty has an article in it, Article 13, which says “Each party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this treaty.” What happened

in the INF treaty, in Article 14, was to add a word to that basic argument, and was that new word, I was confident, would attract the attention of the senators. So Article 14 of the INF treaty reads, “The party shall comply with the treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions.” See, “undertakings” appears to add another category of activities which would conflict with the treaty. My concern was that this could be pointed by the Soviets, directly at our programs of cooperation on nuclear weapons with our allies. In fact, as I think I may have pointed out, I was questioned quite extensively on the fact that this word had been put there. The individual who was primary source of that word, who put the word in there, escaped any questions on that issue.

Another small point. I mentioned a special commission set up to deal with verification; I think I called it the SCC. That has a similar task, but not for INF. It's the SVC, Special Verification Commission that we set up for INF.

You had asked me if any of my Fletcher classmates had ended in the Foreign Service, and I named a couple. I inadvertently left out Peter Lande, who went into the economic side. Our paths never crossed after we joined the Foreign Service; it was one of those odd things.

Another thing I wanted to discuss a bit is to give you a flavor of some of the problems we had in trying to get the Soviets to sit down and seriously negotiate with us. I referred to some of the Ambassador Obukhov's commentaries as “numbologues,” numbing monologues. He had this tendency, as I had said earlier and as I had been forewarned, to do that. On one occasion, he really did go on and on. I just decided to put an end to this. After he finished, I went on and on and on in a similar vein, and then I said, “As you can see, I can do that too, but there was really no value in this for either of us.” So I said, “Let's agree now that unless we are making real progress, these post-plenary discussions will end at one o'clock p.m. And Obukhov agreed. Nevertheless, on one occasion, as the clock was ticking off, he said to Medvedev in Russian, which our interpreter of course picked

up and whispered to us, he said “It's ten minutes until one. Keep on talking and use up all the remaining time.” I called him on that as well, and told him we don't need to play games here. Also, someone on the Soviet delegation told one of our team, during that endless post-plenary, that Obukhov was probably the source of the drawn-out session, and indeed he was.

I mentioned the wave of immigrants coming to us in Nassau. I think I related it to the Bay of Pigs, but, of course, it was the fall of the Batista government and the arrival of Castro that really set this off.

And lastly, I have to say, that while I did make a comment about Cubs not being any better then than they are today, in retrospect I was wrong. The Cubs were much better then, and they had won the National League Pennant, I believe, in 1945. Thank you.

End of interview